



# Security Council

Distr.: General  
10 December 2024

Original: English

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## United Nations Support Mission in Libya

### Report of the Secretary-General

#### I. Introduction

1. The present report, submitted pursuant to Security Council resolutions [2510 \(2020\)](#), [2542 \(2020\)](#), [2570 \(2021\)](#) and [2755 \(2024\)](#), covers political, security and economic developments in Libya. It provides an overview of the human rights and humanitarian situation in the country and of the activities of the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL). The report covers significant developments from 9 August to 4 December 2024.

#### II. Political, security-related and economic developments

2. The Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Political Affairs, Stephanie Koury, who is serving as Officer-in-Charge of UNSMIL, continued her efforts to engage with Libyan and international stakeholders to facilitate and advance the political process and lead the country towards inclusive presidential and legislative elections, in line with Security Council resolutions [2702 \(2023\)](#) and [2755 \(2024\)](#). UNSMIL assisted Libyan counterparts in addressing a series of political disputes, notably a crisis over the leadership of the Central Bank of Libya, urging restraint to avoid unilateral actions that could deepen tensions.

3. Beginning in August, the Libyan political landscape was affected by several overlapping crises that threatened the country's fragile stability. On 6 August, internal elections for the President of the High Council of State resulted in a narrow and contested outcome, and an ensuing leadership dispute deepened divisions within the Council. At the end of two rounds of voting, Khaled Mishri had received 69 out of a total of 139 votes, while Mohamed Takala had garnered 68. One blank ballot was invalidated and another was disputed. On 8 August, the Council's legal committee ruled that the contested ballot had been "cancelled", confirming that the final outcome was in favour of Mr. Mishri. Both Mr. Takala and Mr. Mishri filed appeals with the judiciary to resolve the dispute.

4. The High Council of State sought to complete internal elections for the remaining positions on 28 August, whereby Najji Mukhtar and Omar al-Obaidi were elected as First Vice-President and Second Vice-President, respectively. However, at the request of the Ministry of the Interior, the session was suspended on security grounds before voting for the rapporteur could take place.



5. On 12 November, Mr. Takala convened a session of the High Council of State to hold a revote for the position of Council President, which was reportedly attended by 73 out of a total 142 members. Mr. Takala was re-elected with 55 votes in favour, as were two deputies and a rapporteur. Mr. Mishri and his supporters boycotted the session and rejected its outcomes, reiterating that the vote held at the session held on 6 August remained valid. UNSMIL continued to engage with both sides to facilitate a solution that would preserve the unity of the High Council of State.
6. On 11 August, the Presidential Council issued a decree establishing a commission for referendums and surveys, with responsibility for conducting referendums on legislative, political or administrative issues. The House of Representatives, however, criticized the initiative in a statement on 12 August, maintaining that the Presidential Council lacked the powers to establish such an entity.
7. On 13 August, members of the House of Representatives met in Benghazi and voted to end the mandate of the Government of National Unity and the Presidential Council, stating that the only legitimate executive in Libya was its designated government headed by Oussama Hamad. The House of Representatives further appointed its Speaker, Aguila Saleh, as Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, thereby removing this authority from the Presidential Council. The session was marred by questions over whether the quorum had been met and reports that some members had been unable to attend owing to the cancellation of their flight from Tripoli. The Libyan National Army expressed support for the decision of the House of Representatives, while the Presidential Council, the Government of National Unity and the two contenders for the position of President of the High Council of State condemned it. In a statement on 14 August, UNSMIL expressed concern about unilateral actions by Libyan political actors and institutions that had increased tension, undermined trust and further entrenched institutional divisions.
8. Later in August, a dispute over the leadership of the Central Bank of Libya resulted in the rapid deterioration of political, economic and security conditions across Libya, particularly in Tripoli. On 18 August, the Presidential Council announced two decrees, dated 12 August, to implement a 2018 decision by the House of Representatives to appoint Mohamed Al-Shukri as Governor of the Central Bank and to establish a Board of Directors. The Central Bank of Libya, headed by the then Governor, Saddek Elkaber, rejected these decisions as legally void and suspended its operations. During a session of the House of Representatives held on 19 August, the Speaker of the House, Mr. Saleh, stated that the Presidential Council did not have authority over sovereign institutions. The High Council of State also dismissed the decrees of the Presidential Council. On 22 August, Mr. Al-Shukri declined his appointment as Governor of the Central Bank, citing the need for consensus between the House of Representatives and the High Council of State. The Presidential Council announced the appointment of an acting governor on 26 August.
9. On 25 August, after Mr. Elkaber had left the country, a committee established by the Presidential Council, together with the acting governor of the Central Bank appointed by the Council, entered the headquarters of the Central Bank in Tripoli to take control of its operations. In response to these developments, on 26 August, the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the House of Representatives-designated government separately announced the suspension of oil production and exports. The Speaker, Mr. Saleh, announced that this suspension would continue until the Governor of the Central Bank was reinstated.
10. The Central Bank crisis led to a surge in tension between armed groups in Tripoli and the western region as they aligned with opposing sides of the dispute. In a statement on 22 August, UNSMIL expressed concern about armed mobilization in densely populated areas of Tripoli, urging restraint and calling for dialogue to resolve

the crisis peacefully. In an encouraging development on 23 August, the acting Minister of the Interior, Imad al-Trabulsi, announced that regular security forces would replace all irregular units previously deployed in key areas of the city, including at the Central Bank headquarters. The following day, the Prime Minister of the Government of National Unity, Abdulhamid Al Dabiba, established a High Committee for Security Arrangements to oversee the withdrawal of irregular units, in order to help to ease tensions and reduce military presence around the Central Bank premises.

