



# Security Council

Distr.: General  
8 August 2025

Original: English

---

## United Nations Support Mission in Libya

### Report of the Secretary-General

#### I. Introduction

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to Security Council resolutions [2510 \(2020\)](#), [2542 \(2020\)](#), [2570 \(2021\)](#) and [2755 \(2024\)](#) and covers political, security and economic developments in Libya from 5 April to 1 August 2025. It also provides an overview of the humanitarian and human rights situation in the country and the activities of the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) during the same period.

#### II. Political, security-related and economic developments

2. The security situation in Tripoli deteriorated further following the killing of the head of the Stability Support Apparatus on 12 May. Ensuing armed clashes and protests resulted in several civilian casualties, damage to civilian infrastructure and the temporary closure of Mitiga airport and the Ra's Judayr border crossing, as well as the mobilization of forces in other parts of western Libya. Although a fragile truce among some of the parties to the conflict, including the Stability Support Apparatus, the 444th Brigade and the Special Deterrence Force, was announced on 14 May, the situation remained volatile.

3. On 5 May, the advisory committee of independent Libyan experts submitted its report to UNSMIL. In its report, the advisory committee provides four options for a political road map: (a) conducting simultaneous presidential and parliamentary elections on the basis of revised electoral laws; (b) holding parliamentary elections first, followed by a constitutional review process and presidential elections on the basis of a permanent constitution; (c) the adoption of a permanent constitution before holding national elections; and (d) the establishment of a constituent assembly to replace existing Libyan institutions, pursuant to article 64 of the Libyan Political Agreement, before launching a constitutional review process followed by the holding of elections. On 20 May, UNSMIL published the executive summary of the committee's report.

4. In addition, the advisory committee proposed certain preconditions for the electoral process, including the reconstitution of the board of the High National Elections Commission, the allocation of funds to the Commission, amendments to the constitutional and legal framework governing elections and the formation of a new



unified executive authority. The committee further proposed that, if a political agreement could not be reached on the basis of those preconditions, article 64 of the Libyan Political Agreement should be invoked in order to constitute a new political dialogue mechanism. The committee also recommended reforms to electoral dispute resolution mechanisms, greater inclusion of women and the country's non-Arab groups in the electoral and political processes, limiting voter and candidate eligibility to holders of national identity numbers and checks on presidential powers.

5. As the advisory committee neared the completion of its work, institutional rivalries manifested in unilateral steps taken by the main Libyan institutional and political leaders. On 29 April, the President of the Presidential Council, Mohamed Younis Menfi, issued a decree suspending Law No. 5 (2023) issued by the House of Representatives that established a Supreme Constitutional Court in Benghazi; a decree mandating that the High National Reconciliation Commission convene a general conference to adopt a national reconciliation strategy; and a decree establishing a National Commission for Referendums and National Inquiry. On 30 April, the President of the Presidential Council requested the High National Elections Commission to organize, within 30 days, a referendum on the 2017 draft constitution. Both the Vice-President of the Presidential Council, Abdullah al-Lafi, and the Speaker of the House of Representatives, Aguila Saleh, rejected those measures and contested their legitimacy. The House of Representatives-appointed Prime Minister, Osama Hammad, also denounced the decrees as illegitimate, unilateral and harmful to national stability. UNSMIL warned against the risk of escalatory unilateral actions and called on Libyan leaders to create the necessary conditions to establish a consensual framework for elections.

6. Throughout the reporting period, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Libya and Head of UNSMIL consulted stakeholders across the country on the work of the advisory committee as a basis for building consensus on the way forward to holding national elections and reunifying State institutions. In addition, UNSMIL sought to gather a broader range of Libyan perspectives on the outcomes of the committee's work, including through public opinion polls and visits by UNSMIL senior officials to Bani Walid, Benghazi, Misratah, Nalut, Zawiyah and Zintan to consult with political parties, security actors, notables, community leaders, civil society, women and young people. UNSMIL also received delegations from the three regions of Libya for consultation at its headquarters in Tripoli and at United Nations premises in Benghazi.

7. Outreach by UNSMIL revealed widespread public frustration over protracted political divisions, elected institutions outliving their legitimate mandates, economic decline, enduring corruption and allegations of human rights violations. Many Libyans called for the dissolution of all existing political bodies and the establishment of a constituent assembly or the launch of a new inclusive national dialogue, referencing article 64 of the Libyan Political Agreement. Reflecting on the failure of political leaders to honour commitments made during past political processes, many members of the public emphasized the need for stronger oversight and accountability mechanisms to ensure the implementation of any future agreement, including the imposition of international sanctions on those who obstruct the political process.

8. The House of Representatives resumed efforts to form a new government. On 19, 27 and 28 May, it held sessions to discuss the selection process for a new prime minister and to review the programme proposals of candidates.

9. On 26 May, the Libyan National Army marked the eleventh anniversary of its Operation Karamah (Dignity), which was targeted against terrorism and extremism in eastern Libya, with a military parade in Qaminis, west of Benghazi. The parade, which was attended by General Khalifa Haftar and representatives from the Libyan

National Army, House of Representatives and several diplomatic missions, featured a display of recently acquired military hardware, including explosives-laden uncrewed aerial vehicles, naval assets, air defence systems and helicopters.

