



UNITED NATIONS
LIBYA



COMMON COUNTRY ANALYSIS



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ACROYNMS

CCA: Common Country Analysis

CEDAW: Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women

CRS: Creditor Reporting System (OECD)

FDI: Foreign Direct Investment

GBV: Gender Based Violence

GDP: Gross Domestic Product

GECOL: General Electricity Company of Libya

GNU: Government of National Unity

HIV/AIDS: Human Immunodeficiency Virus/Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome

IDPs: Internally Displace Persons

ISIL: Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant – Libya

JMC: 5+5 Libyan Joint Military Commission

JTCC: Joint Technical Coordination Committee

LYD: Libyan Dinar

MVA: Manufacturing Value Added

ODA: Official Development Assistance

OECD: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development

SDGs: Sustainable Development Goals

SGBV: Sexual and Gender Based Violence

UNSMIL: United Nations Support Mission in Libya

US\$: United States Dollar

WASH: Water, Sanitation, and Hygiene

1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

A decade of political crisis and the recent violent conflict has had a devastating impact on Libya's development trajectory and its population, particularly the most vulnerable. While recent developments have resulted in a reduction in armed conflict and associated humanitarian needs, these gains remain fragile and reversible, with multiple risks threatening to derail progress. The more recent impacts of COVID-19 have further constrained progress across the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).

It is estimated that the proportion of Libyans living in multidimensional poverty has increased over the past decade while social protection systems remain inadequate to support to those most in need. Overall inequality, including income inequality, is high, with most of the country's wealth concentrated within a small proportion of the population. Food security has declined with more vulnerable households unable to meet their basic dietary and nutritional needs resulting in increasing rates of child malnutrition. Low domestic production and reliance on imports exacerbate the country's inability to reliably meet its food needs.

Libya's health and education systems have witnessed a significant deterioration in their capacities to provide accessible and quality services resulting in reduced health and educational outcomes for the population. Increasingly severe water scarcity and protracted conflict have led to a significant decline in water, sanitation, and hygiene services and facilities. Despite its large hydrocarbon resources, access to electricity has reduced, impacting domestic consumption and economic growth. Investment in renewable energy generation remains negligible despite the country's abundant solar and wind energy potential.

Conflict and the impacts of COVID-19 have had devastating consequences on Libya's economy, resulting in low and even negative economic growth rates. A reliance on fossil fuels for export revenues, the large proportion the population employed in the public sector, and a lack of economic diversification due to a poor business enabling environment further stifles the country's economic potential. Unemployment rates remain stubbornly high, particularly for women and youth.

The lack of effective urban planning has resulted in poor provision of adequate housing, services, and infrastructure to an ever-increasing urban population. Despite Libya's vulnerability to the impacts of climate change, there has been little progress towards the development and implementation of national disaster risk reduction or climate change adaptation strategies or plans. Continued environmental degradation threatens further deterioration of terrestrial and marine environments and ecosystems without meaningful action.

National capacity respond to the multitude of challenges faced by Libya has been severely constrained by conflict, political division, and fragmentation of government and governance structures, compounded by a bloated and inefficient civil service, systemic corruption, and weak transparency and accountability. Women remain severely underrepresented in government and

other decision-making institutions and processes. The provision of justice and the rule of law services in line with international norms and standards is limited. Severe human rights violations remain pervasive, particularly against non-Libyan populations, with a lack of accountability of state and non-state perpetrators, while threats to civic space stifles civil society engagement in political and social discourse.

In addition, various vulnerable and marginalized groups in Libya are either left behind or at risk of being left behind, including women and girls; children; youth; older people; displaced populations, migrants, and refugees; persons with disabilities; ethnic minorities; and people living with HIV/AIDS, who will require special attention to ensure they contribute to and benefit from Libya's development and peacebuilding trajectory.

While the challenges and risks are numerous and significant, many opportunities exist for national and international stakeholders to work in partnership in the coming years to overcome the impediments to Libya's path to inclusive, sustainable, and peaceful development.

Continued support to the peace process while addressing the root causes of the political fragility and conflict can help to create a stable peace- and state-building environment in the country. Unification and reform of government and governmental institutions would enable them to become more streamlined, efficient, responsive, and cost-effective, while strengthening of the justice and human rights institutions can help tackle inequality and systemic human rights violations.

Support to economic diversification and the creation of an enabling environment for private sector expansion can create employment opportunities outside of the public sector and help advance sustainable, inclusive, and equitable economic development. Public sector reform and capacity development provide an opportunity for efficient delivery of quality social services and social protection to the population. Building climate change resilience, protecting natural environment, and sustainable natural resource management can help mitigate the impacts of climate change and environmental degradation.

Informed by this Common Country Analysis (CCA), the UN in Libya will explore how it can best contribute to progress in these areas in partnership with various stakeholders through its upcoming United Nations Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework (2023-2025).

2. INTRODUCTION

The United Nations has been present and supporting the people of Libya since the country's independence in the 1950s, followed by the establishment of the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) in 2011. This reflects that Libya's complex and ever-evolving context, particularly after the 2011 revolution, requires the UN to continually reassess its priorities and engagement strategies to enable it to respond to a fluid operational environment.

In preparation for a new United Nations Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework for Libya (2023–2025), the UN in Libya analysed the changing context and needs through this 2021 Common Country Analysis (CCA), in close coordination with humanitarian, development, and peacebuilding actors. The new Cooperation Framework will guide the UN's collective development, stabilization, resilience, and peacebuilding interventions for the coming years in support of the Government and people of Libya.

The CCA is a collective, comprehensive, and multidimensional analysis of the situation in Libya through the lens of the 2030 Agenda and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). This represents the first time that the UN in Libya has undertaken such an in-depth and integrated SDG-centred analysis in the country. The process engaged entities across the UN system in Libya, with mandates traversing the humanitarian-development-peace spectrum. This CCA represents the outcome of this process and will form the analytical basis from which the priorities of the new Cooperation Framework will be formulated in partnership

with the Government of Libya and other stakeholders.

Analysis of progress towards the 2030 Agenda and the SDGs is framed around the five 'P's, specifically: 1) People; 2) Prosperity; 3) Planet; 4) Peace; and 5) Partnerships. In accordance with the core principle of leaving no one behind, the CCA identifies the most vulnerable and marginalized individuals and groups who are at risk of falling further behind and the causes and impacts of their exclusion. To ensure that the humanitarian-development-peacebuilding nexus permeates all aspects of the analysis, the CCA also seeks to examine the underlying causes of fragility and vulnerability of those in need to inform the development of multidimensional and cross-pillar responses.

It should be noted that the CCA process was challenged by a significant lack of reliable and recent data. To compensate, the CCA draws on alternative sources of information to best assess progress towards the SDGs, including data and analysis from in-country, non-resident, and regional UN entities, Libyan government institutions, international financial institutions, national and international non-governmental organizations, amongst others.

The CCA should be revised on an annual basis to update existing and integrate new sources of data as well as to reflect the changes in context and dynamics in the country to ensure that UN programmatic responses in support of the upcoming Cooperation Framework remain risk informed, appropriate, relevant, and effective.

LIBYA POPULATION FACTS AND FIGURES



Total Population:

6,958,537



80% of the population live in urban areas



18% of the population aged between 15-24



4.6% of the population aged 65 or above



212,593 internally displaced persons




610,128 migrants in Libya



41,897 refugees and asylum seekers

Population Age and Geographical Distribution




3. PROGRESS TOWARDS THE 2030 AGENDA AND THE SDGS AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL COMMITMENTS

A central function of the CCA is to examine Libya's progress towards the 2030 Agenda and the SDGs. Structured under five 'P's of the 2030 Agenda, namely: 1) People; 2) Prosperity; 3) Planet; 4) Peace; and 5) Partnerships, and guided and informed by the global SDG indicator framework, this chapter analyses Libya's progress towards each of the 17 Goals against their respective targets.

Where available, SDG specific indicator data is utilized in each of the sub-sections. However, the lack of comprehensive, reliable, and up-to-date SDG specific data and information makes it very difficult to adequately assess progress towards the global targets. Of the SDG indicators examined for this chapter, indicator specific data was unavailable for 46 per cent. To overcome these challenges, alternative and supplementary proxy data sources have been identified and utilized to support the assessment of the situation in each of the SDG areas.

Further challenges were posed by the lack of time series data since the adoption of the 2030 Agenda and the SDGs in 2015, making it difficult to identify trends against SDG and non-SDG specific data over time. However, through annual updates, the CCA aims to monitor progress and capture changing trends until 2030.

Figure 1: Availability of SDG indicator specific data



3.1 PEOPLE

GOAL 1: NO POVERTY




Between 2010 and 2020, GDP per capita (constant 2015 US\$) in Libya declined from US\$ 8,871 to US\$ 4,047 respectively. While having slightly increased from US\$ 4,169 in 2016 to US\$ 5,972 in 2019, GDP per capita rates plummeted in 2020, primarily as a result of COVID-19 and the 11-month blockade of oil facilities in the country.¹

While more recent data is unavailable, it was estimated that the proportion of the population living in multidimensional poverty increased from two per cent in 2014 to nine per cent in 2016.² A third of Libyan children were multidimensionally poor in 2014.