11. In a statement on 26 August, UNSMIL called upon all relevant parties to reach a peaceful resolution of the crisis based on existing political agreements, applicable laws and the principle of the Central Bank's independence, as well as to ensure the continuity of public services. UNSMIL also called for the suspension of all unilateral actions regarding the Central Bank, the lifting of the force majeure on oil fields, an immediate halt to further escalation and a commitment to refrain from the use of force.

12. From 9 to 11 September, the Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, Rosemary DiCarlo, visited Libya and met with political, military and civil society leaders in Tripoli, Benghazi and Qubbah. The discussions explored ways to overcome the political deadlock regarding national elections and advance a national reconciliation process. She urged the resolution of the disputes concerning the leadership of the Central Bank and of the High Council of State and progress towards the reunification of the country's military and security institutions.

13. In September, the Deputy Special Representative facilitated negotiations between the Presidential Council, the House of Representatives and the High Council of State aimed at resolving the Central Bank leadership crisis. She also engaged other Libyan representatives, as well as international partners, advocating a solution grounded in the Libyan Political Agreement, applicable laws and international standards to ensure the impartiality, independence and integrity of the Central Bank. On 26 September, delegates of the House of Representatives and the High Council of State reached agreement, through talks facilitated by UNSMIL, on the appointment of Naji Mohammed Issa Belgasem as Governor of the Central Bank and Maree Moftah al-Baraasi as Deputy Governor. The agreement also included provisions on good governance and the appointment of a Board of Directors of the Central Bank.

14. The new Governor and Deputy Governor of the Central Bank of Libya were sworn in on 1 October following a vote in the House of Representatives and consultation with the High Council. On 3 October, the National Oil Corporation announced the lifting of the force majeure, thereby enabling the full resumption of oil operations and exports. On 21 October, the presidency of the House of Representatives issued a decision to appoint the Board of Directors of the Central Bank. The full Board held its first meeting on 10 November.

#### **A. International Follow-up Committee on Libya of the Berlin process**

15. The International Follow-up Committee on Libya of the Berlin process and its working groups continued to provide support to the intra-Libyan dialogue tracks.

16. On 6 and 7 October, the Co-Chairs of the working group on international humanitarian law and human rights (Netherlands (Kingdom of the), Switzerland and the United Nations) convened a round-table discussion in Geneva, hosted by the Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies under the auspices of the Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association, which was attended by several Libyan partners. The discussion was focused on how to unify existing draft laws on protection of the right to freedom of association, in line with article 22 of the

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, for the consideration of legislative authorities.

17. UNSMIL continued to support the security working group as a forum for coordinating international efforts to facilitate progress on the implementation of the 2020 ceasefire agreement and other security priorities. On 17 October, the security working group held a plenary meeting with the participation of the 5+5 Joint Military Commission in Sirte, the first plenary meeting of the working group since July 2023. The members of the Commission highlighted the need to advance the political process and the reunification of military institutions, as well as the categorization of armed groups and the withdrawal of foreign forces, foreign fighters and mercenaries from Libya. They also sought further support from UNSMIL to strengthen demining capacity in eastern and western Libya.

## **B. International and regional engagement**

18. UNSMIL worked with international partners to overcome the political impasse in Libya through a United Nations-facilitated political process. In addition to briefings to the diplomatic community in Tripoli on 18 August and 8 October, the Deputy Special Representative met bilaterally with representatives of the international community in Tripoli and in Tunis. She emphasized the need to preserve the unity, integrity and independence of the country's sovereign institutions and advocated a coordinated international approach to support Libya.

19. The Deputy Special Representative met with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Migration and Tunisians Abroad, Mohamed Ali Nafti, in Tunis on 13 September and discussed the need for stability and the advancement of a political process in Libya. On 18 September, she met with Italian officials in Rome and discussed the Central Bank of Libya crisis and the need for dialogue as the path to sustainable solutions. On 26 September, she gave a remote briefing to representatives of Algeria, Egypt, France, Germany, Italy, Morocco, Qatar, Türkiye, the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America regarding her efforts to help address the leadership crises of the Central Bank of Libya and the High Council of State and sought coordinated international support to advance the political process. The Deputy Special Representative visited Qatar on 13 October and the United Arab Emirates on 14 October to discuss with officials a more coordinated and unified approach in support of the political process in Libya.

20. On 10 and 11 October, the President of Mauritania and Chair of the African Union, Mohamed Ould Cheikh El Ghazouani, the Chairperson of the African Union Commission, Moussa Faki Mahamat, and the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of the Congo, Jean-Claude Gakosso, visited Libya and discussed with the President of the Presidential Council, Mohamed Younis Menfi, the Vice-President of the Council, Abdullah al-Lafi, and the Prime Minister, Mr. Al Dabiba, ways to promote national reconciliation in Libya, including through the adoption of a charter on national reconciliation. A statement by the African Union on 12 October indicated that a delegation of the African Union would proceed with its planned visit to eastern Libya as soon as schedules permitted.