10. UNSMIL continued efforts to facilitate a resolution of the dispute between Mohamed Takala and Khaled Mishri over the leadership of the High Council of State. On 28 May, the Supreme Court ruled that the administrative judiciary lacked jurisdiction over the matter and annulled a decision handed down on 19 December 2024 by the South Tripoli Court of Appeals invalidating the outcome of the August 2024 vote for the position of President of the High Council of State. The Speaker of the House of Representatives and supporters of Mr. Mishri welcomed the ruling as a win, while supporters of Mr. Takala maintained that the ruling validated his position.

11. On 3 June, the Prime Minister of the Government of National Unity, Abdulhamid Al Dabiba, announced plans for a new political initiative that would entail a reshuffling of government on the basis of competence, rather than political quotas; the launch of a public opinion survey seeking views on the recommendations of the advisory committee; and the establishment of a mechanism to ensure the holding of elections and end the “pretext” for a parallel government.

12. Also on 3 June, the House of Representatives, acting outside the regular budgetary planning framework, approved a three-year extraordinary budget amounting to 69 billion Libyan dinars for the Libya Development and Reconstruction Fund, which is headed by Belqasim Khalifa Haftar. On the same day, at a televised Cabinet meeting, the Prime Minister criticized the decision of the House of Representative, warning that it could cause an “economic catastrophe” and calling on the relevant oversight authorities to disclose parallel expenditures. The candidates for the contested position of President of the High Council of State, Messrs. Takala and Mishri, also rejected the approval process, citing violations of constitutional and legal procedures, and called for executive and oversight bodies to be unified before the adoption of any national budget.

13. On 27 July, the High Council of State held a televised session that was attended by 95 members, thereby meeting the required quorum of two thirds of its membership, and elected Mr. Takala as President. In a statement on 28 July, UNSMIL congratulated the new President and expressed its readiness to engage with Council members to advance the political process.

14. On 29 and 30 July, UNSMIL facilitated consultations between the advisory committee and the 6+6 joint committee of the House of Representatives and High State Council (see [S/2023/589](#), para. 3). Participants underscored the importance of a political agreement and sustained international support for the implementation of the advisory committee’s recommendations.

## **A. International Follow-up Committee on Libya of the Berlin process**

15. The International Follow-up Committee on Libya of the Berlin process and its working groups continued to provide support to the intra-Libyan dialogue tracks.

16. Following the clashes in Tripoli, the Co-Chairs of the international humanitarian law and human rights working group (the Netherlands (Kingdom of), Switzerland and the United Nations) issued a statement on 17 May expressing alarm at the escalation of violence. They called for respect for international humanitarian and human rights law, protection of civilians, accountability for violations and urgent institutional reform.

17. On 13 June, the Co-Chairs of the security working group (France, Italy, Türkiye, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the African Union and the United Nations) convened in Tripoli to discuss security developments in the capital. They underscored the importance of maintaining the truce, refraining from the use of violence and supporting unified and official security institutions. They reaffirmed their commitment to working with the Libyan authorities to advance security sector reform, confidence-building measures and implementation of the 2020 ceasefire agreement.

18. On 20 June, the International Follow-up Committee on Libya of the Berlin process held its first meeting since October 2021. The meeting, which was held in Berlin and co-chaired by UNSMIL and Germany, was attended by representatives from Algeria, Angola (representing the Chair of the African Union), China, Egypt, France, Germany, Italy, Libya, Morocco, the Netherlands (Kingdom of), Qatar, the Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Switzerland, Türkiye, the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom and the United States of America, as well as the African Union, the European Union and the League of Arab States. Participants reaffirmed their commitment to the United Nations-facilitated political process and to respect the relevant Security Council resolutions. In a joint statement following the meeting, the co-chairs noted that, while the 2020 ceasefire agreement was holding, progress towards a political resolution had stalled. Raising concerns about the legitimacy of Libyan institutions, fragmented governance structures and the rapidly deteriorating economic and financial situation, the co-chairs called on the parties to refrain from taking unilateral actions and for those obstructing the political process to be held accountable, including under the relevant Security Council resolutions. They also welcomed the agreement reached by participants regarding a more active and coordinated role for the four thematic working groups established under the Berlin process.

19. On 30 July, in Tripoli, the Special Representative and the Ambassador of Germany convened a meeting of the co-chairs of the four thematic working groups, the focus of which was how to improve internal working methods, strengthen coordination and enhance overall impact.

## **B. International and regional engagement**

20. UNSMIL continued to engage with international and regional partners on political, security and economic developments in Libya. The Special Representative delivered briefings to the diplomatic community in Tripoli and Tunis and to senior officials in some capitals on the recommendations developed by the advisory committee, recent political and security developments and ongoing efforts to sustain the truce.

21. From 11 to 13 April 2025, the Special Representative participated in the Antalya Diplomacy Forum in Türkiye, where she held meetings with key partners, including the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Algeria, Egypt and Tunisia, on the political process, security situation and other Libya-related issues. She also visited Egypt, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates from 25 to 28 May and Türkiye on 18 June for consultations with officials of those countries. All her interlocutors stressed the need to maintain the truce in Tripoli and to take tangible steps towards advancing the political process.

22. From 19 to 23 July, the Special Representative travelled to Angola and Ethiopia, where she discussed the situation in Libya with, among others, the Permanent Representatives of Uganda and the Republic of the Congo to the African Union and with the Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security of the African Union.