There is no reliable or recent data on the proportion of the population living below the international or national poverty lines. While declining, humanitarian needs remain high. A vulnerability study undertaken in August 2021 found that almost half of surveyed Libyan households had experienced shocks in the previous 12 months, including price fluctuations, death or illness of household member, and increase in fuel/food commodity prices.³ Those in need rely on various negative coping strategies to meet their basic needs, including the depleted savings, borrowing money, purchasing on credit, cutting back on daily meals, selling non-productive assets, and reducing non-food related expenses, particularly on health and education.⁴

Libya's social protection system consists of both contributory and non-contributory assistance programmes. Before 2011, Libya had a functional social protection system, including cash transfer capacities, which was able to effectively respond to shocks, with spending on social protection estimated at 4.4 per cent of GDP in 2010.⁵ Libya's current social protection system relies largely on energy price subsidies and cash assistance to households and is financially unsustainable. Although 46.2 per cent of the population is covered by at least one social protection benefit, the coverage of social assistance programmes remains limited.⁶ Excluding spending on universal subsidies, national social assistance expenditures account for less than one per cent of GDP.⁷ In addition, the existing social protection system

Figure 2: GDP Per Capita
(constant 2015 US\$)



in Libya remains fragmented between the public and private sectors, with the same population groups eligible for and covered under different social assistance programmes and leaving large segments of the population working in the informal sector uncovered. Libya remains one of a few countries in the Arab region with no new social protection mitigation measures introduced to tackle the effects of COVID-19 pandemic or the burden of the conflict on households.⁸

Consumer subsidies, mostly for fuel, electricity, pharmaceuticals, and others, are the main form of social protection which places a significant burden on the national budget, accounting for 12.2 per cent of GDP and around 19 per cent of current expenditure and 17.3 per cent of government expenditures in 2018.⁹

Social protection coverage also remains low among the internally displaced (14 per cent) and returnee (22 per cent) population. Refugees and migrants in Libya are not entitled to governmental provided social assistance and cannot access the existing contributory and non-contributory social protection schemes. Social protection provision is also considered discriminatory against women with disabilities and lacks mechanisms to impose social security contributions on the private sector, thus leaving many women without any form of protection.¹⁰

¹ World Bank national accounts data and OECD national accounts data: <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDPPCAP.CD?end=2020&locations=LY&start=2010>.

² Oxford Poverty and Human Development Initiative, Global Multidimensional Poverty Index Country Briefing 2020: Libya, July 2020: https://ophi.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/CB_LBY_2020.pdf

³ WFP and World Bank, Food Security and Nutrition: Libya, November 2021: <https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP-0000135056/download/>

⁴ WFP and World Bank, Food Security and Nutrition: Libya, November 2021: <https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP-0000135056/download/>

⁵ The International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth, UNICEF, 2018. Non-contributory social protection through a child and equity lens in Libya. Available at: https://ipcig.org/pub/eng/OP395_Non_contributory_social_protection_through_a_child_and_equity_lens_in_Libya.pdf

⁶ ILO, World Social Protection Report 2020-22, 2021: https://labordoc.ilo.org/discovery/delivery/41ILO_INST:41ILO_V2/1284205740002676?lang=en&viewerServiceCode=AlmaViewer

⁷ World Bank, Libya Economic Monitor, Spring 2021.

⁸ With the exception of emergency one-off in-kind assistance provided by the Zakat Fund to its existing beneficiaries as well new ones, including poor families and IDPs. In addition, the Ministry of Economy adopted a regulation controlling the price of 16 food items such as fruits, vegetables, and meat, to be revised every 3 months.

⁹ EU, UN, World Bank, Supporting Peace and Stability in Libya: A Compilation of Existing Analysis on Challenges and Needs, 2019.

¹⁰ Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Social Security Laws in Libya: A Gender-Based Perspective, 2020: <http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/libya-office/16680.pdf>

GOAL 2: ZERO HUNGER



Years of economic decline, exacerbated by conflict, and more recently COVID-19, have negatively affected the population's purchasing power and their ability to fulfil their basic needs, thereby impacting all aspects of food security. The prevalence of moderate or severe food insecurity of Libyans increased from 29 per cent in 2015 to 37.4 per cent in 2019.¹¹

A study undertaken in August/September 2021 found that eight per cent of households had inadequate food consumption, indicating an unstable diet that regularly lacks key food groups. Other perceived causes of food insecurity include cash liquidity issues, increased food prices, displacement, and the impacts of COVID-19.

Households in the east and south of the country faced significantly higher rates, standing at 32 per cent in Tobruk and 15 per cent in Murzuk. Sixty per cent of women aged 15 to 49 years old consumed minimum dietary diversity, while only 14 per cent of children aged 6 to 23 months consumed a minimum acceptable diet.¹² In April 2021, 15 per cent of female headed households were found to be food insecure, six percentage points higher than those headed by men.¹³

A survey of women at the outbreak of COVID-19, which intended to gauge the gendered impact of food insecurity, revealed that 60 per cent of women thought they would be forced to reduce meals while 42 per cent stated they would decrease their portion in family meals and opt for cheaper food items. Forty-six per cent feared increased domestic disturbance and violence, with an inability to provide food for the household as a contributing factor.¹⁴

While no recent data exists for the prevalence of wasting, rates increased from 6.5 per cent of children under five in 2007 to 10.2 per cent in 2014.¹⁵

A quarter of migrants are food insecure, with migrants originating from East and West Africa being the most vulnerable. Around 46 per cent of migrants reported being worried about their inability to have enough food due to high costs and limited availability.¹⁶ Refugees also face high rates of food insecurity, standing at 17 per cent.¹⁷

Many IDPs lost their livelihoods because of the conflict, with many having to work in the less secure informal sector, while those returning to their homes due the improved security environment face challenges in finding employment, thereby affecting their ability to sustain themselves and their families with food and other basic needs, resulting in an estimated 22 per cent of IDPs and returnees being food insecure.¹⁸ In addition, negative coping mechanisms in times of food insecurity particularly affect women and girls as social norms imply that they are last to eat when food is scarce and bear significant responsibility for sourcing food.

Libya is heavily reliant on food imports, including 90 per cent for cereals.¹⁹ Diminished exports from other countries, fluctuating exchange rates, a liquidity crisis, and COVID-19 related movement restrictions have caused a supply shortage and driven up the cost of food, by more than double pre-pandemic levels for some basic items, resulting in a doubling in the number of food insecure people in Libya in 2020. More recently, the cost of the food minimum expenditure basket in August 2021 was 24.2 per cent higher than pre-pandemic levels.²⁰

While improving, the fragile security environment continues to have direct and indirect impacts on food systems to the detriment of food security and nutrition of the population. In addition, 95 per cent of Libya's land area is desert while just one per cent is arable, which is further threatened by soil erosion and desertification.²¹

Limited access to agricultural inputs, water resources for irrigation, and support for animal healthcare due to years of conflict around the main agricultural areas has resulted in lower food production. COVID-19 caused further disruptions to agricultural extension services for farmers. Such constraints have pushed more households to abandon agricultural activities, further reducing medium- and long-term food availability. Despite its relatively small contribution to total GDP, 22 per cent of the Libyans were engaged agricultural activities in 2018.²² However, around 38 per cent of households surveyed in 2021 reported to have abandoned agriculture in the previous 12 months.²³ As such, restoring crop and livestock production and strengthening livelihood-based coping mechanisms are urgently required to increase the resilience of agricultural communities and livelihoods. This implies the dissemination of new good agricultural practices, including irrigation practices for efficient water use, to ensure that agriculture contributes to food security and nutrition to the largest possible extent.

¹¹ Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations: <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SN.ITK.MSFI.ZS?locations=LY>

¹² WFP and World Bank, Food Security and Nutrition: Libya, November 2021.

¹³ WFP and World Bank, Food Security and Nutrition: Libya, April 2021.

¹⁴ UN Women, Gender-sensitive Prevention, Response and Management of Covid-19 Outbreak in Libya, October 2020: <https://www2.unwomen.org/-/media/field%20office%20arab%20states/attachments/publications/2020/04/covid-19%20in%20libya/survey%20gendersensitive%20prevention%20response%20and%20management%20of%20covid19%20outbreak%20in%20libyabrief%20design.pdf?la=ar&vs=908>

¹⁵ UNICEF, WHO, World Bank: Joint child malnutrition estimates: <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SH.STA.WAST.ZS?locations=LY>

¹⁶ ILO, WFP, Migration Pulse, November 2021.

¹⁷ Multi-Sector Needs Assessment 2021.

¹⁸ Multi-Sector Needs Assessment 2021.

¹⁹ FAO, GIEWS Country Brief Libya, May 2020: <https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/LBY%20%281%29.pdf>

²⁰ REACH, Libya Joint Market Monitoring Initiative 1-13 August 2021, August 2021: <https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/REACH-LBY-Situation-overview-JMMI-August-2021.pdf>

²¹ EU, UN, World Bank, Supporting Peace and Stability in Libya: A Compilation of Existing Analysis on Challenges and Needs, 2019.

²² FAO, The Impact of the Crisis on Agriculture: Key findings from the 2018 Multi-Sector Needs Assessment, 2019: <https://www.fao.org/3/ca3099en/ca3099en.pdf>

²³ Multi-Sector Needs Assessment 2021.