## **C. Security situation**

### **Tripoli and western Libya**

21. The security situation in western Libya remained highly volatile, with ongoing competition among armed groups over territorial control leading to various incidents.

On 27 August, near the Ra's Judayr border crossing, armed clashes were reported between Zuwara armed forces and forces of the Western Coast Military Region affiliated with the Ministry of Defence, after the Zuwara armed forces demanded that the Western Coastal Military Region forces withdraw from the border crossing. According to unconfirmed reports, the clashes led to civilian casualties and temporary road closures.

22. In Zawiyah, the security situation deteriorated after former coast guard commander Abd Al-Rahman al-Milad (also known as al-Bija) was killed on 1 September. Following an arrest warrant for involvement in the killing, the leader of an armed group, Mohamed Bahrin (also known as Al Far), reportedly surrendered and was detained on 5 September. On 7 October, reports indicated that he had escaped detention and fled abroad. Al Far was returned to Libya and held in detention in Tripoli, awaiting trial. Meanwhile, tensions related to the killing of al-Milad and the detention of Al Far persisted in the Zawiyah area, with military movements and sporadic clashes, including on 12 September, when the Zawiyah-based 52nd Brigade clashed with the Warshafanah-based 55th Brigade near Zawiyah, reportedly leading to three fatalities.

23. In the Hamada area south-east of Zintan, armed clashes broke out on 24 October between a Zintan-based unit of the Petroleum Facilities Guard and elements of the 444th Brigade, after the 444th Brigade reportedly entered territory controlled by the Zintan-based group with the stated intent of conducting anti-smuggling operations. Several individuals of the 444th Brigade were detained by the Petroleum Facilities Guard. Confrontations resumed and additional members of the 444th Brigade have been detained in the area, most recently on 6 November. On 11 November, the Commander of the 444th Brigade met with the head of the Zintan Revolutionaries Military Council and agreed to improve coordination, while the Zintan Military Council expressed willingness to support future anti-smuggling operations by the 444th Brigade in the Hamada area.

24. On 6 November, the Director of the Central Security Department at the Libyan Intelligence Service was abducted by unknown armed men in Tripoli. The Libyan Intelligence Service and the Zintan Revolutionaries Military Council issued separate statements denouncing the abduction, with the latter holding the Government of National Unity responsible. The incident was followed by armed mobilizations and tense protests in Zintan, while a Zintan-based armed group shut off a gas pipeline valve connecting the Sharara and Fil oil fields to the Zawiyah refinery. On 12 November, the Libyan Intelligence Service confirmed the release of the Director, without providing further details.

### **Eastern and southern Libya**

25. On 7 August, large convoys of Libyan National Army armoured vehicles deployed from eastern Libya to Shuwayrif, in the vicinity of the ceasefire line, and continued towards the south-western areas near the border with Algeria. In response, western Libyan forces, including from Zintan, mobilized and issued warnings against any moves by the Libyan National Army towards Ghadamis and its surrounding area. In a statement on 8 August, the Libyan National Army stressed that its military movements were solely intended to enhance security along the country's south-western borders with Algeria, Chad and the Niger. In an effort to defuse tensions, UNSMIL facilitated communications between the Libyan National Army and the Government of National Unity.

26. On 16 August, the 128th Brigade of the Libyan National Army deployed reinforcements to the Kilinja mountains area near the border with Chad, with the stated intention of commencing operations against smuggling and trafficking

operations. However, clashes with the local 129th Infantry Battalion of the Libyan National Army were reported from 17 August to 1 September, allegedly due to suspicions of the latter's involvement in cross-border gold smuggling. At least four combatants were reportedly killed and several others injured in the clashes, which resulted in the 128th Brigade gaining control over checkpoints in the Kilinja mountains area.

#### **Violent extremist organizations and organized criminal networks**

27. Violent extremist organizations reportedly continued to operate across Libya, providing logistical and financial support for their activities in the Sahel. Smuggling and trafficking in persons continued to be major revenue streams for both violent extremist organizations and criminal networks, indicating a possible convergence of interests. In parallel, Libyan security forces, including the western Libya-based 444th Brigade and the Libyan National Army, continued operations aimed at countering the smuggling of drugs, weapons and fuel at locations including Misrata, Benghazi and along the border with Chad.

### **D. Economic situation**

28. The crisis over the leadership of the Central Bank had a deeply destabilizing impact on the economic and financial situation in Libya. Following the declaration of force majeure by the National Oil Corporation for the Shahara oil field on 7 August, Fil oil field on 2 September and the Sidr export terminal on 12 September, Libyan oil exports had reportedly decreased to around 194,000 barrels per day by early September. Concurrently, the Libyan dinar depreciated from 7.1 to 8.0 dinars to the United States dollar in the parallel market, compared with the official rate of 4.8 Libyan dinars.