On 24 July, the Special Representative, in her briefing to African Heads of State at a meeting of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union, highlighted the importance of cooperation between the United Nations and the African Union in advancing national reconciliation, stabilizing the security situation and resolving the political impasse in Libya.

## **C. Security situation**

### **Tripoli and western region**

23. On 3 and 5 April, the Misratah-based Joint Operations Force, which is reportedly affiliated with the Government of National Unity, sent convoys of heavy military equipment to the outskirts of Tripoli. That action prompted a counter-mobilization by forces affiliated with the Deterrence Apparatus for Combating Organized Crime and Terrorism and the Department of Judicial Police, resulting in an unknown number of casualties. Local mediation efforts by armed group leaders and community notables helped de-escalate the situation, but the underlying tensions were not completely resolved.

24. On 5 May, the Stability Support Apparatus raided the Libyan Post, Telecommunications and Information Technology Company in Tripoli and abducted two of its senior officials, who were later released. In response, clashes broke out in Khums on 7 and 9 May when the Joint Operations Force seized the local headquarters of the Stability Support Apparatus, resulting in two fatalities and five injuries. Concurrently, the Stability Support Apparatus ramped up its military presence in Tripoli and other areas, such as Zintan and Zawiyah.

25. On 12 May, the leader of the Stability Support Apparatus, Abdulghani al-Kikli, and nine members of the group were killed during a meeting in Tripoli with security actors affiliated with the Government of National Unity. In the immediate aftermath, forces aligned with the Government of National Unity seized Stability Support Apparatus positions in Gharyan, Nasmah and Tripoli.

26. On 13 May, the Prime Minister issued a statement announcing the integration of several forces under the Ministry of the Interior. On 14 May, heavy clashes erupted between the 444th Brigade and the Deterrence Apparatus for Combating Organized Crime and Terrorism. Those clashes were followed by widespread urban warfare in populated areas of Tripoli, including Abu Salim, Salah al-Din, Suq al-Jum'ah and Tajura'. The events triggered the mobilization of forces in other parts of western Libya, including Misratah, Zawiyah and Zintan. Separately, the Libyan National Army dispatched medium-scale military convoys towards Sirte and Shuwayrif.

27. Also on 14 May, hundreds of protesters gathered in Martyrs' Square in Tripoli demanding the resignation of the Government of National Unity. Security forces used live ammunition to repel protesters. Shortly thereafter, in an apparent reaction, two ministers and two undersecretaries resigned from the Government.

28. Amid growing international calls for de-escalation, a truce was brokered in Tripoli on 14 May as a result of UNSMIL-led mediation in coordination with the Presidential Council. Peaceful demonstrations continued in the capital in the following days, although their intensity gradually declined. Protests also occurred on 26 June in Millitah and Misratah.

29. Several small demonstrations also occurred outside UNSMIL headquarters in Tripoli, with demonstrators calling on the Mission to take urgent action to resolve the country's prolonged political crisis. On 25 June, demonstrators forced open the front

gate of the UNSMIL compound, demanding to be heard. UNSMIL staff engaged with the protestors and listened to their demands.

30. On 17 May, the Prime Minister delivered a statement in which he defended the security operations in Tripoli. He accused the Libyan National Army and political rivals, including the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the contested President of the High Council of State, Mr. Mishri, of fuelling the unrest. He also claimed to have international backing for his actions and reiterated the need to bring armed groups under State authority.

31. To consolidate the fragile truce, the Presidential Council, with support from UNSMIL, established a truce committee on 18 May that was tasked with deploying disengagement forces, facilitating a permanent ceasefire and ensuring the protection of civilians. On 4 June, the Presidential Council established a separate committee to develop and implement a comprehensive plan for security arrangements in Tripoli. On 12 June, that committee established an emergency force to maintain the truce and protect civilians for an initial period of three months. On 1 July, the committee reported that a security plan for Tripoli had been prepared and that some armed groups had withdrawn from and handed over seven key positions to the Ministry of the Interior.

32. In a statement issued on 9 July, UNSMIL called on all parties to uphold the truce, ensure that civilians protesting peacefully are protected and urged accountability for those responsible for violating the truce or international law. The Mission also engaged with security actors, including the Minister of the Interior, the Deputy Minister of Defence, members of the Deterrence Apparatus for Combating Organized Crime and others, to urge de-escalation and promote the establishment of coordinated security arrangements. In addition, UNSMIL held consultations with representatives of the truce committee, the emergency force and local mediators, including notables, community leaders and women and youth political activists.

33. The violence in Tripoli resulted in at least 13 civilian deaths (7 men, 3 women and 3 unidentified persons) and 26 injuries (23 men, of whom 10 were prisoners, and 1 woman and 2 children), extensive damage to civilian infrastructure, including hospitals and a prison, and the temporary closure of Mitiga airport, government institutions, schools, hospitals and courts. Some protests were reportedly met with unnecessary force by State security forces, resulting in the death of one police officer and injuries to five others.