GOAL 3: GOOD HEALTH AND WELL-BEING

3 GOOD HEALTH
AND WELL-BEING



The average life expectancy at birth in Libya in 2019 was 75.8 years (74.2 for males and 77.3 for females), which represents a slight decline from an average of 76 years in 2010.²⁴


An estimated 803,000 people are in need of primary and secondary health services, including 321,200 children.²⁵

While the maternal mortality ratio had been steadily declining, there was a sharp increase from an estimated 52 deaths per 100,000 live births in 2008 to 72 per 100,000 live births in 2017, representing a 38.5 per cent increase. While the rate in Libya is slightly higher than the average in the Middle East and North Africa at 57 deaths per 100,000 live births, it is significantly below the global average, at 211 deaths per 100,000 live births in 2017.²⁶

Despite the conflict, Libya continued to make steady progress in reducing child death rates. The under-five mortality rate declined by 72 per cent between 1990 (41.7 per 1,000 live births) and 2019 (11.5 per 1,000 live births). Both neonatal mortality rates and infant mortality rates also declined by 69 per cent (from 21 to 6.5 per 1,000 live births) and 72 per cent (from 35.6 to 9.9 per 1,000 live births) respectively over the same period.²⁷

The number of primary health workers is 76 per 10,000 population, three times the WHO standard of 23 per 10,000 population. However, an inadequate skills mix, a maldistribution

Figure 3: Maternal Mortality Ratio
(per 100,000 live births)



²⁴ WHO Global Health Observatory: [https://www.who.int/data/gho/data/indicators/indicator-details/GHO/life-expectancy-at-birth-\(years\)](https://www.who.int/data/gho/data/indicators/indicator-details/GHO/life-expectancy-at-birth-(years))²⁵ WFP and World Bank, Food Security and Nutrition: Libya, November 2021.

²⁵ MSNA 2021 and Sector PIN

²⁶ UN Women, GWHO, UNICEF, UNFPA, World Bank Group, and the United Nations Population Division. Trends in Maternal Mortality: 2000 to 2017. Geneva, World Health Organization, 2019: <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SH.STAMMRT?locations=LY-1W-ZQ>

²⁷ WHO Global Health Observatory: [https://www.who.int/data/gho/data/indicators/indicator-details/GHO/under-five-mortality-rate-\(probability-of-dying-by-age-5-per-1000-live-births\)](https://www.who.int/data/gho/data/indicators/indicator-details/GHO/under-five-mortality-rate-(probability-of-dying-by-age-5-per-1000-live-births))


²⁸ Libyan Ministry of Health and WHO, Service Availability and Readiness Assessment of the public health facilities in Libya, 2017: http://www.emro.who.int/images/stories/libya/sara_3_service_availability_and_readiness_assessment_final.pdf?ua=1

²⁹ WHO, Health situation updates, selected districts, 2021.

³⁰ WHO, Health situation updates, selected districts, 2021.

³¹ Libyan Ministry of Health and WHO, Service Availability and Readiness Assessment of the public health facilities in Libya, 2019 Update.

Figure 4: Child Deaths
(per 1,000 live births)



between geographical areas, and the different levels of healthcare available are concerns. The number of professional midwives in hospitals was limited to just 467 in 2017.²⁸

Reports indicate that up to 90 per cent of existing primary healthcare centres remained closed in some areas in 2021,²⁹ including due to increased transmission of COVID-19 among health workers, and a lack of personal protective equipment and supplies. Of those remaining operational, 80 per cent of primary health centres did not have any of the essential medicines when assessed in 2021. Thirty-seven per cent (80) of health facilities were reported as fully or partially damaged during the conflict. Only 20 per cent of communities have child health and emergency services, 25 per cent have general clinical services, and 15 per cent have services for reproductive healthcare and noncommunicable and communicable diseases. Support for rehabilitation of health facilities in remote areas is insufficient while provision of mobile medical teams is inadequate. Support for disability services for more than 100,000 people is also lacking.³⁰

The general medicine availability score was 41 per cent for hospitals, 10 per cent for primary health centres, and 13 per cent for warehouses.³¹ Medicines that are supplied through specialized centres, such as for tuberculosis and HIV medicines, as well as mental illness and reproductive health and family planning medicines and commodities, are limited or not available in health facilities. Treatments for non-communicable diseases is largely unavailable, including medicines for diabetes.

Libya continues to face repeated stockouts of critical routine

immunization vaccines which has been compounded by difficulties in securing funds from the Central Bank of Libya to place new procurement orders. Only 46 per cent of IDP and returnee households possess a vaccination card for their children compared to 62 per cent among non-displaced households.³²

Although declining, cases of COVID-19 remain high, with a total of 388,183 confirmed cases and over 5,700 deaths by the end of 2021. Twenty-seven per cent of the population had received at least one vaccination dose by the end of the year, only 12 per cent were fully vaccinated.³³ Only one per cent of refugees in Libya were vaccinated for COVID-19 as of September 2021.³⁴

Prior to 2011, Libya's health system and outcomes were improving, with notable progress being made across various health related indicators. The 2009 Millennium Development Goals Report for Libya stated that the country was on track to meet its health-related targets by 2015.

However, a decade of conflict and a lack of unified governance has reversed many of these gains and has prevented the meaningful implementation of essential health system reforms, including decentralization. Reorganization of health services and establishment of regional health authorities and municipal health offices is yet to be completed, while revision, harmonization, and costing of the Libyan Essential Package of Health Services is required. Uncertainty around national and international investment healthcare programmes also hinders short-and longer-term reforms.

Finalized in 2019, the Well and Healthy Libya: National Health Policy 2030 was expected to address systemic issues in the sector. In addition, the recently unified Ministry of Health is committed to developing a national health sector recovery strategy. Despite this, significant challenges remain.

Libya currently lacks a national health data repository, standardized guidelines for data management, institutionalized data quality assessments, and a functioning web-based health information system. However, the Ministry of Health, in collaboration with development partners, is seeking to strengthen the country's health information management systems.

In 2014, the last year for which data is available, Libya's total expenditure on health accounted for five per cent of GDP. At present, the Government's financial inputs are mainly limited to the disbursement of salaries, with very little or no allocation for drugs, diagnostics tests, and equipment. Although healthcare at public sector facilities is free for all citizens, distrust and disruption of services have led to a growing private sector. Private health expenditure accounted for 26 per cent of total

health expenditure in 2014. The outsourcing services of public health facilities to private companies is of particular concern. Despite minimal oversight or regulation, pharmacies also play a major role, particularly for those who cannot afford to access healthcare from private providers.³⁵

Of Libyan households requiring healthcare in the three months prior to being surveyed in 2021, 56 per cent reported at least one member could not access when needed, predominantly due to an inability to afford the costs and poor quality of services. Cultural barriers and pre-existing discrimination mean women and girls are more likely to face challenges in accessing health centres and services due to the lack of documentation required by many public health facilities.³⁶

Access to free primary healthcare for migrants and refugees varies across the country, whereby in some areas they can access services while in others they cannot. As such, the issue of formalization of access to free healthcare to non-Libyan populations requires further regulation and action by authorities. Due to a lack of documentation, the inability to cover the costs, and security concerns to reach or access facilities, 77 per cent of migrants in Libya have limited or no access to basic healthcare, including emergency services³⁷ while 17 per cent of refugees reported they could not access essential health services when needed.^{38,39} Migrant and refugee women and children face obstacles to access maternal and child health services and clinical management of rape services (for SGBV survivors) resulting in unintended pregnancies, miscarriages, HIV and sexually transmitted infection transmission, and maternal and new-born deaths.

GOAL 4: QUALITY EDUCATION

4 QUALITY
EDUCATION



Before the 2011 revolution, Libya was an outstanding performer in the Middle East and North Africa on several education indicators. The country met its education Millennium Development Goals. In 2008, Libya's adult literacy was 88 per cent, compared to a 72 per cent regional average, and there was universal literacy among males and females aged 15–24 years.

Although Libya provides free and compulsory education, school attendance and enrolment rates in primary and lower secondary appears to have declined since 2011. As of 2021, 13 per cent of surveyed families reported having at least one child not enrolled in school, 17 per cent reported having at least one

³² Multi-Sector Needs Assessment 2021

³³ WHO COVID-19 dashboard: <https://covid19.who.int/region/emro/country/ly>

³⁴ UNHCR data

³⁵ WHO, Health situation updates, selected districts, 2021.

³⁶ OCHA, Humanitarian Response Plan, January 2021: https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/libya_hrp_2021-final.pdf

³⁷ IOM Libya DTM

³⁸ Multi-Sector Needs Assessment 2021

³⁹ While data on migrants and refugee access to health services seems inconsistent, they should be read considering the differences between the population groups for at least two reasons: 1. Migrant population is more than 10-fold than refugee generating challenges in healthcare absorption capacity. 2. Being a more limited number, a higher percentage of refugee have access to dedicated services provided by UNHCR and partners and moreover refugees populations includes nationalities recognized as vulnerable by Libyan authorities.

at least one child not enrolled or attending school.⁴⁰ In 2021, 53 per cent of migrant and refugee families reported that their school-aged children lacked access to education.⁴¹ Migrant and refugee children face particular challenges in accessing schools due to an inability to pay for school fees and other expenses, a lack of documentation (birth certificates, school certification from country of origin, or lack of a residency permit) and bullying, racism, and discrimination.⁴² An estimated 159,030 children were in need of humanitarian education support at the end of 2021.⁴³ Pre-kindergarten/pre-primary education, which was provided primarily by the private sector,⁴⁴ has until now not been a compulsory component of Libya's education system and has had historically low levels of participation for all children.

Libya does not have a fully functional routine information system to provide data for evidence-based policy, resource allocation, and programme decision making on education. Consequently, basic data (e.g., number of students, number of schools, number of teachers, etc.) is not systematically tracked or easily available. As such, enrolment rates are estimations and/or based on sample-surveys.

Contributing to gaps in education quality, there is a major surplus of teachers, estimated at 200,000 in 2019, who remain on the Ministry of Education's payroll despite being inactive.⁴⁵ Weakness in teacher management and low sectoral efficiency is reflected in extremely low student-to-teacher ratios. In 2012, the World Economic Forum ranked Libya 140 out of 144 countries in teacher training. The teacher workforce is overwhelmingly comprised of female teachers.⁴⁶

The Ministry of Education is the lead government agency for education. However, the mandate for teacher development does not reside within a single ministry. The Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research offers pre-service teacher education through universities and colleges, while the Ministry of Education offers in-service teacher training. The National Board for Technical and Vocational Training and Education, an independent administrative authority, is responsible for technical and vocational education and training. However, coordination between the three bodies is limited.

