



# Security Council

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## United Nations Support Mission in Libya

### Report of the Secretary-General

#### I. Introduction

1. The present report, submitted pursuant to Security Council resolutions [2510 \(2020\)](#), [2542 \(2020\)](#), [2570 \(2021\)](#) and [2755 \(2024\)](#), covers political, security and economic developments in Libya from 5 December 2024 to 4 April 2025. It also provides an overview of the human rights and humanitarian situation in the country and the activities of the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) during the same period.

#### II. Political, security-related and economic developments

2. During the reporting period, Libya continued to be affected by institutional and political divisions, as well as the volatile security and economic situations. In this context, UNSMIL engaged in extensive consultations with a wide range of stakeholders, including Libyan leaders, political parties and women's and youth organizations. Based on the outcome of those consultations, on 4 February 2025, as part of a multitrack initiative to advance the Libyan-led and Libyan-owned political process facilitated by the United Nations, an advisory committee composed of 20 independent Libyan experts (7 women and 13 men) was formed and tasked with resolving contentious political and legal issues that are preventing national elections from being held. The role of the committee is to develop proposals and options for resolving outstanding politically contentious issues that are impeding national elections, building on the existing Libyan framework and laws for elections. Those proposals and options will be considered by UNSMIL in the next phase of the political process. Committee members were selected on the basis of their expertise and professionalism, and also with a view to ensuring geographical and cultural representation and gender balance in the committee's composition.

3. UNSMIL has facilitated five sessions of the advisory committee since its establishment. At the inaugural session, which was held on 9 and 10 February in Tripoli, the committee agreed on its rules of procedure and workplan. The advisory committee reconvened in Tripoli from 18 to 20 February and then held an online meeting on 25 and 26 February. Those were followed by a meeting in Benghazi from 9 to 11 March and another in Tripoli from 16 to 18 March. The discussions were focused on identifying the contentious issues in the electoral framework and considering options to address them. The advisory committee's meetings included



consultations with members of the 6+6 Committee of the House of Representatives and High Council of State that developed the electoral laws in 2024, and with the chairperson of the High National Elections Commission.

4. On 20 February, the new Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Libya and Head of UNSMIL, Hanna Tetteh, took up her duties in Libya and held introductory meetings in Tripoli and Benghazi with Libyan leaders, including the Prime Minister, Abdelhamid Al Dabiba, the President of the Presidential Council, Mohamed Younis Menfi, the Vice-Presidents of the Council, Musa al-Koni and Abdullah al-Lafi, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, Aguila Saleh, and General Khalifa Haftar. In those meetings, the Special Representative conveyed her commitment to working with all parties to advance the political process. Reactions to the announcement of the multitrack political process were largely positive. Many Libyan stakeholders, including political parties, social movements, influential figures and women's and youth groups issued statements welcoming the establishment of the advisory committee of Libyan experts and urging others to support the efforts of UNSMIL. The Special Representative also met with representatives of key Libyan ministries and institutions, as well as security actors. In her meetings with members of the diplomatic community, the Special Representative called for cohesive international support to build political consensus among Libyan stakeholders.

5. UNSMIL engaged with relevant stakeholders in western and eastern Libya to encourage progress towards reaching agreement on a unified budget. On 5 February, UNSMIL released a statement in which it underscored "the urgent need for consensus on a balanced, unified budget", in order to, inter alia, "enhance the ability of the Central Bank of Libya to implement effective monetary policies, stabilize the exchange rate and manage public spending sustainably".

6. On 10 and 11 February in Tunis, UNSMIL, as part of its multitrack initiative to advance the political process, facilitated consultations among 14 independent Libyan economic experts, 4 of whom were women, on strengthening economic governance and developing a shared economic vision for Libya. The experts warned that the country's current system of economic governance was unsustainable, citing unchecked expenditures, the lack of a unified budget and weak financial and administrative oversight. They identified priorities and barriers to and solutions for improving governance and accountability in the context of the complex political and economic landscape of Libya. They also highlighted the difficulty of advancing economic reforms and anti-corruption efforts in the absence of unified institutions.

7. The dispute between Mohamed Takala and Khaled Mishri over the position of President of the High Council of State continued, with Council members remaining divided in their support for the candidates.

8. On 18 and 19 December, 32 members of the House of Representatives and 46 members of High Council of State met in Bouznika, Morocco, where they agreed that it is imperative to reconstitute the executive authority, end the transitional period, restore stability through elections and launch joint efforts by the two institutions to address outstanding political issues. The meeting was welcomed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives, Mr. Saleh. High Council of State members affiliated with Mr. Takala did not attend the meeting. On 18 December, the acting Minister for Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, Eltaher Elbaour, addressed a letter to his Moroccan counterpart in which he expressed "strong surprise" that the Morocco had hosted the meeting without prior coordination and official communication with the Government of National Unity.

9. On 23 February, a group comprising members of the House of Representatives and the High Council of State met in Cairo at the invitation of the Parliament of Egypt.

In their closing statement, the attendees reaffirmed the ownership of official Libyan institutions over the political process. They also called for the executive authority to be reconfigured and for the implementation of the outcomes of the trilateral meeting of the President of the Presidential Council, the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President of the High Council of State that was held in Cairo on 10 March 2024, under the auspices of the League of Arab States (see S/2024/301, para. 10). In addition, the attendees characterized the role of UNSMIL as being limited to supporting Libyan institutions emanating from the Libyan Political Agreement.