29. Following the agreement of 26 September and the subsequent lifting of force majeure by the National Oil Corporation on 3 October, the Libyan dinar rose to 6.2 dinars to the dollar in the parallel market and further strengthened to 5.9 dinars to the dollar by the end of October, as the Central Bank eased restrictions on foreign currency sales, lifted the limits on cash withdrawals from commercial banks and removed caps on internal bank transfers. Oil production rose to around 500,000 barrels per day in late September and had returned to the pre-crisis level of around 1.3 million barrels per day by 13 October. The partial disruption of oil production was estimated to have caused a loss of approximately \$1.4 billion.

30. During the Central Bank crisis, the international banking system largely halted transactions with Libya, which threatened to destabilize imports of essential goods. The World Food Programme reported a significant increase in food prices across Libya in August and September, and the western region saw the largest increases, 4.2 per cent in August and 3.5 per cent in September. Prices also remained high in southern Libya owing to the impact of military operations and heavy rains in September that disrupted supply chains to the area. Kufrah in the south-east experienced the highest spike, with prices rising 13.4 per cent above the national average, exacerbated by the influx of Sudanese refugees, which increased demand.

31. The Central Bank of Libya incrementally extended the deadline for replacing the 50 Libyan dinar banknotes with other denominations and eliminating counterfeit notes, from August 2024 to April 2025, following reports of related logistical challenges. Separately, despite court rulings in April and July to halt the temporary surcharge on official foreign exchange sales, the Central Bank continued to apply the surcharge. On 6 October, the Speaker of the House of Representatives issued a decision to reduce the surcharge on the official exchange rate from 27 per cent to

20 per cent for all transactions. The Government of National Unity and the Presidential Council criticized this decision and urged the immediate implementation of the court rulings to halt the surcharge. On 20 November, the Speaker further reduced the surcharge to 15 per cent.

### III. Electoral support

32. The High National Elections Commission, supported by UNSMIL and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), continued preparations for local elections in 60 municipalities. By early September, 90 per cent of the nearly 210,000 printed voter cards had been collected by registered voters. The final voter list was published, comprising 186,055 registered voters, 30 per cent of whom were women. From 18 August to 14 September, candidates were able to submit nominations either individually or as part of a list; municipal councils range in size from 7 to 11 seats, depending on population data, with reserved seats for women and persons with disabilities. In 10 municipalities, candidate lists were required to include members of the Tebu and Tuareg communities.

33. On 27 October, following the vetting process conducted by the Ministry of the Interior, the Office of the Prosecutor and other relevant entities, the High National Elections Commission published the final lists of candidates, with a total of 2,331 candidates, including 487 women and 386 persons with disabilities. Elections in Jadidah and Zawia Wassat municipalities in western Libya were postponed, to be included in the next round of municipal council elections, as they had not received eligible lists of candidates.

34. The High National Elections Commission accredited 111 civil society organizations to observe the elections, with 1,375 national observers, including 346 women, as well as 4,929 persons authorised by candidates to observe the process on their behalf, including 1,340 women. Additionally, 79 media representatives were accredited to cover the elections.

35. On 16 November, voting took place across 58 municipalities, with 77 per cent voter turnout. The largest municipal election in this round was in Misratah (27,461 registered voters). Polling proceeded smoothly and all 352 polling centres were fully operational. The Deputy Special Representative visited a polling station in Qasr Bin Ghashir district, south of Tripoli, as well as the High National Elections Commission central operations room in Tripoli. Following the elections, several Libyan leaders, including the President of the Presidential Council, Mr. Menfi, the Prime Minister, Mr. Al Dabiba, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, Mr. Saleh, and the two contenders for the position of President of the High Council of State, Mr. Takala and Mr. Mishri, welcomed the peaceful conduct of municipal elections as a sign of the Libyan people's desire to participate in political decision-making through their elected representatives. The High National Elections Commission announced the preliminary results on 24 November. The final results will be announced following the completion of court challenges and appeals.

36. On 13 October, the High National Elections Commission published decision no. 110, announcing the start of the electoral process for a second group of 59 municipalities in January 2025, which would include Benghazi and Tripoli. The Commission also requested that the Government of National Unity allocate the funding necessary to allow for timely implementation of the electoral process.

## **IV. Security sector support and the implementation of the ceasefire agreement**

37. UNSMIL continued to support the implementation of the Libyan Ceasefire Agreement, including by engaging with the 5+5 Joint Military Commission. On 25 August, the Deputy Special Representative met with the members of the Commission in Sirte, where she stressed the crucial role of the Commission in upholding the ceasefire agreement and discussed options for further support, including on the issue of the withdrawal of foreign forces, foreign fighters and mercenaries from Libya.

38. Meeting with the members of the 5+5 Joint Military Commission in Benghazi on 9 September, the Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs stressed that the Commission must remain united and continue efforts to reinforce the implementation of the ceasefire agreement, address the presence of foreign forces, foreign fighters and mercenaries, and promote the reunification of Libyan security institutions.

39. Progress on the withdrawal of foreign forces, foreign fighters and mercenaries remained stalled owing to the prevailing political divisions among Libyan actors and the fragile regional security situation. In a meeting with UNSMIL on 8 October, members of the liaison committees from Chad, the Niger and the Sudan emphasized the need for a joint border management strategy with Libya and requested to meet with the 5+5 Joint Military Commission to discuss regional security threats posed by mercenaries and foreign fighters.