Of particular concern, there is evidence that violence in schools is frequent in many parts of the country (teacher-to-student and peer-to-peer, including gender-based violence), though it is legally prohibited. A 2018 study found that 67 per cent of children reported that they had experienced violence at the hands of their teacher within the 12 months prior to the study and 36 per cent of children reported peer-bullying.⁴⁷

In the absence of proper budgetary allocations by the government, particularly related to development, the majority of public spending in education is dedicated to salaries while there has been insufficient allocation of funds for essential schools equipment and supplies, school infrastructure, teacher training, and curriculum development. Physical infrastructure in the education sector has been severely affected by the protracted conflict. Between 2011 and 2019, at least 37 schools were destroyed and 182 were partially damaged.⁴⁸ Between January and September 2020 alone, the previous Government of National Accord based in Tripoli reported that 16 schools were targeted by strikes resulting in physical damage, affecting approximately 15,890 students.^{49,50} In addition, 27 schools in 14 municipalities were repurposed to serve as temporary IDP shelters in 2020.⁵¹ A 2019 assessment of 17 mantikas (regions)⁵² also found that some schools had been taken over by armed actors to serve as military barracks and field hospitals.⁵³

An estimated 74 per cent of schools lack adequate safe drinking water.⁵⁴ Many schools lack gender sensitive water, sanitation, and hygiene (WASH) facilities which can impact the regular attendance of adolescent girls. Around 35 per cent of schools do not have gender segregated latrines while 15 per cent of those with latrines do not have handwashing facilities.⁵⁵

The reduced availability of schools has led to overcrowding.⁵⁶ Urban areas have extremely large school populations, with some primary schools accommodating as many as 2,000 students.⁵⁷ Some schools have adopted a shift system to facilitate the large numbers of students which also impacts the ability to develop extracurricular activities.

To mitigate the spread of COVID-19, Libya closed all its schools in March 2020, affecting an estimated 1.3 million children.⁵⁸ Schools reopened in the western region for the preparation of grade 12 exams in August 2020, and in the eastern region in September

⁴⁰ REACH. 2021. MSNA Key Findings: Libyan population (December 2021).

⁴¹ IOM. 2021. IOM Libya Migrant Report, July - September 2021, Round 38, p. 12

⁴² REACH. 2021. Libya Multi-Sectoral Needs Assessments (MSNA) 2021: Key Preliminary Findings (PowerPoint Presentation, August 2021).

⁴³ OCHA (December 2021), Humanitarian Needs Overview Libya 2022

⁴⁴ Ministry of Education, Nationwide School Assessment, 2012.

⁴⁵ Some nonqualified teachers are also on the education sector's payroll. They are generally not assigned teaching positions (MoE, UNICEF, and European Union, 2019).

⁴⁶ Libya Education Sector, Joint Education Needs Assessment, December 2019: <https://educationclusterapp.box.com/v/LibyaJENADec2019>

⁴⁷ CORAM (2018) "Study on Violence against Children in Libya" p. 36 and 55

⁴⁸ OCHA, Humanitarian Response Plan, 2020: https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/libya_hrp_2020_english_full_v1.pdf

⁴⁹ Data reported by the Government of Libya, "Attack in Schools 2019-2020 Sept 2020."

⁵⁰ United Nations, Socio-Economic Framework for the Response to COVID-19 in Libya, October 2020.

⁵¹ United Nations, Socio-Economic Framework for the Response to COVID-19 in Libya, October 2020.

⁵² The 17 targeted mantikas for the 2019 MSNA were: Al Jabal, Al Gharbi, Al Jfara, Al Jufra, Al Kufra, Azzawya, Benghazi, Derna, Ejdabia, Ghat, Misrata, Murzuq, Sebha, Sirt, Tripoli, Ubari, Wadi Ashshati and Zwara.

⁵³ REACH/ACTED, Libya 2019 Multi-Sector Needs Assessment, April 2020.

⁵⁴ OCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview Libya 2022, December 2021.

⁵⁵ Libya Education Sector, Joint Education Needs Assessment, December 2019.


⁵⁶ OCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview 2021, December 2020.

⁵⁷ Ministry of Education, UNICEF and European Union (2019). Towards a strategy for teacher development in Libya. Conducted in 2013/2014 and updated in 2017, p. 24.

⁵⁸ United Nations, Socio-Economic Framework for the Response to COVID-19 in Libya, October 2020.

2020 for the preparation for grade 9 exams.⁵⁹ Schools remained closed for all other grades until January 2021. The Ministry of Education introduced distance education via television and digital platforms during the school closure, however, just 17 per cent of surveyed households with enrolled school-aged children reported access to education during COVID-19 lockdown measures.⁶⁰

The Ministry of Education reports that for the 2019/2020 academic year, the primary school certificate pass rate was 62 per cent,⁶¹ while the secondary certificate rate was 44 per cent.⁶² While performance is not dramatically different from previous years, results likely do not fully reflect the learning levels for most children unable to go to schools for almost nine months due to COVID-19, while remote learning reached a minority of children.



Libya is a party to several international instruments that provide for gender equality under the law and promote women's rights, including the right to a life free from violence. Libya ratified the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) in 1989, and its optional protocol in 2004, however it maintains reservations to some articles as well as a general reservation that accession cannot conflict with personal status laws derived from Sharia.⁶³ Libya also ratified the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa (Maputo Protocol) in 2004. Despite this, Libya's ranking in the global Gender Inequality Index dropped from 41 out of 162 countries in 2018 to 56 in 2019.⁶⁴

Libya's Draft Constitution includes several sections on women's rights which explicitly outlines the principle of equality between men and women.⁶⁵ A state minister for Women's Affairs was appointed as part of the GNU with a mandate to work on areas related to women's empowerment. The absence of a well-established national machinery for women in Libya led to the establishment of different entities with different and conflicting mandates. An Office of Women and Youth was also established within the Presidential Council but has a limited mandate.

While women and men have the same voting rights, the political landscape in Libya remains dominated by men.⁶⁶ Just 16 per cent of parliamentary seats are held by women (30 out of 188 seats) as of January 2021,⁶⁷ while just 5 out of 33 ministerial positions are held by women. Law 59 on Local Governance that reserves at least one seat in municipal councils is often misconstrued to limit women's participation to only one seat. Only 16 of the 75 delegates in the Libyan Political Dialogue Forum were women. While the ensuing roadmap reflected the demand that women occupy at least 30 per cent of leadership positions, this was not implemented within the newly formed government. The quota for women's representation under the new electoral laws developed in preparation for the subsequently postponed December 2021 elections stand at just 16 per cent. There also appears to have been no progress towards gender-responsive budgeting under the 2021 budget presented to the House of Representatives.

Women's exclusion from political leadership roles broadly reflective of prevailing societal attitudes, particularly amongst men. For instance, research conducted in 2019 found that 71 per cent of men agreed or strongly agreed that political leadership in the community should be largely in the hands of men compared to 55 per cent of women.⁶⁸

Libyan women active in public life, including human rights defenders, activists, elected officials and peacebuilders, continue to be targeted with violence, ranging from online harassment and defamation campaigns to physical attacks, abductions, extortion, blackmail, smear campaigns, and assassinations designed to intimidate, silence, discredit and stigmatize their work. Women engaged in activities to prevent and counter violent extremism in their families and communities also face significant risks to their lives and wellbeing.⁶⁹ In October 2021, the OHCHR Fact-Finding Mission's highlighted concerns regarding the enforced disappearance and extrajudicial killings of prominent women activists and figures.

There are multiple gaps in the legal framework that allows for domestic violence to go largely under-reported, exonerates a rapist if he marries his victim, and reduced penalties in cases of "honour" crimes.

Violence against women is simultaneously widely prevalent and an exceptionally taboo topic in Libyan society. As such, there is a lack of accurate data and information on GBV in the country. The most common forms of GBV are assaults, conflict related GBV, sexual violence, early and forced marriage, harassment, and human trafficking. Sexual and gender-based violence have been widely used as a weapon in the context of the Libyan conflict by combatants on both sides.⁷⁰ Sexual violence, including sexual torture,

⁵⁹ United Nations, Socio-Economic Framework for the Response to COVID-19 in Libya, October 2020.

⁶⁰ REACH (2020). 2020 Libya Multi-Sector Needs Assessments (MSNAs), Key Preliminary Findings October 2020.

⁶¹ Rabia Golden (January 2021), 'Ministry of Education: 62.4% pass rate for primary school certificate', The Libya Observer: <https://www.libyaobserver.ly/inbrief/ministry-education-624-pass-rate-primary-school-certificate>

⁶² Libyan Express (December 2020), 'Secondary Education certificate results: Less than half passed their exams', Libyan Express: <https://www.libyanexpress.com/secondary-education-certificate-results-less-than-half-passed-their-exams/>

⁶³ United Nations, Socio-Economic Framework for the Response to COVID-19 in Libya, October 2020.

⁶⁴ UNDP, Gender Equality Index annex table, 2020: http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/2020_statistical_annex_table_5.pdf

⁶⁵ For example, Law 10 of 1984, law 16 of 1985, law 12 of 2010

⁶⁶ OECD, Gender Index, 2019: <https://www.genderindex.org/wp-content/uploads/files/datasheets/2019/LY.pdf>

⁶⁷ UN Women, Women in Politics 2021, January 2021: <https://www.unwomen.org/-/media/headquarters/attachments/sections/library/publications/2021/women-in-politics-2021-en.pdf?i=en&vs=353>

⁶⁸ UN Women and Monash University, Gender Equality and Violent Extremism: A Research Agenda for Libya, 2019: https://arabstates.unwomen.org/sites/default/files/Field%20Office%20Arab%20States/Attachments/Publications/2019/11/Monash_GenderEquality_ViolentExtremism_paper_ART2.pdf

⁶⁹ UN Women and Monash University, Gender Equality and Violent Extremism: A Research Agenda for Libya, 2019.