10. Tensions within the National Audit Bureau escalated in December 2024 following a dispute over the appointment of the Deputy Chair of the Bureau. The House of Representatives had appointed Attia Allah Abdulkarim to the position on 25 August 2024, but it withdrew the appointment on 8 September. Mr. Abdulkarim, however, remained in position, with the backing of the Stabilization Support Apparatus. On 19 December, UNSMIL issued a statement in which it called for the independence and operational integrity of the National Audit Bureau to be respected. As at the end of December, attempts in court to remove the Chair of the Audit Bureau, Khaled Shakshak, and install Mr. Abdulkarim, the Deputy Chair whose appointment was being contested, as acting Chair had been blocked on appeal. The Government of National Unity and the House of Representatives reaffirmed Mr. Shakshak's authority in official letters dated 26 and 29 December, respectively. Mr. Abdulkarim continued to operate from an alternate location in Tripoli.

11. On 7 January 2025, the Administrative Control Authority launched an investigation into the Chair of the National Oil Corporation, Farhat Bengdara, over alleged financial and administrative irregularities. On 16 January, Mr. Bengdara resigned as Chair, citing health reasons and denying social media reports that he had been dismissed by the Prime Minister. Later that day, the National Oil Corporation confirmed in a statement that the Prime Minister had accepted Mr. Bengdara's resignation and that he had appointed Masoud Suleiman, a member of the Board of Directors of the Corporation, as acting Chair.

12. On 12 February, the Government of National Unity announced that the Minister of State for Cabinet Affairs, Adel Juma, had survived an armed attack on his car in Tripoli. The Government reported that he was in stable condition and that security forces had launched an investigation. Mr. Juma was transferred to Rome for medical treatment on 13 February. The incident was widely condemned in Libya and by members of the international community.

#### **A. International Follow-up Committee on Libya of the Berlin process**

13. The International Follow-up Committee on Libya of the Berlin process and its working groups continued to provide support to the intra-Libyan dialogue tracks.

14. On 15 December 2024, the Co-Chairs of the economic working group (Egypt, United States of America, European Union and United Nations) met in Tripoli with the Governor, Deputy Governor and Board of Directors of the Central Bank. The participants in the meeting emphasized the urgent need for a unified budget or an agreed-upon spending framework to stabilize the financial situation and achieve transparent and equitable public spending. The Co-Chairs reaffirmed their commitment to supporting the Central Bank in fulfilling its mandate and pledged to encourage all relevant Libyan parties to safeguard its integrity and independence, building on the steps taken following the UNSMIL-facilitated agreement of 26 September 2024 on the leadership and governance of the Central Bank.

15. On 29 January, the Co-Chairs of the working group on international humanitarian law and human rights (Netherlands (Kingdom of the), Switzerland and United Nations), together with Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Malta, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Spain and the European Union, addressed a letter to the Government of National Unity and a letter the Libyan National Army to express serious concern about the practice of arbitrary arrest and detention by law enforcement and security actors, in contravention of the laws of Libya and the country's international human rights obligations. The letters included recommendations, such as reviewing the files of arbitrarily detained persons with a view to accelerating their release; issuing clear orders to security actors to cease the practice of arbitrary arrest and detention; establishing a national mechanism for the prevention of torture; and allowing UNSMIL unimpeded access to places of detention. On 25 February, the Co-Chairs met with the acting Minister for Foreign Affairs in Tripoli to discuss obtaining access to all places of detention and ways to end arbitrary arrests and detention in Libya through technical support, training and continued dialogue.

16. On 8 March, the Co-Chairs of the international humanitarian law and human rights working group met with officials from the International Criminal Court at The Hague. Following the meeting, they issued a statement in which they expressed full support for the Court's work and underscored the importance of investigating and prosecuting serious crimes perpetrated in Libya and of ensuring independent, fair and victim-centred judicial proceedings.

## **B. International and regional engagement**

17. UNSMIL engaged with members of the international community in order to outline to them its reinvigorated political initiative and to mobilize support, including through briefings to the diplomatic community in Tripoli on 15 December 2024 and 11 February 2025, to ambassadors and representatives of African Member States on 12 December 2024 and 19 March 2025, and to the ambassadors and representatives of European Union member States on 10 March 2025.

18. The Special Representative, recognizing the critical role of neighbouring and regional Member States in supporting the stability of Libya and the efforts of UNSMIL to facilitate an inclusive political process, met with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Emigration and Egyptian Expatriates of Egypt, Badr Abdelatty, in Cairo on 12 March, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, National Community Abroad and African Affairs of Algeria, Ahmed Attaf, in Algiers on 13 March, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Türkiye, Hakan Fidan, in Istanbul on 14 March, and the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Migration and Tunisians Abroad of Tunisia, Mohamed Ali Nafti, on 24 March to discuss the situation in Libya and the UNSMIL-facilitated political process. In those meetings, the participants underscored the importance of building consensus among Libyans towards holding national elections, the reunification of State institutions and fostering security and economic stability. The Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Political Affairs also met with Mr. Abdelatty in Cairo on 16 January.