34. On 3 June, skirmishes occurred in Tripoli between the Deterrence Apparatus for Combating Organized Crime and Terrorism, which is affiliated with the Presidential Council, and the General Security Apparatus, which is affiliated with the Government of National Unity. On 5 June, in Tripoli, the General Security Apparatus reportedly opened fire on the Deterrence Apparatus, resulting in the death of one General Security Apparatus fighter and injury to a Deterrence Apparatus fighter. Violence escalated again on 9 June when Deterrence Apparatus forces moved against the General Security Apparatus for allegedly violating the truce and detained a 444th Brigade patrol. The truce was restored on the same day after mediation by the disengagement force.

### **Eastern and southern Libya**

35. On 1 May, in Harawa, east of Sirte, dozens of demonstrators blocked key roads in protest against perceived punitive action by the Libyan National Army against Hassan Zagma, the former commander of the dismantled 128th Reinforced Brigade. Those tensions followed an earlier confrontation on 28 April between the military police of the Libyan National Army and forces loyal to Zagma at a military camp in Jufrah.

36. In southern Libya, tensions flared again on 15 May when a group of Tebu fighters attacked two security positions close to the Libya-Chad border held by the 676th Battalion of the Libyan National Army. The attack resulted in 4 fatalities among Libyan National Army personnel and the capture of at least 10 others. The assailants withdrew into Chadian territory. An unconfirmed number of captives were released on 17 May, following mediation by Tebu elders. On 2 July, clashes reignited between units of the Libyan National Army and Tebu fighters, reportedly backed by Chadian opposition forces, in the desert region near the Libya-Chad border. Two Libyan National Army personnel were reported killed.

37. On 6 June, clashes erupted along the Libya-Sudan border between the Subul al-Salam and 15th Battalions of the Libyan National Army and the Sudanese Joint Force aligned with the Sudanese Armed Forces. The fighting resulted in an unknown number of casualties on both sides.

## **D. Economic developments**

38. Political and institutional fragmentation and heightened tensions continued to impede efforts to achieve unified financial governance, negatively affecting the country's economy.

39. On 6 April, the Central Bank of Libya launched financial stabilization measures, including tighter controls on foreign exchange and financial transfers and stricter documentation requirements for credit. Those measures were followed by increases to the reserve requirements on 8 April and to the liquid assets ratio on 10 April, in order to enable commercial banks to better manage liquidity. On 15 April, the Central Bank introduced measures to absorb excess cash in the market and, on 8 May, concluded the withdrawal of the 50-dinar banknote from circulation, a measure that had been initially scheduled for August 2024. In a statement released on 29 June, the Central Bank clarified that there were more than 3.5 billion dinars in circulation that had not been officially issued by the Central Bank, which negatively affected the value of the Libyan dinar and increased the risk of money-laundering and financing of terrorism.

40. Following the decision of the Central Bank on 6 April to devalue the Libyan dinar because of the growing fiscal imbalance, UNSMIL issued a statement on 9 April urging all parties to reach consensus on a unified budget. The Mission reaffirmed its readiness to facilitate dialogue to that end and emphasized the urgent need to safeguard and empower the country's oversight institutions.

41. Progress was made towards the technical unification of the National Audit Bureau, despite the ongoing disputes over its leadership. On 24 April, in Tunis, UNSMIL and the World Bank convened a meeting between the chairs of the eastern and western branches of the Audit Bureau in which members of the oversight committees of the House of Representatives and the High Council of State participated. The two chairs agreed to harmonize the structures, workplans and reporting lines of the Audit Bureau and underscored the need to preserve its professional and financial independence, in order to enable it to combat corruption effectively. UNSMIL welcomed the effort to bolster economic and financial governance in a context of pervasive fiscal fragility.

42. In the aftermath of the clashes in Tripoli in May, the National Oil Corporation announced in a statement on 16 May that oil production had reached around 1.4 million barrels per day and that export operations remained uninterrupted. The Central Bank of Libya continued to carry out foreign transactions and maintain cash flows to commercial banks. On 28 May, an armed unit forcibly entered and the headquarters

of the National Oil Corporation and remained there for several hours. In reaction, the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the Prime Minister of the House of Representatives-designated government issued warnings about a potential declaration of force majeure with regard to oil production and called for the headquarters to be moved to a safer location. The National Oil Corporation later clarified that the incident stemmed from an internal personal dispute that was resolved by administrative security.

43. The parallel exchange rate remained relatively stable at 7.3 Libyan dinars to the United States dollar, although it declined briefly immediately after the clashes in Tripoli. On 3 June, it fell to approximately 7.8 dinars. The official exchange rate has remained at 5.57 dinars since 6 April.

44. On 25 June, the International Monetary Fund released the report of its 2025 article IV consultation with Libya. According to the Fund, owing to lower oil production caused by sporadic closures of oil facilities, the gross domestic product growth rate decreased from 10 per cent in 2023 to 2 per cent in 2024. Instead of an expected budget surplus in 2024, a large deficit was recorded, driven by higher government expenditure, including unexpected additional spending of 59 billion Libyan dinars by the eastern authorities.

### **III. Electoral support**

45. UNSMIL and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) continued to provide advice and technical assistance to the High National Elections Commission for municipal council elections. Funding shortfalls held back the organization of the second group of municipal council elections in 62 municipalities, which were to be held in mid-August. As at 25 March, the Government of National Unity had allocated half of the 30 million Libyan dinars requested for organizing the elections, with no indication of a time frame for further disbursements. Additional disruptions were caused by government and court decisions to alter certain municipal boundaries during the electoral process, after the Commission had completed the process of collecting candidate nominations.