⁷⁰ UNDP, 2018

against female and male refugees and migrants, is widespread (see section on displaced populations, migrants, and refugees in Chapter “Leave No One Behind” for further information).

GBV services are provided in 10 mantikas in Libya and include specialized health care (clinical management of rape), mental health and psychosocial support, GBV case management, and material assistance (dignity kits distribution) in addition to GBV prevention. However, the absence of shelters and protection services remain the main challenge in tackling GBV.⁷¹ Critical gaps remain in the provision of clinical management of rape and case management services in 18 out of the 22 mantikas in Libya.⁷² In addition, police forces are not trained to deal with victims of violence and most police stations do not have policewomen or social workers to handle such cases.

Law enforcement and judicial responses to gender-based violence are inadequate, contributing to significant underreporting of incidents by women and girl survivors who may fear further harm, including stigmatization by the community or retribution at the hands of perpetrators, if they report or pursue legal remedies. The absence of a legal framework addressing the situation of refugees and asylum seekers, and the precarious legal status of refugee women and girls, further contributes to their susceptibility to GBV and exploitation.

In June 2020, the Supreme Judicial Court in Libya established two special courts in Benghazi and Tripoli to deal with cases of violence against women and children. Six judges were appointed to the courts, (five women and a man) and were trained in gender-based violence and international conventions including CEDAW and the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child at the end of 2020.⁷³

The Family Law stipulates that the minimum age for marriage for women and men is 20, although a court may allow those under this age to marry if there is a specific reason, benefit, or necessity. While there are no official statistics on early marriage in Libya, the practise appears not to be common, although there are reports of it increasing, particularly in rural areas where early marriage is protected by tribal custom. While the law previously imposed restrictions on polygamy, these were lifted by Libya’s Supreme Court in 2013, allowing a husband to take a second wife without the consent of the first.⁷⁴

Many women whose spouses were killed, severely injured, forcibly disappeared, or unlawfully detained as a result of the conflict have been forced to become the main breadwinner of the household, thereby contributing to further financial hardship and mental stress. COVID-19 has also exacerbated or re-entrenched women’s traditional roles in the household, including bearing the burden of maintaining household sanitation and hygiene and caring for sick family members or children unable to attend school during the pandemic. Confinement in the home with male family members under stressful circumstances further increased the threat of domestic violence.⁷⁵

GOAL 6: CLEAN WATER AND SANITATION

6 CLEAN WATER
AND SANITATION



Libya is considered one of the most water scarce countries in the world, with renewable water reserves of just 103m³ per person per year, compared to an internationally required minimum of 1,000m³ per person per year.⁷⁶ Despite such shortages, individual water consumption is around 350–400 litres per person per day which is considered a high compared to between 50–100 litres per capita per day required to meet basic needs according to the WHO. Water use is unmonitored and free, as such there is no incentive for the public to conserve water.

The impacts of climate change are compounding water scarcity, including through droughts, floods, and extreme weather and heat events, which can damage vital water and sanitation infrastructure and services at homes, schools and healthcare facilities, and food supplies.

Providing around 60 per cent of Libya’s of freshwater needs, the Great Man-Made River Project exploits water from non-renewable aquifers that cannot be recharged by rain. Higher temperatures and diminished rainfall increase irrigation needs, places further pressure on water resources, and increases the risk of drought. A lack of awareness of the optimal use and conservation of water, and the penetration of seawater into coastal aquifers, further contributes to the water crisis.

The protracted conflict in Libya has caused a severe decline in access to water, sanitation, and hygiene (WASH) services and facilities. Only 65 per cent of households have access to the public water network, while just 44.7 per cent are connected to the wastewater network.⁷⁷ The situation has been exacerbated by frequent power cuts, a lack of fuel needed for operations, and unmaintained and damaged water infrastructure, which increases waste and threatens water supplies and sanitation services. Governance in the water sector is fragmented between several actors while a lack of data due to an absence of regular collection and information management systems, hinders effective sectoral planning and development.

Given the severity of water scarcity, primary consideration needs to be given to the rapid improvement of the water management system, including the purification of wastewater (currently more than 90 per cent is disposed of into the sea untreated), to prolong the availability of existing water sources. Significant investment should also be made to develop alternative water sources, including desalination at scale.

⁷¹ USAID, Libya Gender analysis, June 2020: https://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PA00WRDD.pdf

⁷² GBV AoR, Secondary Data Review: Libya, June 2021

⁷³ UN Women, Gender Justice and the Law Report: Libya. June 2021 (publication pending).

⁷⁴ UNFPA, Libya: Gender Justice and the Law, 2018: https://arabstates.unfpa.org/sites/default/files/pub-pdf/Libya%20Country%20Assessment%20-%20English_0.pdf

⁷⁵ USAID, Libya Gender analysis, June 2020.

⁷⁶ Libya National Voluntary Review 2020: <https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/memberstates/libya>

⁷⁷ UNICEF, Assessment of national water systems, 2019: https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/1CxxwVjbr_uJSfI251MN7hOLIOcq7mNcs?usp=sharing

3.2 PROSPERITY

GOAL 7: AFFORDABLE AND CLEAN ENERGY

7 AFFORDABLE AND
CLEAN ENERGY



GOAL 8: DECENT WORK AND ECONOMIC GROWTH

8 DECENT WORK AND
ECONOMIC GROWTH



Despite its vast energy reserves, the proportion of Libya's population with access to electricity declined from almost 100 per cent in 2000, to 80 per cent in 2011, before declining further to just 69 per cent in 2019, meaning over 2 million Libyans are without electricity.⁷⁸ While 83 per cent of the urban population had access to electricity in 2019 (0.88 million people without electricity), rural access stood at just 7.5 per cent (1.2 million people without electricity),⁷⁹ resulting primarily from the destruction of facilities as a result of conflict or deterioration due to lack of maintenance.

As of 2021, only half of Libya's 10,236 megawatts of installed capacity, some 5,300 megawatts, is functional. In the summertime, which coincides with peak demand, production drops further to 3,700 megawatts due to inefficiencies created by heat.


There is no ministry in Libya responsible for the energy sector, with this function falling under the purview of the Prime Minister. Electricity is generated by the fully integrated state monopoly company, General Electricity Company of Libya (GECOL), which manages all aspects of the sector from production to distribution and retail. GECOL continues to charge one of the lowest tariffs in the world at 0.02 LYD/KWh, or about US\$ 0.004 for households and 0.031 LYD/KWh, or about US\$ 0.007 for businesses, well below actual operational costs.⁸⁰ There has been a gradual transition towards natural gas, which now produces 68 per cent of Libya's power in 2020, with the remaining power generated by oil.

Established in 2007, the Renewable Energy Authority of Libya (REAOL) is responsible for accelerating the adoption of renewable energy in the country, however, it lacks any regulatory powers to support its mandate. As such, Libya has made very little progress in its energy transition and has not installed any on-grid utility scale renewable energy to date, despite its vast solar radiation and wind potential. Renewable energy accounted for only 0.03 per cent of total energy consumption in the country in 2018.⁸¹ Growth in the renewable energy sector is disincentivised by the heavily subsidized power provided by GECOL which stifles innovation and makes private sector power generation uncompetitive.

Libya's economy has been decimated by conflict and instability over the past decade, with many years witnessing a contraction of the economy. While there was positive growth between 2017 and 2019, the impact of COVID-19 and the 11-month blockade of oil facilities starting in January 2020 resulted in negative growth of -31.3 per cent in 2020 to US\$ 37.8 billion.⁸² The annual growth rate of GDP per employed person also declined from 24 per cent in 2017 to -20.7 per cent in 2019.⁸³

The resumption of oil production, which returned to 1.2 million barrels a day, and the rebound in international oil prices, gives Libya an optimistic outlook in 2021, with an estimated growth forecast of 67 per cent.

Figure 5: Real GDP Growth Rate
(percentage change over previous year)



Total labour force participation (ages 15–64) has been steadily increasing over the past decades, reaching 52.8 per cent in 2019, although the rate of increase has slowed in recent years.⁸⁴

However, the participation rate for women stood at 36.5 per cent in 2019 compared to 68.8 per cent for men.⁸⁵ Although well below

⁷⁸ World Bank Global Electrification Database: <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/EG.ELC.ACCS.ZS?locations=LY>

⁷⁹ Africa Energy Portal, Libya Country Profile: <https://africa-energy-portal.org/country/libya>

⁸⁰ Data as of June 2021 from [GlobalPetrolPrices.com](https://www.globalpetrolprices.com)

⁸¹ IRENA, Renewable Energy Statistics 2021, August 2021: https://irena.org/-/media/Files/IRENA/Agency/Publication/2021/Aug/IRENA_Renewable_Energy_Statistics_2021.pdf

⁸² World Bank national accounts data and OECD National Accounts data files: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?end=2020&locations=LY&most_recent_value_desc=true&start=2010

⁸³ UNDESA, SDG Country Profile - Libya: <https://country-profiles.unstats.un.org/ly/#goal-8>


⁸⁴ International Labour Organization, ILOSTAT database: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.TLF.ACT1.ZS?end=2019&locations=LY&most_recent_value_desc=true&start=1990

⁸⁵ International Labour Organization, ILOSTAT database: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.TLF.ACT1.FE.ZS?end=2019&locations=LY&most_recent_value_desc=true&start=1990

that of men's participation, women's role in the labour market in Libya is higher than regional levels, mainly due to Libya's high level of public sector employment. It is estimated that the private sector represented only 14 per cent of employment in Libya (2.5 per cent of women and 11 per cent of men) in 2016.⁸⁶

The total unemployment rate in Libya was 19.4 per cent of the total labour force in 2020, with this number standing at 24 per cent for women compared to 15.4 for men.⁸⁷ Skills provided by the education system often do not meet labour market needs, contributing to high unemployment rates among youth (ages 15–24), standing almost 50 per cent in 2019 (41.6 per cent for men and 68.4 per cent for women).^{88,89} While reliable data is unavailable, it is estimated that the proportion of workers employed in the informal sector increased from 10 per cent in 2013 to at least 20 per cent in 2021.⁹⁰

Figure 6: Unemployment Rate



Migrant unemployment rates increased to 22 per cent in April 2021, higher than pre-COVID-19 levels at 17 per cent in February 2020, before declining to 20 per cent in May and June 2021.⁹¹ Despite persistent high unemployment rates, there is no youth employment or national employment strategy. In addition, the last labour market survey undertaken in the country was in 2012 which hinders the development of evidence-based employment policies.⁹² Libya has ratified all eight of the International Labour Organization's Fundamental Conventions and Principles.