## **C. Security situation**

### **Tripoli and western region**

19. The overall volatile security situation showed signs of further deterioration, with heightened tensions and competition over territorial control between armed groups in several parts of Libya.

20. Forces affiliated with the Government of National Unity broadened their efforts to assert authority over the coastal region and the western mountain region. On 3 January, the Western Coast Military Region Command launched a security operation involving ground and air military capacities that was ostensibly directed against smuggling dens and criminal networks in the coastal cities of Zawiyah, Sabrata, Ujaylat and Zuwarah. On 6 January, the Western Coast Military Region Command declared that it had taken control of the Zawiyah refinery, which had been controlled previously by local armed elements. A raid by the Western Coast Military Region Command-affiliated 103rd Battalion on an armed group in Ujaylat, west of Zawiyah, on 11 January reportedly resulted in the death of one woman and three children. On 28 January, media reported that an uncrewed aerial vehicle had been downed over Ujaylat by an unknown armed group.

21. On 21 January, the acting Minister of the Interior, Imad al-Trabulsi, announced the establishment of a joint security room, composed of Tripoli and Zintan forces, tasked with ensuring security and enforcing public arrest warrants in the western mountain region. Units from the joint security room started patrolling in the Ghadamis basin and along the borders with Algeria and Tunisia. That decision came against the backdrop of heightening competition for control over the strategic hydrocarbon-rich Ghadamis basin, with repeated incursions in the region by Tripoli-based armed forces and counter-mobilization by forces from Zintan.

22. On 22 January, armed clashes over territorial control broke out in Tripoli between two forces affiliated with the Government of National Unity, reportedly resulting in injuries and damage to civilian property. The clashes ended on 23 January after the parties reportedly reached an agreement brokered by the Attorney General. On 30 January, the deployment of the Misratah-based Counter-Terrorism Force to Tripoli resulted in heightened tensions with Tripoli-based armed groups aligned with the Government of National Unity. In addition, on 26 February, armed clashes erupted in Janzur between a local armed group and the 52nd Battalion, which is affiliated with the Western Coast Military Region. On 28 February, the Attorney General ordered the detention of seven individuals on charges of blocking a public road and endangering citizens in Janzur.

23. On 9 February, in Zlitan, the Misratah-based Joint Operations Force, which is affiliated with the Government of National Unity, arrested dozens of security personnel affiliated with the Tripoli-based Judicial Police and the Deterrence Apparatus for Combating Organized Crime and Terrorism, reportedly in reaction to the Deterrence Apparatus detaining individuals associated with the Joint Operations Force. The incident prompted armed mobilization in Tripoli. The situation was defused once the arrested personnel had been reportedly released and transferred back to Tripoli.

#### **Eastern and southern Libya**

24. On 30 December 2024, the 101st Battalion of the Libyan National Army took control of Tindi military camp, in the vicinity of Awbari. The camp had previously been under the control of the Commander of the Sabha Military Region, which is under the Government of National Unity. In a letter to the Presidential Council and the Prime Minister dated 31 December, the Deputy Minister of Defence, Abdulsalam Zubi, described the incident as “a violation of the 2020 ceasefire agreement”. The 5+5 Joint Military Commission did not take a position with regard to the incident. UNSMIL urged the Commission to meet and discuss the matter, in order to de-escalate the situation and prevent conflict.

25. The Libyan National Army took steps to consolidate control over its affiliated armed units in the central and southern regions. Amid reports of increasing tension between the Chief of Staff of the Ground Forces of the Libyan National Army,

Saddam Haftar, and Commander Hassan Zadma of the 128th Reinforced Brigade, both of which operate in the eastern and central regions of the country, General Khalifa Haftar issued a decision on 11 January to restructure the 128th Reinforced Brigade, effectively reducing the personnel and military assets under Commander Zadma's control and limiting his area of operations to the Jufrah region. A new light infantry brigade was established in Sirte that integrates many units from the dismantled 128th Reinforced Brigade.

26. On 4 February, the Libyan National Army deployed its military police forces to the southern region to take over military assets belonging to the 128th Reinforced Brigade. That deployment led to heavy clashes in the Bakhi area, near Qatrun, on 12 and 13 February, as a local force associated with the 128th Reinforced Brigade reportedly refused to comply with orders to hand over their military assets. A ceasefire was brokered by Tebu elders. Unconfirmed reports indicate more than 20 killed and 35 wounded among the belligerents, and that civilians had been injured. The Libyan National Army reported seven casualties on its side.

#### **D. Economic developments**

27. Economic instability persisted, despite increased oil production and some efforts by the Central Bank to implement measures to stabilize the financial situation. Oil output rose to 1.4 million barrels per day, up from 1.3 million barrels per day, following the resumption of full production by the National Oil Corporation in October 2024. Liquidity problems, however, delayed the payment of public sector salaries. The Libyan dinar depreciated from 5.9 dinars to the United States dollar to 7.3 dinars to the dollar in March in the parallel market. On 6 April, the Central Bank adjusted the official rate from 4.8 dinars to the dollar to 5.56 dinars to the dollar.