46. Despite these challenges, the Commission concluded voter registration updates across the 62 municipalities on 15 April. More than 572,000 citizens were registered, 31 per cent of whom are women. Following the completion of the dispute resolution process for candidates, which was adjudicated by the judiciary and the Office of the Prosecutor, the number of eligible candidates across the 62 municipalities stood at 4,665, including 1,355 women.

47. The electoral timeline was interrupted because of the clashes that occurred in Tripoli. On 12 May, the Commission was compelled to suspend operations at its headquarters in Tripoli and its Aziziyah field office south-west of the capital, and also to delay the scheduled publication of the preliminary voter list. Limited activities resumed on 25 May, notably the production of voter cards. On 1 June, the preliminary voter list was published at 1,075 polling centres across the country and on the Commission's website. On 8 June, the Commission was forced to close its headquarters temporarily following the unauthorized entry of members of the Judicial Police Force, which is affiliated with the Ministry of Justice. The headquarters were reopened on 15 June.

48. On 28 June, the Commission began distributing voter cards across 62 municipalities, but security authorities affiliated with the House of Representative-designated government halted the process and confiscated voter cards in 10 municipalities in the east, including Benghazi, Sabhah, Sirte and Tubruq, citing

security concerns. The electoral process was also suspended in the western municipality of Janzur. Although UNSMIL engaged with the relevant authorities and urged that the electoral process be resumed, as at 22 July, election operations remained suspended in those 11 municipalities. Voter card distribution was therefore completed in 51 of the 62 municipalities only, with 379,405 individuals (117,284 women and 262,121 men) collecting their cards, representing 92 per cent of those who had registered to vote.

49. With support from UNSMIL and UNDP, the Commission continued efforts to enhance its institutional capacity and promote women's participation. On 22 and 23 April, the Commission conducted workshops for more than 3,000 staff members on voter card distribution procedures. On 24 April, it held a dialogue with former women candidates to address barriers to women's participation in elections. On 31 July, training for polling staff commenced in 51 municipalities, to be completed ahead of the polling day on 6 August.

50. The results of the 2024 municipal council elections for the municipality of Shuwayrif have still not been published, following an electoral dispute resolution process marked by reports of political pressure on the Commission and the judicial officials responsible for the process.

#### **IV. Security sector support and the implementation of the ceasefire agreement**

51. The ceasefire continued to hold. Progress on implementation of outstanding provisions of the ceasefire agreement of 2020 remained limited, owing mainly to Libyan and regional political and security dynamics.

52. UNSMIL collaborated with Promediation, a non-governmental organization (NGO), and the 5+5 Joint Military Commission on the repatriation of a group of Chadian opposition fighters. The 5+5 Joint Military Commission agreed to facilitate their return in collaboration with the Government of Chad and reaffirmed its commitment to facilitating the voluntary return of foreign forces, foreign fighters and mercenaries to their home countries, with the support of UNSMIL.

53. From 21 to 24 April, in Benghazi, UNSMIL organized a forum on media and electoral security with the participation of representatives from the High National Elections Commission, Ministry of the Interior, civil society and the media. Approximately 70 people attended the forum, of whom 35 per cent were women. The forum was aimed at raising awareness of security risks associated with misinformation, disinformation and hate speech. Participants recommended the establishment of an interactive electronic networking platform for civil society, relevant institutions and UNSMIL.

54. On 12 May, UNSMIL and the United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (UN-Women) convened a two-day workshop in Tripoli for 23 women activists and civil society representatives from across Libya to strengthen support for the full implementation of the ceasefire agreement. The workshop served as a platform to underscore the role of women in preserving security and stability in their communities.

## **A. Support for Libyan planning for interim security arrangements and reunification of security institutions**

55. On 20 April, with the support of UNSMIL, a joint technical coordination team of military and security officials from the Government of National Unity and the Libyan National Army established a joint communication and information exchange centre in Tripoli to support institutions engaged in securing the country's borders, combating terrorism and addressing irregular migration.

56. On 24 April, UNSMIL facilitated a dialogue in Benghazi between the defence committee of the House of Representatives and military prosecutors from the Libyan National Army to enhance coherence in the military judiciary system. Building on the adoption in 2024 of a code of conduct by military and security actors from across Libya to promote professionalism and accountability within the armed forces and security agencies in (see [S/2024/598](#), para. 10, and [S/2024/895](#), para. 42), on 13 May, UNSMIL facilitated a follow-up meeting in Benghazi with eastern military and police training officials to integrate the code into their training plans.

## **B. Mine action and arms and ammunition management**

57. On 16 April, to mark the International Day for Mine Action Awareness and Assistance in Mine Action, UNSMIL and the Libyan Mine Action Centre co-hosted a commemorative event with 11 national and international mine action organizations and operators. Participants emphasized the need to expand mine action operations nationwide and strengthen donor coordination.

58. UNSMIL provided technical support to the Libyan Mine Action Centre on 18 May to launch an emergency response plan following the clashes in Tripoli. The fighting, involving various types of weaponry, resulted in new contamination from unexploded ordnance affecting 14 neighbourhoods across the capital. In response, four explosive ordnance risk education teams and five explosive ordnance disposal teams from non-NGOs reached about 19,500 people, including more than 4,700 women and 3,800 children.