40. As part of efforts to build an environment conducive to peaceful elections, UNSMIL organized a workshop in Tripoli on 30 and 31 October on the role of civil society in promoting election security. Participants included officials from the High National Elections Commission and the Ministry of the Interior, election security officials from eastern and western Libya and civil society groups from across the country, including women's and youth organizations. The workshop contributed to building trust among participating institutions and civil society groups.

### **A. Support for Libyan planning for interim security arrangements and the unification of security institutions**

41. On 26 and 27 August, UNSMIL organized a workshop in Tunis on security sector reform and governance for members of the committees for defence and national security of the House of Representatives and the High Council of State, officials from the Ministries of Defence and Interior, the Counter-terrorism Office of the Presidential Council and military prosecutors from eastern and western Libya. The workshop focused on strengthening the role of the legislature in security sector reform. The committees issued a joint statement in which they called for separating security and military functions and reviewing security sector laws in accordance with international standards, and urged UNSMIL to facilitate further dialogue on achieving a unified executive authority.

42. On 14 August, the Prime Minister, Mr. Al Dabiba, who continued to serve as acting Minister of Defence, endorsed a code of conduct, developed with UNSMIL assistance, to promote professionalism and accountability within the armed forces and security agencies. Further to a previous workshop on the code of conduct convened in May 2024 (see [S/2024/598](#), para. 10), UNSMIL organized a second workshop in Tunis on 5 and 6 November in coordination with the Ministry of Defence and the Libyan National Army for ministerial officials and security actors, which was focused



on the implementation of the code of conduct and securing commitment from participants to this end. On 11 November, the code of conduct was circulated for implementation by all security units of the Government of National Unity.

43. Concurrently with the code of conduct workshop, UNSMIL organized a two-day event on border security and the prevention of violent extremism, convening military and police officers from the Libyan National Army, counter-terrorism units and police departments from both eastern and western Libya in the first such joint border control meeting since 2014. Participants underscored that measures to strengthen security and stability in border areas needed to be accompanied by development projects and other efforts to promote the well-being of the local population in these areas.

## **B. Mine action and arms and ammunition management**

44. Since the beginning of 2024, 17 fatalities and 26 injuries from landmines and explosive remnants of war were reported, raising serious concerns about the widespread contamination from landmines and explosive remnants of war in Libya. On 18 August, an explosion at the Sabriyah munition camp in Tajura', east of Tripoli, resulted in six fatalities and caused moderate damage to nearby buildings. On 19 August, a hand grenade detonated in a house in Qasr Bin Ghashir in southern Tripoli, killing a man and injuring a boy. On 20 August, a boy died when an item of unexploded ordnance detonated in Bani Walid. On 4 September, two military officers were killed in an ammunition explosion during a training exercise in the Dufan area, between Zlitan and Misratah. On 9 September, a projectile explosion near Salah al-Din claimed the lives of two men. On 18 September, explosive remnants of war were discovered in Saadi village, near Tripoli, prompting police to secure the site and safely transfer the ordnance for destruction. On 30 September, a boy was killed and another injured in an ordnance explosion in the Shuqayqah area, near Mizdah. On 17 October a girl died in an accident involving explosive remnants of war in Tobruk. On 7 and 8 November, two anti-tank mine explosions near Waddan killed one civilian and injured four others.

45. In response to such continued threats, UNSMIL provided technical support to 14 explosive ordnance risk education teams from local and international non-governmental organizations that delivered 530 risk education sessions, reaching 4,381 beneficiaries in locations including Tripoli, Awbari, Zawiyah, Gharyan, Murzuq and Tawurghah.

46. On 11 October in Tunis, UNSMIL and the Libyan Mine Action Centre co-chaired the third quarterly meeting of mine action implementing partners, during which the Libyan Mine Action Centre reported on the requirements presented by the Libyan National Army for the resumption of demining operations in eastern Libya.

## **V. Human rights, transitional justice and the rule of law**

47. The dispute between the House of Representatives in Benghazi and the Supreme Court in Tripoli over efforts by the House to establish a constitutional court based in Benghazi continued. On 23 September, the Second Deputy Speaker of the House and several other members of the House of Representatives administered the oath to eight judges who would serve at the new constitutional court. On 1 October, the Supreme Court rejected these appointments. It should be recalled that in May 2023, the Supreme Court had ruled that a law adopted by the House of Representatives in March 2023 to establish a Benghazi-based constitutional court was unconstitutional (S/2023/589, para. 45).

48. During the reporting period, the eastern and western branches of the Internal Security Agency released over 20 individuals who had been arbitrarily detained in Benghazi and Tripoli after peacefully exercising their right to freedom of expression or following accusations of having transgressed Islamic values.

49. As part of efforts to enhance outreach in eastern Libya, UNSMIL organized four workshops in Benghazi, hosted by the Military Academy for Strategic and Security Sciences affiliated with the Libyan National Army, to train military judges, prosecutors, military police officers and military intelligence staff on international human rights standards and mechanisms in areas such as the treatment of prisoners and transitional justice. Overall, the training reached 82 practitioners, including 6 women.