28. On 13 January, the Central Bank reported 2024 public revenues of 123.5 billion Libyan dinars (\$24.97 billion) and expenditures of 123.2 billion Libyan dinars (\$24.91 billion). Despite court rulings to halt a temporary surcharge of 15 per cent on foreign exchange transactions, the surcharge continued to be applied and constituted the second-largest revenue source, amounting to 22.5 billion Libyan dinars. Oil exports continued to be the largest source of revenue (76.7 billion Libyan dinars).

29. A foreign exchange deficit of \$5.2 billion was reported for 2024 and attributed to reduced oil revenue transfers. In a statement released on 6 April, the Central Bank indicated that, in the first quarter of 2025, the country's foreign exchange deficit had soared to \$ 4.6 billion, as foreign exchange earnings generated from oil exports of \$5.2 billion fell short of foreign exchange expenditures amounting to \$9.8 billion. That shortfall is equivalent to 88.4 per cent of the total foreign exchange deficit in 2024. Simultaneously, the monthly cash supply to banks surged to 8 billion Libyan dinars (\$1.65 billion), up from an average of 5.6 billion Libyan dinars (\$1.16 billion) in 2024.

30. Following the release on 1 December 2024 of the report of the National Audit Bureau for 2023, in which the Bureau criticized the practice of importing fuel in exchange for crude oil as lacking transparency, the National Oil Corporation ended the controversial oil-for-fuel trading system on 1 March 2025. According to the report, the system had cost the Libyan State 41.3 billion Libyan dinars (\$8.4 billion) in 2023, constituting a significant burden on the country's resources and reducing oil revenue transfers to the Central Bank.

### III. Electoral support

31. The integrated electoral support team of UNSMIL and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) continued to provide advice and technical assistance to the High National Elections Commission for the planning, implementation and evaluation of different stages of municipal elections. On 22 December 2024, the High National Elections Commission published the final results of municipal council elections in 56 municipalities, bringing to a close the first group of municipal council elections. In accordance with court decisions, the final results for the municipalities of Zamzam and Shuwayrif in the west and the south, respectively, were not published. The Commission decided to hold new elections for Zamzam as part of the next group of municipal council elections, while the final results for Shuwayrif are pending.

32. The swearing-in of the elected mayors and municipal councils was completed by 15 January 2025. For the first time in the history of Libya, a woman was sworn in as a mayor, in the western municipality of Zlitan. On 16 January, the House of Representatives-appointed government ordered newly elected members of the municipal council of Harawah, 75 km east of Sirte, to suspend their work and ordered the outgoing municipal council to hand over functions to the list of candidates that had finished in second place. According to the order, the elected municipal council, by attending the swearing-in ceremony before the Minister of Local Government on 15 January in Tripoli, had acted in breach of a House of Representatives resolution in 2021 to withdraw confidence in the Government of National Unity.

33. On 1 January, the High National Elections Commission announced the start of preparations for the second group of municipal council elections in 63 municipalities, including Benghazi, Tripoli and Sabha. Nominations of candidates were received from 19 January to 13 February, with a total of 4,961 candidates, including 1,373 women, submitting nominations. A three-week voter-registration period commenced on 22 February. As at 10 March, more than 295,000 eligible voters, 29 per cent of whom are women, had registered by text message or in one of 141 voter registration centres.

34. In order to increase women's participation in the electoral process, the High National Elections Commission met in January and February with women's civil society organizations across the country to raise awareness of the candidate nomination and voter registration processes. The Commission extended the candidate nomination period by two days exclusively for women and, in coordination with the Civil Registry Authority, introduced additional provisions in the procedures for holding municipal council elections to allow women married to non-Libyans to register as candidates and voters. As at 9 March, women constituted 28 per cent of registered candidates.

35. On 14 January, the High National Elections Commission resubmitted a request to the Government of National Unity to allocate 30 million Libyan dinars (\$6.1 million) for the holding of the second group of municipal elections. On 19 February, the Council of Ministers of the Government of National Unity issued a decision to allocate 15 million Libyan dinars to the Commission for that purpose.

### IV. Security sector support and the implementation of the ceasefire agreement

36. UNSMIL continued to engage with the 5+5 Joint Military Commission to implement the ceasefire agreement of October 2020, including with regard to the withdrawal of foreign forces, foreign fighters and mercenaries from Libya, on which progress remained limited.

37. On 11 February 2025, the 5+5 Joint Military Commission met in Cairo with the Chief of Staff of the Egyptian Armed Forces, Lieutenant General Ahmed Khalifah, reportedly to discuss the implementation of the ceasefire agreement, withdrawal of foreign forces, foreign fighters and mercenaries from Libya, and the unification of security and military institutions.

38. On 20 February, the liaison committees from Libya, the Niger and the Sudan convened in Tripoli to discuss security developments affecting shared border areas and to exchange information on mercenaries operating in those areas. They concurred that the cross-border movements of mercenaries had a destabilizing effect in their respective countries and posed a threat to collective regional security, and that sustained and coordinated regional efforts were required to address the issue.

39. On 25 and 26 February, UNSMIL organized a forum in Tunis with the 5+5 Joint Military Commission, Libyan ceasefire monitors and members of the Commission's security arrangements subcommittee to examine the growing trend of hate speech, misinformation and incitement across traditional and social media platforms in Libya. Participants recommended activating the Commission's subcommittee for monitoring hate speech, in line with article 5 of the ceasefire agreement; supporting local initiatives and platforms for monitoring and curbing the spread of hate speech, incitement and misinformation; and strengthening the role of civil society and the media in raising public awareness of the ceasefire.