59. Between 13 and 28 May, four stray projectiles fell in the UNSMIL compound in Oea and three fell in the United Nations country team compound during the clashes that occurred in Tripoli. All were safely removed with support from a local partner.

## **V. Human rights, transitional justice and the rule of law**

60. Several mass graves were uncovered following the violence in Tripoli. On 15 May, the General Authority for the Search and Identification of Missing Persons received reports of a suspected grave inside Abu Salim Zoo in Tripoli, allegedly used by the Stability Support Apparatus as an informal detention site. On 18 May, the 444th Brigade released footage showing 10 burned bodies that had been exhumed from a Stability Support Apparatus facility that was under the supervision of the Ministry of the Interior of the Government of National Unity. That same day, nine bodies, reportedly belonging to Libyan National Army fighters who had been killed in the 2019 conflict, were found at Khadra' Hospital. On 19 May, the Ministry of the Interior announced the discovery of 58 bodies in Abu Salim Hospital. The General Authority for the Search and Identification of Missing Persons has not yet been granted access to those sites. UNSMIL addressed a letter to the Office of the Attorney General on 25 May in which it urged that evidence be preserved, in order to support accountability

efforts and enable the relevant national institutions to carry out proper identification and forensic procedures.

61. Separately, on 13 May, the General Authority for the Search and Identification of Missing Persons announced the discovery of a mass grave along the shore of Misratah containing the bodies of 30 unidentified persons.

62. Ahead of the review of Libya in the context of the universal periodic review in November 2025, UNSMIL, in collaboration with UNDP, UN-Women, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and Libyan civil society organizations, organized two workshops to enhance civil society engagement and advocacy. The first workshop, held in Tunis on 5 and 6 April, brought together human rights defenders from across Libya and was focused on women's rights, migrant rights, arbitrary detention and freedom of expression and association. To further strengthen civil society capacity, a follow-up workshop on legal aid was held in Tunis on 27 and 28 June.

63. From 1 to 3 July, UNSMIL, in partnership with the Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association, among others, co-hosted a workshop in Tunis on the draft law regulating civil society organizations. The workshop, which was attended by 20 civil society organizations and members of the House of Representatives, was aimed at underscoring the need to align the draft law with international standards.

64. On 12 May, Libya, through a declaration to the Registrar of the International Criminal Court under article 12 (3) of the Rome Statute, accepted the jurisdiction of the Court with respect to alleged crimes committed in its territory between 2011 and 2027.

## **A. Transitional justice and national reconciliation**

65. On 9 April, UNSMIL, UNDP and local partners launched "Mafqood", a nationwide media campaign to raise awareness of the rights of families of missing persons. On 27 April, UNSMIL, as part of its programme with UNDP on missing persons, presented an assessment of the legal framework on missing persons to the House of Representatives in Benghazi in which it highlighted legal gaps and institutional overlaps and proposed reforms for a more inclusive, victim-centred approach.

66. Consultations by UNSMIL with families of missing persons from Benghazi and Darnah that were to be held from 24 to 28 April in Benghazi were postponed after eastern security authorities cited lack of authorization. Two other activities, namely, the launch of a national civil society network on missing persons and a gathering of families from Benghazi and Darnah that was to be held in Tunisia, were also postponed following a request by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Government of National Unity to participate in the event and review the lists of invitees.

67. On 23 and 24 June, UNSMIL convened a workshop with legal experts and representatives from the High Council of State, House of Representatives, General Authority for the Search and Identification of Missing Persons, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Presidential Council, Supreme Judicial Council and National Council for Civil Liberties and Human Rights to discuss the drafting of a new law on missing persons that is aligned with international standards.

68. UNSMIL continued to advocate in favour of the adoption of a comprehensive national reconciliation and transitional justice law, in accordance with the outcomes of the Presidential Council-led process and the draft law submitted by the Presidential

Council to the House of Representatives in 2024. On 24 July, the Special Representative participated virtually in a meeting of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union to review the situation in Libya and the implementation of the African Union-sponsored Charter for Peace and National Reconciliation.

## **B. Unlawful deprivation of liberty, detention and torture**

69. On 5 May, video footage surfaced purportedly showing House of Representatives member Ibrahim al-Dersi in chains and bearing visible signs of torture. The footage was reportedly recorded shortly after his disappearance in Benghazi on 16 May 2024. UNSMIL reiterated its call for an independent investigation into the enforced disappearance of Mr. Al-Dersi and allegations of torture.

70. UNSMIL continued to receive reports of arbitrary detention in facilities operated by the Libyan National Army and the eastern Internal Security Agency. Conditions in detention facilities, including Gernada and Kuwayfiah, reportedly remained dire, characterized by prolonged detention without due process, overcrowding and denial of medical care, legal representation and family contact.

71. The seizure of Stability Support Apparatus detention facilities in Tripoli by security forces, including units under the Ministry of the Interior, enabled UNSMIL and international human rights organizations to confirm reports that they had received of torture, enforced disappearances and extrajudicial killings in those facilities. On 22 and 23 May, the Ministry of the Interior published videos of detained members of the Stability Support Apparatus in which they confessed to crimes, raising concerns about coercion and violations of fair trial rights.