The social norms in Libya force women to take the full burden of unpaid domestic work in addition to caring for their families.

Despite legal obligations under the Constitution and labour laws for the public and private sector to guarantee equal opportunities and prohibit discrimination based on gender,⁹³ women on average earn 10 per cent less than men.⁹⁴ Women in Libya also earn nearly three times less than men, with reported average earnings of LYD 722 (US\$ 523)⁹⁵ compared to male counterparts at LYD 1,783 (US\$ 1,292).⁹⁶ The highest income earned by women was amongst those in Tripoli, at LYD 923 (US\$ 669) while the average for other regions varies by LYD 100 to 200. Women are more likely than men to be employed in the public sector which may account for women's lower earnings. According to survey data from 2018, the tendency to seek work in the public sector is largely a result of the unpaid care and domestic burden women have within the home, with the public sector offering more flexible working hours and more stable contracts and benefits.⁹⁷

The overwhelming reliance on hydrocarbons as a driver of economic growth, and the inflated numbers of people employed in the public sector, demonstrate the need for economic diversification. However, much delayed economic reforms have hindered the creation of an enabling environment for small and medium-sized enterprises, despite consensus from international and national financial institutions on the necessity to diversify Libya's economy beyond oil and gas production. Libya ranked 186 out of 190 countries globally in the World Bank Ease of Doing Business 2020 survey which assesses regulations that either enhance or constrain business activity.⁹⁸ Small and medium-sized enterprises also face challenges in obtaining funding. While there have been attempts to incentivise banks to provide loans, these are often refused due to no or limited guarantees for their loans.

Despite the conclusion of the UN-facilitated audit, the Central Bank of Libya remains divided, creating stress on the banking sector, inhibiting private sector activity, leaving unaddressed outstanding liabilities, and inhibiting further monetary reform policies.

GOAL 9: INDUSTRY, INNOVATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE

9 INDUSTRY, INNOVATION
AND INFRASTRUCTURE



Libya's manufacturing sector face many challenges that hamper its development and growth potential. Manufacturing

⁸⁶ OECD, 2016. The Development Dimension. SMEs in Libya's Reconstruction: Preparing for a Post-Conflict Economy. Paris: OECD Publishing: https://read.oecd-ilibrary.org/development/smes-in-libya-s-reconstruction_9789264264205-en#page1

⁸⁷ International Labour Organization, ILOSTAT database

⁸⁸ EU, UN, World Bank, Supporting Peace and Stability in Libya: A Compilation of Existing Analysis on Challenges and Needs, 2019.

⁸⁹ International Labour Organization, ILOSTAT database: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.UEM1524.ZS?end=2019&locations=LY&most_recent_value_desc=true&start=1990 and https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.UEM1524.MA.ZS?end=2019&locations=LY&most_recent_value_desc=true&start=1990

⁹⁰ IOM, Labour Market Assessment Libya, August 2021: https://libya.iom.int/sites/g/files/tmzbd1931/files/documents/20210811_LMA%20Collated%20Report%20ENG.pdf

⁹¹ IOM, Libya—Migrant Report 37 (May–June 2021), 16 August 2021: <https://dtm.iom.int/reports/libya-%E2%80%94-migrant-report-37-may-june-2021>

⁹² ILO Libya Country Dashboard: https://www.ilo.org/ilostat-files/Country_Dashboard/LBY.html

⁹³ UN Women, Gender Justice and the Law Report: Libya. June 2021 (in process of being published).

⁹⁴ IOM, Labour Market Assessment Libya, January 2021: https://libya.iom.int/sites/g/files/tmzbd1931/files/documents/20210811_LMA%20Collated%20Report%20ENG.pdf

⁹⁵ The numbers featured are according to the UN exchange rate of 2018 (November).

⁹⁶ UN Women, The Economic and Social Impact of Conflict on Libyan Women, January 2020: http://elibrary.arabwomenorg.org/Content/21545_libya%20report%20english.pdf


⁹⁷ Ibid.

⁹⁸ World Bank, Doing Business 2020: Libya, 2020: <https://www.doingbusiness.org/content/dam/doingBusiness/country/L/libya/LBY.pdf>

contributes very little to the overall economy and performs poorly in terms of employment generation, productivity, and competitiveness. In addition, the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic significantly impacted the sector.

Manufacturing value added (MVA) as a proportion of GDP has seen its lowest ratio since 2013, declining from 2.9 per cent in 2019 to 2.4 per cent in 2020.⁹⁹ Libya also performs poorly compared to its regional counterparts, including Morocco (17.3 per cent), Egypt (15.3 per cent), Tunisia (14.5 per cent), and Algeria (5 per cent). MVA per capita (constant 2015 US\$) in Libya also decreased from US\$ 134 in 2019 to just US\$ 45 in 2020.¹⁰⁰ A continuation of this decline risks premature deindustrialization.

Figure 7: Manufacturing Value Added as Proportion of GDP
(constant 2015 US\$)




Industrialization is only beneficial when it is inclusive and sustainable, while the creation of employment opportunities in the formal economy is a prerequisite for inclusive industrial development. However, employment in industry as a proportion of total employment declined from 29.5 per cent in 2010 to 22.4 per cent in 2016, before rebounding slightly to 24.4 per cent in 2020. However, while 28 per cent of employed men worked in industry, this figure stands at just 17 per cent for employed women.¹⁰¹

Employment in manufacturing in Libya has also been steadily declining over recent decades from 14 per cent in 1991 to 9.1 per cent in 2018.¹⁰² This is below the average for developing countries at 10 per cent and the global average of 14 per cent.¹⁰³ The value added per worker in the manufacturing sector stood at LYD 9,800 in 2016, lower than trade (LYD

15,638) and hotels (LYD 12,580).¹⁰⁴ While there are no updated statistics on small-scale industries, evidence suggests poor performance in employment generation and productivity.

More positively, Libya reduced the emissions intensity of its manufacturing sector from 10kg of carbon dioxide in 2016 to 5.9kg in 2018. However, this remains significantly above its regional counterparts, including Egypt (0.72kg), Morocco (0.37kg), Tunisia (0.73kg), and Algeria (1.05kg).¹⁰⁵

Figure 8: CO₂ Emissions Per Unit of MVA
(KGs of CO₂ per constant 2015 US\$)



While there is no data on the share of medium- and high-technology in total manufacturing, analysing Libya exports by sector indicates that the economy is dominated by medium-tech industries.

Classified as a medium-tech industry, hydrocarbons represent 78 per cent of Libya's total exports,¹⁰⁶ while the chemicals sector, a high-tech industry, accounts for only 3.8 per cent.¹⁰⁷

Technology intensive sectors are associated with higher levels of research and development and serve as a proxy for innovation; the higher the share of medium-high and high-tech in MVA, the more technologically advanced a country can be considered. As this proportion is very low for Libya, it can be inferred that levels of research and development in the country are minimal.

⁹⁹ UNIDO, Libya Country Profile: <https://stat.unido.org/SDG/LBY>

¹⁰⁰ UNIDO, Libya Country Profile: <https://stat.unido.org/SDG/LBY>

¹⁰¹International Labour Organization, ILOSTAT database: <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.IND.EMPL.ZS?locations=LY>, <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.IND.EMPL.ZS?locations=LY> and <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.IND.EMPL.FE.ZS?locations=LY>

¹⁰² UNIDO Industrial Analytics Platform, Libya Country Profile: <https://iap.unido.org/country/LBY>

¹⁰³ UNIDO Industrial Analytics Platform, Libya Country Profile: <https://iap.unido.org/country/LBY>

¹⁰⁴ OECD, SMEs in Libya's Reconstruction, 2016: https://read.oecd-ilibrary.org/development/smes-in-libya-s-reconstruction_9789264264205-en#page28

¹⁰⁵ UNIDO, Libya Country Profile: <https://stat.unido.org/SDG/LBY>

¹⁰⁶ International Trade Centre, Trade Map: https://www.trademap.org/Product_SelProductCountry.aspx?nvpm=%7c434%7c%7c%7cTOTAL%7c%7c%7c2%7c1%7c2%7c2%7c1%7c1%7c1%7c1%7c1

¹⁰⁷ UNIDO Industrial Analytics Platform, Libya Country Profile: <https://iap.unido.org/country/LBY>

GOAL 10: REDUCED INEQUALITIES




between men and women: while formal figures put the pay gap at 10 per cent, survey respondents report earning up to three times less than their male counterparts.^{109,110} Such disparities require sound policies to support lower-income earners and promote greater economic inclusion.