50. In collaboration with the Ministry of Justice, UNSMIL also trained 31 judicial police officials from western Libya, including 16 female officers, on international standards for the treatment of prisoners and women prisoners as well as on non-custodial measures for women offenders in the Libyan correctional system. In addition, UNSMIL organized a workshop in Tunis on 1 and 2 October for 12 military prosecutors from western Libya, including 2 female prosecutors, on human rights and protection in investigations related to terrorism and organized crime.

51. On 3 and 4 October, UNSMIL conducted a workshop in Tunis for 16 human rights defenders from across Libya, including 6 women, on enhancing the prevention of and response to conflict-related sexual violence, as part of efforts to combat conflict-related sexual violence in Libya. Participants focused on identifying forms of conflict-related sexual violence; the importance of adopting a dedicated law on violence against women; and regional and international best practices on data collection.

#### **A. Transitional justice and national reconciliation**

52. On 30 August, to mark the International Day of the Victims of Enforced Disappearances, UNSMIL and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights launched a report in Tarhuna that documented extensive human rights violations and atrocity crimes committed by the Kaniyat armed group and allied groups in the city between 2013 and 2020. In the report, the need for accountability and truth-seeking, including the continuation of mass grave excavations, as well as the provision of psychosocial support and reparations to victims, was emphasized.

53. On 4 October, the International Criminal Court unsealed six arrest warrants related to alleged war crimes committed in Tarhunah. The individuals named in the arrest warrants also remained subject to arrest warrants issued by the Attorney General of Libya. Their exact whereabouts are unknown.

54. After the High Council of State rejected, in May, a draft law on transitional justice and reconciliation prepared by the Presidential Council and the House of Representatives with UNSMIL support, UNSMIL, in cooperation with the African Union, continued to engage with Libyan stakeholders to promote the adoption of a unified law promoting victim-centred transitional justice, in line with the guidance note of the Secretary-General on transitional justice. To this end, UNSMIL met with members of the House of Representatives and provided comments on various draft laws to bring them into line with best practices of transitional justice, and facilitated a meeting between the House of Representatives, the High Council of State and the Presidential Council to reach an agreement on a consensual version of the draft law on reconciliation that would respond to the long-standing grievances and needs of victims.

55. In order to address grievances relating to missing persons in Libya, from 2 to 8 September, UNSMIL and UNDP, through their joint three-year programme for the period 2023–2026, provided capacity-building training for officials of the Ministries of Justice and Social Affairs. From 2 to 4 October, with support from the International Commission on Missing Persons, UNSMIL and UNDP held a forum in Tunis with civil society organizations from Iraq, Lebanon, Libya and the Syrian Arab Republic to enhance advocacy efforts for missing persons and share lessons learned. The event culminated in a commitment to create a national network on missing persons in Libya.

## **B. Unlawful deprivation of liberty, detention and torture**

56. Enforced disappearances as well as arbitrary arrests and detention continued throughout Libya, contributing to a climate of fear. At least 12 individuals, including 2 children, were forcibly disappeared by the Internal Security Agency in western Libya following a demonstration in Zlitan on 1 September. Confessions were extracted from some of them, some of which were shared on social media. The eastern branch of the Internal Security Agency was implicated in the abduction from 18 September to 23 October of a female journalist from Benghazi, whose parents were also detained from 16 to 24 October.

57. On 26 September, the Office of the Attorney General ordered the arrest of five members of the Deterrence Apparatus for Combating Organized Crime and Terrorism and three members of the Internal Security Agency. The order followed the reported death of a man in custody after his arrest by the Deterrence Apparatus on 22 September, as well as an attempt by the Internal Security Agency to unlawfully detain a member of the High Council of State.

58. In the context of the Central Bank crisis, the Criminal Investigations Department of the Ministry of the Interior, the Facilities Security Authority of the Prime Minister and the Internal Security Agency were reportedly involved in temporary abductions of five Central Bank employees and supporters of the then-Governor of the Bank, Mr. Elkaber, with the individuals being held in some cases for a few days between 18 and 27 August.

59. UNSMIL continued to document systematic violations of due process and the right to a fair trial, including inadequate legal representation; procedural delays, caused by detained individuals not being brought to court to attend hearings; and frequent adjournments, which contributed to prolonged pretrial detention. On 1 October, the Permanent Military Tribunal in Tripoli sentenced a member of the House of Representatives to 10 years and 6 months in prison after a trial marked by due process violations, including unclear charges and a lack of access to legal representation, following his arbitrary arrest and detention by the Deterrence Apparatus for Combating Organized Crime and Terrorism in February 2023.

## **C. Migrants and refugees**

60. Libya remained a country of destination and transit for migrants and refugees. According to the International Organization for Migration (IOM), the number of migrants in Libya stood at 787,326 as at October 2024. Between 10 August and 30 November, the Libyan Coast Guard intercepted 7,516 migrants and refugees attempting to cross the Mediterranean Sea from Libya. From 1 January to 30 November, the Libyan Coast Guard intercepted 20,839 migrants and refugees at sea and returned them to Libya, with 600 persons reported dead and 838 missing. Migrants and refugees who disembarked at Libyan ports to which United Nations humanitarian agencies have access, received critical humanitarian assistance.

61. As at 1 December, 5,471 migrants and refugees, including 4,529 men, 856 women and 356 children, were being arbitrarily detained in official detention centres throughout Libya. As at 4 December, armed groups operated six unofficial detention centres where approximately 3,000 people were estimated to be arbitrarily detained and to which United Nations agencies, funds and programmes do not have access.