72. On 5 July, an activist reportedly abducted by the Internal Security Agency on 30 June in Surman, west of Tripoli, died in unclear circumstances. UNSMIL urged the authorities to conduct a transparent and independent investigation into his arbitrary detention, allegations of torture during detention and the circumstances surrounding his death. Between March 2024 and July 2025, UNSMIL documented a total of 18 deaths in custody, comprising 16 men and 2 women.

## **C. Migrants and refugees**

73. As at February 2025, the number of refugees and migrants in Libya exceeded 858,000, according to the International Organization for Migration. Between 7 April and 6 July, more than 5,900 migrants and refugees were intercepted while attempting to cross the Mediterranean from the coast of Libya. Since January 2025, more than 13,200 migrants have been intercepted, with 370 deaths and 290 reported missing.

74. Since 3 April, more than 300 migrants and refugees have been intercepted at the Libya-Tunisia border by the Ministry of the Interior of Libya and Border Guard forces, bringing total interceptions in the area to more than 13,100 since June 2023. At the Libya-Algeria border, 170 migrants and refugees expelled from Algeria were intercepted by the Border Guard of Libya, bringing the total to more than 2,100 since January 2024. Those intercepted were transferred to facilities where they were reportedly arbitrarily detained and subjected to human rights violations. As at 13 June, 460 individuals (399 men, 51 women and 10 children) were reportedly held at the Assah detention facility and 263 in Ghadamis.

75. On 11 May, the Prime Minister issued a decree dissolving the Directorate for Combating Illegal Migration, leading to the closure of all official detention centres in Tripoli and the release of detainees, except from the Tajura' detention centre, which

remains operational with around 2,000 detained individuals. The decree established a new general administration for combating illegal migration under the Ministry of the Interior and transferred the responsibilities, assets and personnel of the Directorate to the new entity. Armed groups, however, reportedly continued to operate at least six unofficial detention centres, holding over 3,000 individuals in inhumane conditions. Serious human rights violations, including torture, sexual violence, enforced disappearance, extrajudicial killings and forced labour, have been reported at those unofficial detention centres. Those sites remain inaccessible to United Nations entities.

76. On 5 June, clashes erupted in Sabrata between rival armed groups from Sabrata and Zawiyah that led to the reported death of three fighters affiliated with the Zawiyah-based armed groups and the injury of at least three refugees and migrants, the displacement of an unconfirmed number of migrants and the detention of more than 500 refugees and migrants by local security actors. Detained refugees and migrants were initially held at a General Security Apparatus training facility before being transferred to Tajura' detention centre and other sites in Zawiyah.

## **VI. Empowerment of women**

77. On 26 April, to mark National Libyan Women's Day, UNSMIL and UN-Women co-hosted a webinar for some 70 participants on a recently published study entitled "Women in the public sector and decision-making in Libya". Discussions were focused on barriers to women's meaningful participation in public life. The participants developed recommendations aimed at enhancing women's participation in public life, including improved data collection, stronger legislation, unifying women's support offices across ministries and expanded roles for women in public office.

78. On 7 May, the House of Representatives reviewed the draft law on protecting women from violence, which was developed with the support of the United Nations.

## **VII. Youth and peace and security**

79. During the reporting period, UNSMIL, as part of its "YouEngage" youth engagement initiative, conducted 19 workshops on such topics as political inclusion, negotiation skills for young women, international humanitarian law and community violence reduction. The workshops reached 326 young persons (207 men, 119 women) across Libya.

## **VIII. Humanitarian situation and development**

80. United Nations development and humanitarian operations in Tripoli and the western region were temporarily disrupted following the outbreak of violence in May. The disruption coincided with the suspension that began in May of the activities of international NGOs ordered Libya by the Internal Security Apparatus, which cited alleged violations of national laws related to the provision of humanitarian assistance to migrants. On 25 June, the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator a.i., accompanied by representatives of international NGOs and the international community in Tripoli, met with the acting Minister for Foreign Affairs to advocate in favour of the resumption of the activities of international NGOs in the western region. The acting Minister agreed to consult

with the Attorney General on the appropriate legal pathways to enable the resumption of such activities.

81. On 9 June, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs released its Libya Humanitarian Profile for 2025. In that profile, the Office estimates that about 787,000 people remained in need of assistance, including internally displaced persons, migrants, refugees and asylum-seekers. The latest data signal a return to the 2022 figure of around 800,000, which had declined steeply to 323,000 in 2023. That decline was primarily attributable to internally displaced persons returning to their places of origin following the armed conflict. The increase in 2025 is attributable primarily to an influx of Sudanese refugees. By contrast, the number of internally displaced persons and returnees in need of humanitarian assistance decreased to 35,043 from 50,000 in 2023.

82. An estimated 370,000 to 550,000 Sudanese refugees are expected to arrive in Libya by the end of 2025. As at 7 July, only \$22 million (22 per cent) of the \$106 million needed for refugee support in Libya under the Sudan Emergency Regional Refugee Response Plan had been received.

83. On 28 April, the United Nations country team convened a coordination meeting in Benghazi with the eastern authorities to discuss the Sudanese refugee response. Participants agreed to hold follow-up sectoral meetings on healthcare, protection and registration, as well as to expand coordination in the south-west.