#### **A. Support for Libyan planning for interim security arrangements and reunification of security institutions**

40. UNSMIL supported the Libyan authorities' efforts to enhance coordination in respect of border security, counter-terrorism and managing irregular migration. In the period from December 2024 to February 2025, UNSMIL facilitated four meetings of a joint technical coordination team of senior military and security officials from the Government of National Unity and the Libyan National Army, in order to enhance coordination on border security counter-terrorism and managing irregular migration. In addition, the Mission facilitated a field visit by the team to a border security centre on the Tunisia side of the Libya-Tunisia border to enhance awareness of cross-border security challenges.

41. UNSMIL, in collaboration with the Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance, trained 22 military legal advisers from the Government of National Unity and the Libyan National Army on international humanitarian law and the law of armed conflict in Tunis from 28 to 30 January.

#### **B. Mine action and arms and ammunition management**

42. In response to the threat posed by mines and explosive remnants of war, UNSMIL provided technical support to 15 explosive ordnance risk education teams from local and international non-governmental organizations (NGOs). As a result, 73 risk education sessions were delivered to 3,965 beneficiaries in Awbari, Gharyan, Murzuq, Sabha and Tawurghah. On 1 December 2024, UNSMIL and local NGOs held a session at Ukhuwwah Sudanese School in Tripoli on explosive ordnance risks, reaching 32 Sudanese refugee pupils (13 girls and 19 boys) and 3 women teachers.

43. On 10 December 2024 and 24 February 2025, UNSMIL and the Libyan Mine Action Centre co-chaired quarterly meetings of mine action implementing partners, which were held in Tunis and Tripoli, respectively. The main items on the agenda

were prioritizing and expanding mine action activities across Libya, including in the east, and donor mapping for the mine action sector in Libya.

## **V. Human rights, transitional justice and the rule of law**

44. On 19 January, Osama Elmasry Njeem, the subject of an International Criminal Court arrest warrant for alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity committed in Mitiga Prison from 15 February 2015 onwards, was arrested in Turin, Italy. The Italian authorities, citing alleged procedural irregularities and anomalies, as well as unspecified security concerns, released him two days later and allowed him to return to Libya. On 25 January 2025, UNSMIL, stressing the need to ensure accountability, called on the Libyan authorities to arrest him and to either initiate an investigation into his alleged crimes or transfer him to the International Criminal Court.

45. From 12 to 14 March, a misinformation and hate speech campaign on social media targeting migrants and asylum-seekers in Libya triggered mass roundups of sub-Saharan African migrants and the arrest of hundreds in Misratah, Tripoli and Sabratah. On 13 March, a non-Libyan man was shot and killed in Sabratah by two Libyan youths, who were arrested by local authorities.

### **A. Transitional justice and national reconciliation**

46. UNSMIL continued to support the efforts of Libyan authorities and civil society to tackle issues related to missing persons through advocacy, awareness-raising and capacity-building. On 30 August 2024, UNSMIL and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights published a joint report entitled “Tarhuna – mass graves and related human rights violations and abuses in Libya”. In that connection, UNSMIL and UNDP organized a meeting on 18 and 19 December 2024 with officials from the Office of the Military Prosecutor, the General Authority for the Search for and Identification of Missing Persons and relevant ministries to review the progress made in implementing the recommendations set out in that report concerning accountability, truth-seeking and reparations. The discussions were focused on the need to resume excavation of the mass graves identified around Tarhunah and to facilitate access to aid and psychosocial services for families.

47. Progress on national reconciliation in Libya continued to be affected by the dispute between the Presidential Council and the House of Representatives over the draft reconciliation law. On 5 and 6 December 2024, UNSMIL and UNDP convened a meeting in Tunis with officials from the House of Representatives, the High Council of State, the Presidential Council and the Constitutional Drafting Assembly, as well as several legal experts, with a view to facilitating an agreement on a unified, comprehensive legal framework for national reconciliation that aligns with the international obligations of Libya. An agreement on a draft text of the reconciliation law was subsequently reached. However, on 7 January 2025, the House of Representatives voted to amend the agreed-upon text of the draft law, a move that the Presidential Council rejected in a statement on 9 January. UNSMIL engaged with all relevant parties in order to encourage further discussion and the adoption by consensus of a unified law that can contribute to addressing past crimes and violations, in line with best practices for transitional justice.

48. On 14 February, in Addis Ababa, the African Union High-Level Committee on Libya organized the signing of a charter for peace and national reconciliation in Libya that had been proposed by the African Union and finalized on 27 January in Zintan. Representatives of President Menfi, Vice-President Al-Koni, the House of Representatives, the High Council of State and Saif al-Islam Gaddafi signed the

charter. Mr. Takala's supporters in the High Council of State issued a statement on 15 February rejecting the charter and urging the African Union to pursue a consensual national reconciliation project.

## **B. Unlawful deprivation of liberty, detention and torture**

49. Enforced disappearances, arbitrary arrests and detention and other politically motivated human rights violations and abuses continued, contributing to a climate of fear and making it difficult to maintain an environment that is conducive to an inclusive political process.