Examining labour — comprising wages and social protection transfers — as a proportion of GDP provides useful information regarding the relative share of GDP which accrues to employees compared with the share allocated to capital. Libya's share of labour as a proportion of GDP declined from 44.6 per cent in 2011 to 39.6 per cent a year later. Despite somewhat recovering in 2013 and 2014, the rate further declined in each subsequent year, reaching 41.2 per cent in 2017, compared to a global average of 51.4 per cent.¹¹¹

Libya is classified as an upper-middle income country, ranking 89th globally and 12th in Africa in terms of total GDP in 2019. However, entrenched inequalities across many facets of social, economic, political life persist within the country, further exacerbating the exclusion and marginalization, particularly of the most poor and vulnerable. Certain population groups in Libya suffer from acute inequalities based on various factors, including gender, race, geographical location, ethnicity, and migratory status (see chapter “Leave No One Behind” for further information).

Conflict and instability in the post-revolutionary period have stifled efforts to reduce inequalities. Weak social protection systems have further limited support for the poorest and most in need, while a lack of rights for refugee and migrant populations in the country further compounds their vulnerability.

Figure 9: Share of Pre-Tax National Income



Wealth continues to accrue to the top income earners in the country. In 2019, the share of pre-tax national income of the top 1 per cent of earners was greater than the bottom 40 per cent, standing at 13.6 per cent and 10.3 per cent respectively, indicating a high level of wealth concentration to the most privileged. Strikingly, the top ten per cent of earners accounted for 44.2 per cent of pre-tax national income, almost four times more than the bottom 40 per cent.¹⁰⁸ Income inequality is also very high

¹⁰⁸ World Bank, World Inequality Database: <https://wid.world/country/libya/>

¹⁰⁹ IOM: Libya – Labour Market Assessment. Jan 2021: https://libya.iom.int/sites/g/files/tmzbd1931/files/documents/20210811_LMA%20Collated%20Report%20ENG.pdf

¹¹⁰ Figures here are based on survey responses from 2018 for original research commissioned by UN Women, documented here: UN Women, The Economic and Social Impact of Conflict on Libyan Women, January 2020: http://elibrary.arabwomenorg.org/Content/21545_libya%20report%20english.pdf

¹¹¹ UNDESA, SDG Country Profile - Libya: <https://country-profiles.unstatshub.org/lby/#goal-10>

3.3 PLANET

GOAL 11: SUSTAINABLE CITIES AND COMMUNITIES



Over 5.5 million people, accounting for 80 per cent of Libya's population, live in urban areas, with this increasing at an annual rate of 1.7 per cent. This increasing urban population, in addition to conflict related damage, have resulted in major urbanization challenges, including the provision of adequate housing and basic services, job opportunities, transportation, and the uncontrolled sprawl of informal settlements.

Libya previously had an advanced urban planning system covering national, regional, and local levels. The first generation of plans were undertaken from independence until the late 1980s, followed by the second generation of plans until 2000. The development of third generation plans and the national spatial policy were halted due to the conflict. Since then, urban development has been undertaken in a haphazard and uncoordinated manner, without enforcement of existing planning instruments.

The extremely weak and largely dysfunctional land administration system, covering only a fraction of the country, is the main impediment to the provision of adequate housing, urban investments, and services and infrastructure. The freeze in land registration introduced in 2011 also pushed all land transactions to informality, thereby blocking access to the legal land market.

No recent data exists on access to adequate, safe, and affordable housing, nor on the percentage of urban residents living in slums or informal settlements, or housing damaged due to conflict. Prior to 2009, housing demand was mostly met by large state-managed projects, however, such interventions progressively slowed in 2009 and completely halted in 2011. Informal and unregulated urban sprawl increased rapidly leading to degraded and poorly managed urban development while putting additional pressure on public utilities and services.

Since 2011 there has been considerable damage to the housing stock due to conflict. Large parts of major cities are still uninhabitable without formalized plans to reconstruct and compensate those for their losses. The burden of reconstruction has largely been borne by the homeowners themselves.

The housing rental market, which plays an important role in providing access to affordable housing for young people, migrants, refugees, and low-income households, is also problematic. Before 2011, the government's vision for the provision of housing revolved around individual ownership. Rental options were not contemplated and regulated; this still affects the rental market, pushing renters and landlords into informality, and

removing the legal benefits of clear rights and duties for both. Although evictions and expropriation of property are prohibited by law, forced evictions remain a concern. Weak rule of law and enforcement, and the widespread use of verbal rental contracts, further weaken security of tenure of renters. Refugees, asylum seekers, migrants, and IDPs face particular challenges in tenure rights leaving them vulnerable to exploitation and preventing them from seeking justice for violations.

Solid waste is collected by state-owned companies which is transported to public landfills in the outskirts of urban centres, creating environmental hazards. There is no sorting or recycling of solid waste.

Public transportation is not commonly available. For instance, the city of Tripoli, inhabited a third Libya's population, has just recently started running 2 bus lanes, while the other 20 planned lines are not yet active. Women face challenges in their freedom of movement in both urban and rural areas, as well as between neighbourhoods and cities, due to social norms and the impact of conflict. Public spaces suffer from a lack of maintenance while there is indiscriminate formal and informal encroachment on green spaces.

Urban governance needs to be improved, including in the direct participation of civil society in urban planning and management. While civil society organizations and academic institutions are increasingly engaged in sustainable urban development, and some successful initiatives exist, efficiency, sustainability, and institutionalization remain lacking.

Libya has legislation in place, as well as various bodies and institutions, concerned with the protection of Libya's cultural and natural heritage. However, many archaeological and historical buildings have been severely damaged during the war and restoration efforts have not been undertaken. No data is available on the per capita expenditure on preserving and protecting cultural and natural heritage, nor on the impact of disasters.

GOAL 12: RESPONSIBLE CONSUMPTION AND PRODUCTION

12 RESPONSIBLE
CONSUMPTION
AND PRODUCTION



Libyan production is heavily dependent on the hydrocarbon sector. Between 2014 and 2020, income from hydrocarbon sales averaged 84 per cent of total public revenues while its tax and custom collection remains very narrow.¹¹³

Libya's carbon dioxide emissions stood at 58.9 million metric tons

¹¹³ UN-Central Bank of Libya Financial Review Report: <https://www.facebook.com/106605708197550/posts/204554555069331/>

in 2018,¹¹⁴ with an estimated per capita emissions rate of 8.8 metric tons, compared to the global average of 4.5 metric tons.¹¹⁵ Domestic material consumption plummeted from 17.3 metric tons per capita in 2010 to 9 metric tons in 2011, before increasing to 11 metric tons in 2017.¹¹⁶

There is no data available on recycling in Libya, although there have been initiatives supported by international and multilateral organisations that have assisted local authorities with waste recycling. Electronic waste per capita increased from 8kg in 2000 to 13.3kg in 2014, before declining to 11.5kg in 2019.¹¹⁷

In 2021, the Environmental General Authority became the Ministry of Environment, which is embarking on various hazardous waste related initiatives, including the development of a National Hazardous Waste Management Plan. While Libya adheres to some international multilateral environmental agreements on hazardous waste and materials, there is currently no detailed data available on compliance.¹¹⁸

The UN Environment Programme has made a low confidence estimate that approximately 75kg of food is wasted per person per year in Libya, slightly less than neighbouring countries in North Africa. The conflict has severely impacted the agricultural sector, resulting in the need to import over 80 per cent of its staple food needs, thereby making food prices susceptible to exchange rate fluctuations and threatening food security.

While there is no data on post-harvest losses, anecdotal evidence, and a 2020 WFP agriculture assessment in the south of the country, suggests that a significant amount of food is lost before reaching markets. Insecurity and a lack of finance means that many farmers lack storage for their produce. The unstable electricity supply impacts the ability of producers to refrigerate food, resulting in short shelf lives and the dumping of produce when it spoils in high temperatures.



Libya is heavily susceptible to the impacts of climate change. Projected increases in temperatures, increased frequency and intensity of extreme weather conditions, declining precipitation, and rising sea levels threaten the sustainability of water supplies and poses an existential risk to coastal population centres, where around 70 per cent of the country's people reside. Climate change is compounding water scarcity, thereby reducing water availability for agricultural and domestic consumption.

While Libya signed the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change in 2015 and ratified the Paris Climate Accord in 2021, it has not submitted the requisite policies, plans or reports, such as a National Determined Contribution, National Adaptation Plans, or National Communications.

Climate related issues fall under the authority of the Ministry of Environment; the Ministry of Agriculture, Animal and Marine Resources; the Ministry of Planning; the Ministry of Industry and Data; the Ministry of Water Resources; and the Ministry of Electricity and Renewable Energy. Libya coordinates its climate change initiatives through its National Committee for Climate Change under the Ministry of Planning with membership across various ministries, in addition to the General Electricity Company and experts in atmospheric science and climate change. However, the Committee has only met once to date.



Libya has an almost 2,000 km coastline on the Mediterranean Sea, with an exclusive economic zone of some 364,696 km². Despite its extensive marine resources, Libya does not have a strong tradition in fisheries. However, extensive public investments in ports and onshore infrastructure and services led to an increase in the sector since the 1970s.