84. From 17 to 19 June, the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator a.i. and members of the United Nations country team travelled to eastern Libya, including Bayda', Benghazi, Darnah and Shahhat, where they met with municipal authorities to strengthen coordination on the Sudanese refugee response and improve emergency preparedness. In a notable development, the Libya Development and Reconstruction Fund agreed to more regular engagement with the United Nations country team at the technical level.

## **IX. Mission presence and security arrangements**

85. UNSMIL maintained a presence of 316 civilian staff, comprising 101 national staff, 210 international staff and 5 United Nations Volunteers. Of those, 292 were stationed in Tripoli, 19 in Tunis, 4 in Benghazi and one in Sabha. UNSMIL international staff continued to be accommodated at the Oea compound in Tripoli, protected by the United Nations Guard Unit, with the exception of 2 international staff based at the United Nations hub in Benghazi and 15 in Tunis.

86. The United Nations maintained a security presence in Tripoli and continued its engagement with Libyan security actors and international partners. UNSMIL also continued to provide two security officers on a rotational basis to support the United Nations hub in Benghazi. In response to the armed clashes in Tripoli, the United Nations activated its crisis management team from 13 to 24 May. The annual rotation of the United Nations Guard Unit occurred in May and June, with 230 troops departing and 231 arriving as the incoming contingent.

## **X. Observations**

87. The recent clashes that occurred in mid-May in Tripoli and the rapid escalation that ensued, as well as the fragile security situation in the western region and beyond, demonstrate the pressing need for Libyan actors to reverse course, refrain from

resorting to violence to achieve political objectives and engage in serious dialogue to return to a path towards sustainable peace and stability.

88. These developments underscore the imperative for a revitalized and inclusive Libyan-led and Libyan-owned political process, facilitated by UNSMIL, that leads to national elections and unified and legitimate institutions, in line with the aspirations of the Libyan people. The proposals of the advisory committee of independent Libyan experts offer credible pathways for this process. I strongly urge Libyan leaders and all stakeholders to overcome narrow interests and engage constructively and in good faith on the basis of those proposals and forge consensus on a practical, inclusive and time-bound road map towards holding national elections, unifying institutions and ending the vicious cycle of transitional phases.

89. The 20 June meeting of the International Follow-up Committee on Libya of the Berlin process, the first since 2021, signalled a renewed commitment by the international community to support the UNSMIL-facilitated political process. I urge international partners to align their efforts to promote a more active role for the Berlin process, with a view to encouraging progress on the intra-Libyan political, security, economic and human rights tracks and supporting the Mission's mandate, while fully respecting the sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of Libya.

90. The suspension of municipal election operations in 11 key municipalities in eastern Libya is deeply concerning. This action calls into question the commitment of some Libyan leaders to electoral processes and casts doubt on their commitment to the broader political process, including the future conduct of national elections.

91. I welcome the efforts of the Presidential Council and other Libyan actors, with the support of UNSMIL, to solidify the truce in Tripoli. I also commend the efforts of local leaders, notables, women and young people, whose contributions have been instrumental in de-escalation and reducing tensions. All armed actors must remain committed to upholding the truce, withdraw from civilian areas and refrain from actions that risk reigniting violence. Law enforcement operations should be conducted in full compliance with international human rights standards, with priority given to protecting civilians and respecting the rights to freedom of assembly and peaceful demonstration.

92. While the 2020 ceasefire agreement continues to hold, de-escalation in Tripoli and other parts of the western region and cooperation at the national level are needed to sustain the ceasefire and bolster the country's fragile stability. I urge the 5+5 Joint Military Commission and all concerned actors to continue with efforts to uphold the ceasefire agreement and strengthen its implementation, including by creating conditions conducive to the withdrawal of foreign forces, foreign fighters and mercenaries from Libyan territory.

93. The deterioration of the economic situation in Libya is a matter of increasing concern. Rising deficits and unchecked parallel public spending reflect systemic challenges. It is critical that Libyan actors agree on a national budget, improve financial transparency and safeguard the independence of oversight institutions. Recent steps towards the technical unification of the National Audit Bureau are a welcome development and should be fully and swiftly implemented to help restore public trust.

94. I remain deeply concerned by the human rights situation in Libya. Reports of arbitrary arrests and detention, enforced disappearances, torture, deaths in custody and discoveries of mass graves require prompt, independent and thorough investigations and accountability for those responsible.

95. Increased civic engagement by women and young people strengthens the legitimacy and increases the inclusivity of political and electoral processes. I urge the Libyan authorities to protect civic space and boost efforts to combat the spread of hate speech. I also urge the House of Representatives to finalize and adopt the draft law on protecting women from violence.

96. Conditions for migrants, asylum-seekers and refugees in Libya remain dire. I reiterate my appeal to the Libyan authorities to enhance protection of the dignity and rights of these vulnerable groups and hold accountable the perpetrators of abuse and violations against them. I encourage the Libyan authorities to continue supporting Sudanese refugees and urge the international community to scale up funding for the Sudan Emergency Regional Refugee Response Plan, in order to address urgent humanitarian needs.

97. I thank my Special Representative for Libya and Head of UNSMIL, Hanna Tetteh, and the staff of UNSMIL and the United Nations country team for their continued dedication and efforts. I also thank the Government of Nepal for its continued provision of the United Nations Guard Unit in Libya.

---