50. The Internal Security Agency continued to extract and publicly broadcast forced "confessions", an unlawful practice. UNSMIL has repeatedly stressed to the authorities in Tripoli that this practice undermines defendants' rights and taints any potential trials.

51. On 7 January 2025, a prominent blogger was abducted by the Stability Support Apparatus from his home in Tripoli and held in an unofficial detention facility in the Abu Salim district after he criticized the Government of National Unity in an online post. He was released on 9 January. A political activist from Misrata who had called for protests against the Government of National Unity and two other persons were abducted by unidentified armed men on 9 January. They were released on 11 January. Two military prosecutors, who have been detained since 2022, a member of the House of Representative and his brother, who have been detained since 2024, and the Head of the Libyan Asset Recovery and Management Office, who was detained in early 2025, were released in March.

52. On 12 January, videos reportedly dating from 2020 circulated online showing dozens of Libyan and foreign detainees being subjected to ill-treatment and torture. UNSMIL identified the location as the Gernada detention facility in eastern Libya and assessed that some of the perpetrators belonged to Libyan National Army-affiliated forces.

53. During the reporting period, legal professionals, members of the judiciary and their relatives were arbitrarily arrested. Among those who were targeted is a prominent lawyer, who has been arbitrarily detained in Benghazi since 12 March, and the brother of an outspoken anti-corruption activist, who was abducted by unidentified men on 24 March and remained missing as at 31 March.

54. UNSMIL continued to document systematic violations of due process and the right to a fair trial for detainees across Libya, including inadequate legal representation, procedural delays and frequent adjournments of court hearings, all of which contributed to prolonged pretrial detention. On 20 January, UNSMIL expressed those concerns during a visit to the Mitiga detention centre, which is operated by the Deterrence Apparatus for Combating Organized Crime and Terrorism. UNSMIL representatives, accompanied by a prosecutor from the Office of the Attorney General, inspected parts of the facility and reviewed detainee files, communicating their observations to the Office of the Attorney General.

55. On 8 February, the Libyan National Army gave UNSMIL partial access to the military section of Kuwayfiah prison in Benghazi, and then access to the military section of the Gernada detention facility on 11 February. UNSMIL representatives assessed the facilities and engaged with several male detainees at Gernada and with a woman detainee and her two children at Kuwayfiah.

56. A delegation from the National Council for Public Freedoms and Human Rights and UNSMIL visited those three prisons as part of efforts to enhance the capacity of

the national human rights institutions of Libya. On 13 February, UNSMIL discussed the findings arising from those visits with 10 military judges and prosecutors at the Supreme Military Court and conducted a training session for them on international human rights and criminal justice standards.

57. UNSMIL provided training to 15 guards and military police officers at Kuwayfiah prison on implementing the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (the Nelson Mandela Rules) and aligning national legislation on prisons with international law and standards. On 9 and 11 February, UNSMIL trained 25 senior officers at an Internal Security Agency prison on the implementation of international human rights standards.

### **C. Migrants and refugees**

58. According to the International Organization for Migration, the number of migrants in Libya exceeded 824,000 as at December 2024. Between 11 December 2024 and 31 March 2025, more than 5,000 migrants and refugees were intercepted attempting to cross the Mediterranean Sea from the coast of Libya. In 2024, the Libyan Coast Guard intercepted 21,762 migrants and refugees at sea and returned them to Libya, with 665 persons reported dead and 1,034 missing. Migrants and refugees who disembarked at Libyan ports to which United Nations humanitarian agencies have access received life-saving humanitarian assistance. As at 23 March, more than 5,000 migrants and refugees, including 1,156 persons of concern to the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), were being arbitrarily detained in official detention centres in Libya. Armed groups operated at least six unofficial detention centres where more than 3,000 people were estimated to be arbitrarily detained and to which United Nations agencies, funds and programmes do not have access.

59. From June 2023 to 3 April 2025, more than 12,750 migrants and refugees were intercepted at the border with Tunisia by forces from the Ministry of the Interior and the Libyan Border Guard. Over that same period, the Libyan Border Guard had intercepted more than 1,930 migrants and refugees at the Libya-Algeria border who had been expelled from Algeria. Libyan authorities continued to transfer those intercepted to facilities where they were arbitrarily detained and reportedly subjected to human rights violations, including the Assah detention facility operated by the Libyan Border Guard, detention centres operated by the Directorate for Combating Illegal Migration in Tripoli and Bi'r al-Ghanam, an unofficial detention centre. As at 3 April, the Ministry of Interior and the Libyan Border Guard reported accommodating 360 migrants and individuals in need of international protection in Assah (325 men, 28 women and 7 children), in addition to 150 individuals in need of protection in Ghadamis. At the time of writing, 141 people in need of international protection had been released, including 102 persons (comprising 97 women, of whom 19 were girls, and 5 boys) from Assah and 39 men (including 13 boys) from Tajura' detention centre.