62. The movement, pushback or expulsion of migrants and asylum-seekers into Libya from Algeria and Tunisia continued, near the areas of Assah, Nalut, Tiji and Ghadamis. From June 2023 to 28 November 2024, a total of 12,010 migrants and refugees were intercepted at the border with Tunisia by forces from the Ministry of the Interior of Libya and the Libyan Border Guard. As at 28 November, the Libyan Border Guard had intercepted 509 migrants and refugees at the Libya-Algeria border who had been expelled from Algeria. Libyan authorities continued to transfer people to facilities where they were arbitrarily detained and reportedly subjected to human rights violations, including the Assah detention facility operated by the Libyan Border Guard, detention centres operated by the Directorate for Combating Illegal Migration in Tripoli and Bi'r al-Ghanam, an unofficial detention centre. As at 28 November, the Ministry of Interior and the Libyan Border Guard reported "hosting" 357 migrants and individuals in need of international protection in Assah (including 318 men, 25 women and 14 children) and 35 migrants and individuals in need of protection in Ghadamis (including 24 men, 10 women and 1 child).

63. As at 1 December, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) had registered 36,144 Sudanese refugees (11,423 men, 8,433 women, 8,843 boys and 7,445 girls) out of an estimated 180,000 total refugees arriving in Libya since the conflict in the Sudan began in April 2023. Most Sudanese refugees reached Kufrah through irregular crossings along the southern border of Libya, mostly from the Sudan or indirectly through Chad, while a minority made their way from Egypt. As at 1 December, the total number of Sudanese refugees registered in Libya was 55,297, including both those who had arrived before and after the start of the conflict in the Sudan in April 2023. Local authorities in Kufrah continued to provide significant assistance, including access to public health services and education enrolment. However, further support was needed for local communities receiving Sudanese refugees elsewhere in the country, including in coastal cities.

#### **D. Groups in vulnerable situations**

64. With support from UNSMIL, the Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict visited Libya from 31 August to 11 September. During the visit, UNSMIL facilitated interviews with civil society and other key stakeholders to discuss the denial of humanitarian access to children across Libya.

### **VI. Empowerment of women**

65. In August and September, UNSMIL conducted a series of focus group discussions for a study on the challenges faced by women running for elections in Libya. A total of 41 women, who had registered as electoral candidates in 2021, participated in person or online. The study highlighted continued barriers to women's political participation, including restrictive cultural norms, financial constraints and bureaucratic delays. The study recommended capacity-building for women candidates, including on public speaking, campaign management and digital outreach, and highlighted the importance of establishing platforms to connect women involved in public affairs across the country.

66. In a meeting with the Deputy Special Representative on 17 August in Tripoli, women from municipal councils highlighted ongoing challenges faced by women in local governance. Representatives reported being subjected to verbal and physical abuse, including threats to their families, as well as being excluded from key municipal activities or decisions.

## **VII. Youth and peace and security**

67. From 12 August to 8 December, in line with its youth empowerment strategy, UNSMIL held 15 online and in-person workshops in Tripoli and Sabha with 469 young people from across Libya, including 238 women. In order to amplify youth voices, UNSMIL produced digital content for dissemination in support of recommendations shared by the participants, in which they emphasized the need for youth inclusion and engagement in political and decision-making processes and the importance of supporting youth-led initiatives and equipping youth with the necessary skills to become effective advocates for change. A survey of the attendees showed that 81 per cent reported an increase in their knowledge of the topics that were covered.

68. Following the conclusion of the first edition of the “Ra’idat” programme in June, which equipped 30 young women from diverse backgrounds from across Libya with skills in communications, leadership and advocacy, UNSMIL launched the second edition of the programme on 20 October, in partnership with the United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (UN-Women), UNDP and the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF). The second edition will benefit 35 young Libyan women from across the country. The first sessions, held in October in Tripoli, were focused on developing skills in communications, leadership, teamwork, advocacy and human rights. In addition, UNSMIL provided training for 100 young women that was focused on communications, leadership and women’s empowerment.

## **VIII. Humanitarian situation and development**

69. On 16 August, severe rainfall and flooding affected Ghat and Tahala in southwestern Libya, displacing over 7,000 people, according to IOM. Among those displaced, 4,346 Libyans were housed in camps and informal shelters, while 2,745 migrants were hosted by relatives and friends. The United Nations country team and its humanitarian partners promptly delivered medical supplies and non-food items and coordinated with local authorities to provide additional aid, including drinking water.

70. From 1 to 4 September, the former Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator, Georgette Gagnon, led an inter-agency mission to the city of Darnah and its surrounding communities. The mission marked the one-year commemoration of Storm Daniel and served to assess the progress made in United Nations-supported humanitarian and recovery efforts, and allowed for engagement with key stakeholders.

### **Coordination of international assistance**

71. Since July, United Nations assistance was provided to over 92,000 Sudanese refugees in Libya through the Sudan Regional Refugee Response Plan, launched in July 2024. The plan aimed to support 195,000 beneficiaries, including 149,000 Sudanese refugees, 1,000 third-country nationals and 45,000 members of host communities in Libya, focusing on health, nutrition, protection, including intervention

and assistance to survivors of sexual and gender-based violence, and food security. As at 31 October, the \$48.6 million budget for the plan was 52 per cent funded.