60. There have been reports from Kufrah and Wahat districts in the south-east of severe abuse by traffickers, with victims, including women and children, subjected to exploitation and extortion. On 29 January, the Office of the Attorney General announced that 263 Eritrean, Ethiopian and Somali nationals had been rescued from a trafficking hub in Jikharrah, Wahat district, where they had been held for months and tortured for ransom. On 7 February, 71 Eritrean and Somali asylum-seekers, including women and children, were rescued from Kufrah. The Office of the Attorney General announced the arrest and detention of several suspects, including Libyan and foreign nationals. Those rescued had been detained in facilities operated by the Directorate for Combatting Illegal Migration, owing to their irregular status.

61. In January 2025, a video of a non-Libyan woman who claimed that she had been tortured and sexually abused circulated on social media. In the video, the woman pleaded with her family to pay a ransom for her release from traffickers in Kufrah. In February, two similar videos emerged on social media, one showing an ill non-Libyan child pleading for a ransom to be paid to secure her release from traffickers in Kufrah and the other showing a non-Libyan man being violently beaten and tortured. UNSMIL documented ongoing extortion by Directorate for Combating Illegal Migration guards at Ghawt al-Sha'al, Mabani, Tajura' and Ayn Zarah detention centres.

62. On 7 and 8 February, two mass graves containing a total of 93 bodies were found at Jikharrah, Wahat district, and in Kufrah district following raids that also led to the rescue of 273 asylum-seekers in Wahat district and another 71 in Kufrah district. The raids were carried out by Ministry of the Interior forces, reportedly in the context of anti-trafficking operations. The rescued individuals were transferred to detention centres run by the Directorate for Combating Illegal Migration. UNSMIL called for a full investigation into the mass graves and the immediate release of those detained, as well as the provision of critical medical and psychological support.

## **VI. Empowerment of women**

63. Prior to launching the multitrack political initiative, including the establishment of the advisory committee of Libyan experts, UNSMIL held two consultative meetings on 4 and 15 December 2024 with 57 women members from the House of Representatives and the High Council of State, as well as representatives of civil society organizations. The consultations, which were attended by 28 women in Tripoli and 29 women in Benghazi, were focused on the challenges that women face in the public sphere and the options available to them for enhancing their political participation. The participants produced a list of recommendations, including larger quotas for women in political institutions. They also called for the adoption of measures to protect women from all forms of violence, including on social media.

64. On 22 January, UNSMIL briefed members of the Libyan Businesswomen's Organization on its multitrack political initiative, emphasizing the need for greater women's participation in economic development. The women in attendance described significant challenges to their full economic participation and mobility, including security concerns, bureaucratic obstacles, limited access to financial resources and outdated regulations that hinder entrepreneurship in a male-dominated business environment.

## **VII. Youth and peace and security**

65. During the reporting period, UNSMIL, in line with its youth engagement strategy, held seven in-person workshops in Tripoli and Benghazi with more than 144 young persons (57 women and 87 men) from across Libya. The themes of the workshops were political inclusion (11, 16 and 17 December), supporting the ceasefire agreement (22 January), strategic communications (29 January) and the economic future of Libya (24 February and 4 March). Following the workshops, 76 per cent of participants reported that they had a more positive perception of the United Nations in Libya. On 12 January, UNSMIL held a Facebook Live discussion with 261 young people on the role of the United Nations in the political process.

66. As part the programme entitled "Ra'idat: promoting women's leadership in Libya", UNSMIL, in collaboration with the United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women, UNDP and the United Nations Children's Fund

held training sessions in December 2024 and February 2025 for 35 young women from across Libya to enhance their knowledge of human rights and women's empowerment. On 3 and 4 February, UNSMIL organized capacity-building workshops on strategic communications for 22 civil servants (8 women, 14 men) from the Ministry of Youth, with a view to supporting the development of a communications strategy in the Ministry.

## VIII. Humanitarian situation and development

67. The overall humanitarian response in Libya was primarily focused on the continued arrival of Sudanese refugees. The United Nations and its partners continued to provide urgent humanitarian support to refugees and host communities.

68. On 19 December 2024, the Deputy Special Representative for Political Affairs and the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator a.i. led a joint mission to Kufrah to assess the humanitarian response for Sudanese refugees. They met with local authorities, implementing partners and representatives of host communities. It was agreed that the United Nations country team and local authorities would hold regular technical coordination meetings, in order to improve aid effectiveness. The first of these meetings was held on 20 January 2025 in Benghazi with the mayor of Kufrah and Libyan National Army officials to discuss how to enhance coordination of humanitarian assistance to Sudanese refugees and address ongoing access challenges.

69. As at 31 March 2025, UNHCR had registered 46,000 of the 240,000 Sudanese refugees estimated to have arrived in Libya since the start of the conflict in the Sudan in April 2023. Most Sudanese refugees reached Kufrah through irregular crossing points along the southern border of Libya with the Sudan and Chad, while a minority made their way from Egypt. As at 31 March 2025, the total number of Sudanese refugees registered in Libya, including those who had arrived before the conflict in the Sudan had begun, was more than 65,600, comprising 24,500 men, 14,500 women, 14,200 boys and 12,400 girls. Local authorities have continued to provide assistance, including by enabling refugees to access public health and education services.

70. Sudanese refugees continue to arrive in Libya in large numbers. Under the 2025 Sudan Refugee Regional Response Plan, which was launched in Geneva on 17 February, a total of \$106 million, double the amount of support provided in 2024, will be required to meet the needs of an estimated 446,000 individuals, including 370,000 Sudanese refugees, 70,000 members of host communities and 1,000 third country nationals

71. In mid-March, the Internal Security Agency summoned some 18 staff members from 10 international non-governmental organizations for questioning. Some had their passports confiscated and were forced to resign from their positions. At a press conference in Tripoli on 2 April, the Internal Security Agency stated that it was "acting against hostile foreign activity aimed at settling illegal immigrants" and that "some of the international non-governmental organizations had not followed agreed procedures".

72. The Deputy Special Representative, Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator and the representatives of 17 Member States transmitted a *démarche* on 27 March to the acting Minister for Foreign Affairs of Libya in which they expressed deep concern at the ongoing crackdown on international non-governmental organizations and its effect on humanitarian operations, including the provision of health assistance to the most vulnerable Libyans and migrants.

## **IX. Mission presence and security arrangements**

73. UNSMIL maintained an average presence of 314 civilian staff members, comprising 102 national staff, 208 international staff and 4 United Nations Volunteers. Of those, 292 staff were stationed in Tripoli, 19 in Tunis, 2 in Benghazi and 1 in Sabha. UNSMIL also maintained four government-provided personnel, one located in Tripoli and three in Tunis. UNSMIL international staff and its offices continued to be accommodated at the Oea compound in Tripoli, protected by 230 troops of the United Nations Guard Unit. UNSMIL also provided two security officers on a rotational basis to support the United Nations hub in Benghazi.

## **X. Observations**

74. More than 14 years after the revolution of 17 February 2011, the aspirations of the Libyan people for a united, stable and democratic country remain unfulfilled. Deep institutional divisions and entrenched political interests are increasingly undermining the political and economic stability and fragile security of Libya, and hindering efforts to achieve national reconciliation.

75. The launching of UNSMIL-facilitated deliberations by the advisory committee of Libyan experts is a crucial step towards reviving an inclusive Libyan-led and Libyan-owned political process to preserve stability and enable a path to national elections and the reunification of State institutions. I commend the members of the advisory committee for their effort, in support of the Mission's mediation and good offices, to devise options to resolve outstanding issues preventing the holding of national elections.

76. An agreement on a balanced, unified budget with strong oversight mechanisms remains critical, so that the revenue and resources of Libya are used in a transparent and equitable manner for the benefit of the Libyan people. It is also essential to ensure respect for the independence and integrity of oversight institutions and to implement vital reforms in order to improve the economic governance of Libya. I take note of the decision to end the crude oil-for-fuel exchange system, an important step in fighting corruption.

77. The leadership crisis in the High Council of State continues to prevent it from fulfilling its mandate under the Libyan Political Agreement. I reiterate my call to members of the High Council of State to come together and reunify the Council, so it can play a constructive role in the political process.

78. I welcome recent efforts by military and security actors from eastern and western Libya to enhance coordination and communication on matters of national security, such as border security and counter-terrorism. Further steps, however, need to be taken by the Libyan authorities, including the 5+5 Joint Military Commission, to fully implement the ceasefire agreement and promote the reunification of military and security institutions.

79. Continued and widespread violations of international law, including international human rights law, by security actors across Libya, coupled with the persistent lack of accountability, are deeply concerning. The release and return to Libya of Osama Elmasry Njeem, the subject of an International Criminal Court arrest warrant for war crimes and crimes against humanity, highlight the challenges in pursuing justice for serious human rights violations. I reiterate my calls for ending impunity for serious international crimes.

80. Violations against persons deprived of their liberty, in particular individuals arbitrarily detained for prolonged periods without access to justice, remain a grave concern. I urge the Libyan authorities to strengthen due process in the criminal justice

system and to ensure that all detainees are promptly informed of charges, have access to legal representation and are brought before a judge within a reasonable time frame. Perpetrators of violations against the human rights of detainees should also be held accountable. I welcome the access to some detention facilities granted to UNSMIL and call upon the authorities to extend access to UNSMIL and human rights organizations to all places of detention.

81. The ongoing violence against migrants in Libya and the tragic discovery of mass graves in the eastern part of the country are reminders of a deeply entrenched system of trafficking in persons (S/2023/640), torture and extortion targeting migrants and asylum-seekers. I appeal to the Libyan authorities to enhance efforts to protect the dignity and rights of migrants, refugees and asylum-seekers, dismantle trafficking networks and hold accountable the perpetrators of violations against these vulnerable groups.

82. I commend the ongoing efforts by the Libyan authorities and host communities in support of Sudanese refugees in Kufrah and elsewhere in the country. I encourage donors to provide additional funding for the Sudan Regional Refugee Response Plan, in order to enable the United Nations to continue providing support, and urge the Libyan authorities to facilitate the movement of aid actors and resources.

83. I thank my new Special Representative for Libya and Head of UNSMIL, Hanna Tetteh, for the work that she has done since taking office, and I thank my Deputy Special Representative for Political Affairs, Stephanie Koury, for having served as Officer-in-Charge. I also thank the staff of UNSMIL and the United Nations country team for their continued dedicated efforts and support to the Libyan people. I reiterate my gratitude to the United Nations Guard Unit in Libya, generously provided by the Government of Nepal.