## **IX. Deployment of the Mission and security arrangements**

72. UNSMIL maintained an average presence of around 314 civilian staff members, comprising 102 national staff, 208 international staff and 4 United Nations Volunteers. Of those, 292 staff were stationed in Tripoli, 19 in Tunis, 2 in Benghazi and 1 in Sabha. UNSMIL also maintained four government-provided personnel, one located in Tripoli and three in Tunis. UNSMIL international staff and its offices continued to be accommodated at the Oea compound in Tripoli, protected by 230 troops of the United Nations Guard Unit. UNSMIL also provided two security officers on a rotational basis to support the United Nations hub in Benghazi.

## **X. Observations and recommendations**

73. I welcome the UNSMIL-facilitated agreement between the House of Representatives and the High Council of State on the Central Bank of Libya, as well as the steps taken to implement it, including the swearing-in of the new Central Bank leadership and the establishment of a Board of Directors. It is crucial that Libyan State institutions remain free from political interference. The country's economic resources should not be used for political gains and must be managed through proper institutional frameworks to the benefit of the people of Libya.

74. The resolution of the Central Bank crisis and the appointment of a Board of Directors present an opportunity to address urgent economic and financial challenges, which will be required in order to improve stability, build trust among stakeholders and restore national unity. Further tangible progress is needed towards the reunification and good governance of the Central Bank, in line with recommendations from the UNSMIL-facilitated international audit of the Central Bank and the article IV consultation process of the International Monetary Fund. UNSMIL will continue to engage with the Libyan parties towards reaching consensus on a unified national budget and to enhance the equitable, transparent and accountable disbursement of State funds.

75. The resolution of the Central Bank crisis demonstrated that Libyan parties working together can overcome their political differences and reach compromises in line with the interests and aspirations of the people of Libya. I urge all Libyan stakeholders to engage constructively and resolve disputes through UNSMIL-facilitated dialogue so as to clear the path for the holding of elections. Unilateral actions will only further weaken Libyan unity and sovereignty, deepen the political stalemate and divert attention from the task of unifying State institutions and achieving a comprehensive political solution through general elections.

76. The prolonged leadership dispute within the High Council of State is deeply concerning, as it erodes the unity of that institution and compromises its role in any political process. I encourage leaders and members of the High Council of State to find a resolution that can enable the Council to fulfil its functions in line with the Libyan Political Agreement.

77. I welcome the successful conduct by the High National Elections Commission of municipal council elections in 58 municipalities across Libya, ensuring the peaceful transfer of power and legitimate governance at the local level. The cooperation of governmental authorities in the process is essential, including through the prompt allocation of resources for the smooth implementation of the next round

of municipal elections. Moreover, further efforts are needed to support the equal participation of women in Libyan public life, including in elections, both as candidates and voters.

78. While commending their successful conduct, municipal elections should not be seen as a substitute for the national elections, which have been delayed for far too long and are essential to restore the legitimacy of the main State institutions. I commend the efforts of the High National Elections Commission in ensuring successful municipal elections. Those efforts provide an important basis for the implementation of a national electoral process once a political settlement on an implementable legal framework is reached.

79. I welcome the continued commitment of the 5+5 Joint Military Commission to support the implementation of the 2020 ceasefire agreement. It is vital that the Commission and other Libyan stakeholders redouble efforts for progress towards unified security and military institutions and strengthened implementation of the ceasefire agreement.

80. The persistent and widespread violations of international law, including international human rights law, by security actors across Libya, coupled with the ongoing lack of accountability, are deeply troubling. I take note of the arrest orders issued by the Attorney General for certain individuals implicated in these violations, and strongly urge the authorities to take further decisive and sustained actions to ensure full accountability.

81. The ongoing dispute between the House of Representatives and the Supreme Court on the adjudication of constitutional matters is concerning, and I underscore the importance of preserving the independence and unity of the judicial system. It is also critical to reach consensus on the way forward for a national reconciliation process and to expedite the adoption of a unified law on transitional justice and national reconciliation that upholds the rights of victims and aligns with international law and with best practices of transitional justice. The United Nations reaffirms its commitment to working with the African Union to support a Libyan-led, human rights-based and people-centred reconciliation process.

82. I welcome the support offered by authorities to Sudanese refugees, in Kufrah and elsewhere in the country. The United Nations will continue to offer assistance under the Sudan Regional Refugee Response Plan. I encourage donors to provide additional funding for the plan. I also continue to encourage Libyan authorities to enhance efforts to fulfil their human rights obligations and protect the dignity and rights of migrants, refugees and asylum-seekers, including in the context of border security and governance. Facilitating the movement of aid actors and resources across Libya in accordance with humanitarian principles is essential for the effective delivery of humanitarian assistance and for ensuring access and the delivery of aid to those in need.

83. I thank the Officer-in-Charge of UNSMIL, Ms. Koury, and the staff of UNSMIL and the United Nations country team for their dedicated efforts and support to the Libyan people. I reiterate my gratitude to the United Nations Guard Unit in Libya, generously provided by the Government of Nepal.