There is little consistent and reliable data on employment in fisheries in Libya. Based on data collected by the Department of Statistics and Economic and Social Studies of Marine Biology Research Centre of Tajura in 2017, there was an estimated 14,000 workers employed in the fisheries sector, of which 3,500 were employed in the post-harvest sector in processing, marketing, and administrative services. However, FAO reported in 2019 that 50,603 people were engaged in fishing, with 480 people engaged in aquaculture. There were an estimated 4,534 fishing vessels in Libya in 2017, with most under 24 meters in length.¹¹⁹

The fisheries sector is comprised of four major activities: artisanal coastal fishing, lampara fishing, trawling, and tuna fishing. Most recent data estimates that capture fisheries were 32,000 metric tons from 2017, approximately a 50 per cent decline from pre-civil war levels. Aquaculture production also declined from almost 400 metric tons in the mid-2000s to just to 10 metric tons in 2017.¹²⁰ Limited aquaculture (freshwater and marine) has been attempted at several sites on a pilot basis over the past two decades, although production remains minimal.

Imports of fish in 2017 was estimated at US\$ 173 million, while

¹¹⁴ Climate Watch. 2020. GHG Emissions. Washington, DC: World Resources Institute: <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/EN.ATM.CO2E.KT?locations=LY>

¹¹⁵ Climate Watch. 2020. GHG Emissions. Washington, DC: World Resources Institute: <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/EN.ATM.CO2E.PC?locations=LY-1W>

¹¹⁶ UNDESA, SDG Country Profile - Libya: <https://country-profiles.unstats.un.org/lyby#goal-12>

¹¹⁷ UNDESA, SDG Country Profile - Libya: <https://country-profiles.unstats.un.org/lyby#goal-12>

¹¹⁸ See Annex II for information on the ratification status of various Conventions related to hazardous wastes and materials.

¹¹⁹ FAO, Fishery and Agriculture Profiles: State of Libya, August 2019: <http://www.fao.org/figis/pdf/fishery/facp/LBY/en?title=FAO%20Fisheries%20%26%20Aquaculture%20-%20Fishery%20and%20Aquaculture%20Country%20Profiles%20-%20Libya>

¹²⁰ FAO, Fishery and Agriculture Profiles: State of Libya, August 2019

exports stood at US\$ 36 million. Per capita fish consumption was estimated at around 17.4kg in 2016.¹²¹ Catches are usually sold and consumed fresh in large urban markets, except for a portion of small pelagic species which are canned for the domestic market or as fishmeal. Facilities for receiving, handling, and distributing fish have improved considerably in recent years following the privatization of the marketing chain.

Limited capacities of the central government in controlling and protecting Libyan waters has encouraged foreign fishing vessels to engage in illegal fishing, fuel smuggling, or human trafficking. Libya signed the Agreement on Port State Measures in 2018, the first binding international agreement to specifically tackle illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing, including by preventing vessels engaged in such activities from using ports and landing their catches.

Libya is also a member of various regional fisheries bodies, including the General Fisheries Commission for the Mediterranean, the International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas, and the Lake Chad Basin Commission.

Libya has promising prospects for further development of its fishing sector with stocks that could be better exploited and the presence of large quantities of bluefin tuna in its waters. National planning objectives call for further diversification of the economy, particularly in food production, for which fisheries and aquaculture can play an increased role.

However, only 0.6 per cent of Libya's territorial waters have been designated as marine protected areas.¹²² Coastal pollution, including from the oil industry, threatens marine ecology and fisheries related livelihoods. To mitigate this risk, the Ministry of Environment is working with the Libyan Coast Guard on a National Oil Spill Plan.

is driven by a combination of factors, including high rates of urbanization and overexploitation of water resources and natural vegetation. Future climate change induced sea level rises will likely increase soil salinity, further impacting agricultural production. In an effort to tackle this issue, Libya became signatory to the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification in 1996, however, it is likely that little progress has been made over the past decade.

Libya's forest areas, mainly in the Green Mountain area, comprise only 2,170 km², accounting for just 0.12 per cent of the total land area of the country.¹²³ The Green Mountain hosts 70 per cent of Libya's flora. The lack of protection for forest areas, the impacts of climate change, and unsustainable human exploitation further threatens the country's already sparse woodlands. The natural Mediterranean forest lost 9,018 hectares over the last 32 years, 39 per cent of its total area, with the highest deforestation rate registered between 2010 and 2017, estimated at 513 hectares per year.¹²⁴

Just 0.2 per cent of Libya's landmass is covered by protected areas,¹²⁵ while no sites considered important for terrestrial and freshwater biodiversity are protected.¹²⁶ Inadequate solid waste management and the impacts of oil production, including soil contamination, further threaten terrestrial ecosystems.

While little recent information exists, a 2011 report by the International Union for Conservation of Nature noted that there is no list of protected species or habitats in Libya nor any updated regulations on hunting and fishing activities. While hunting was banned by law in 1998, it is still widely practiced in many parts of the country.¹²⁷

Libya has signed a number of important conventions and multilateral agreements relating to the protection of terrestrial biodiversity and the environment (see Annex II for further information). While demonstrating the country's aspirations with respect to environmental and biodiversity protection, implementation has been minimal.

In addition, while Libya became a contracting party to the International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture in 2012, it does not have a National Biodiversity Strategy and Action Plan. No funds are allocated under the national budget to manage the threat of invasive alien species.



Approximately 95 per cent of Libya's land area is comprised of desert. Coastal areas, the low mountains, and scattered oases in the desert, are the most densely populated areas of the country, and suffer the highest levels of land degradation and the least protection of its biologically diverse ecosystems and habitats.

Desertification is one of the most pressing environmental threats in Libya which poses risks of further loss of already limited arable land, thereby potentially impacting food security. Desertification

¹²¹ FAO, Fishery and Agriculture Profiles: State of Libya, August 2019

¹²² World Database on Protected Areas: <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/ER.MRN.PTMR.ZS?locations=LY>

¹²³ FAO, electronic files and web site: <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/AG.LND.FRST.K2?locations=LY> and <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/AG.LND.FRST.ZS?locations=LY>

¹²⁴ MDPI, Detecting and Analyzing Land Use and Land Cover Changes in the Region of Al-Jabal Al-Akhdar, Libya Using Time-Series Landsat Data from 1985 to 2017, April 2020: <https://www.mdpi.com/2071-1050/12/11/4490>

¹²⁵ World Database on Protected Areas: <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/ER.LND.PTLD.ZS?locations=LY>

¹²⁶ BirdLife International, IUCN and UNEP-WCMC (2020)

¹²⁷ International Union for Conservation of Nature, Towards a Representative Network of Marine Protected Areas in Libya, July 2011: <https://portals.iucn.org/library/sites/library/files/documents/2011-037.pdf>

3.4 PEACE

GOAL 16: PEACE, JUSTICE AND STRONG INSTITUTIONS



POLITICAL ANALYSIS

The implementation of the political agreement and road map agreed at the Libyan Political Dialogue Forum in November 2020 continues to face serious challenges and obstacles. The 24 December 2021 presidential and parliamentary elections, which were expected to end the transitional period and address the legitimacy crises of the current political institutions, were indefinitely postponed over disagreements between political factions over various aspects of the electoral process.

Elected in February 2021, the Government of National Unity (GNU) was expected to achieve a degree of functional unification in the government. While the Interim Government in the East no longer exists, the civilian payroll was unified, and the GNU, together with the Central Bank of Libya in Tripoli, manages state revenues; key institutions, including security institutions and the Central Bank of Libya, remain divided, which deprives the GNU of effective control over the eastern and southern regions of the country.

Although the GNU was elected with a limited mandate to prepare for elections at the end of 2021, it has extensively expanded a system of patronage by increasing salaries, social benefits, and embarking on numerous development projects. This is enabled by its special relationship with the Central Bank who regularly approve expenditures through “special measures” to issue new social entitlements and unify the public payroll, which is now estimated to include some 2.6 million persons, over a third of the Libyan population. Although the House of Representatives initially refused to approve the national budget due to concerns over a lack of oversight over expenditures, their inability to pass a budgetary law has thrown the budgetary process into limbo, giving the government greater discretion in running their affairs.

The lack of progress in establishing the conditions for elections is feeding greater political polarization and creating greater mistrust in the electoral process. The initial political momentum demonstrated by the House of Representatives has waned and internal divisions and acrimonious relations with the High Council of State has created a state of paralysis. The position of the Libyan National Army has further complicated the situation as it appears make concessions or submit to the authority of the Presidential Council.

As the guarantor of the road map, the ability of the Libyan Political Dialogue Forum to narrow the differences between parties and negotiate arrangements for the interim period has

weakened as divisions increase and new interests consolidate to support the continued existence of the GNU.

Given the absence of a political agreement and the lack of consensus on a constitutional basis for elections, the planned 24 December 2021 electoral process was postponed, thereby continuing the current state of no war and no peace.

GOVERNANCE

The Libyan state is highly centralised and reliant on decisions made by the Prime Minister and the cabinet composed of the main line ministries. These ministries channel state funding derived from the Central Bank of Libya who receives financing from the National Oil Corporation. The dependency on oil revenues makes competition over access to this resource highly contentious. This tension is exacerbated by the fact that while the majority of the population is in the north-west of the country, natural resources, including oil and water, are largely concentrated in the east and south.

Instead of utilizing oil revenue to diversify the economy, Libya has instead increased entitlements to the population in the form of salaries and subsidies which constitute nearly 80 per cent of expenditures. Although many efforts have been made to decentralise both fiscal and political governance to the municipalities, these efforts have never been fully implemented. Similarly, efforts to create space for the private sector have been stymied by the legacy of a dominant public sector. For example, most public services, including electricity, water, and sanitation, continue to be implemented by state owned enterprises who are neither cost effective nor responsive to changing market conditions.

Libya has had no national development planning framework since 2011. The National Planning Council, which used to be responsible for national development planning, until recently has largely been defunct, while development expenditures are determined by the Ministry of Planning. However, in the event there is no budgetary agreement within the House of Representatives, the Prime Minister allocates funds based on “special measures” agreed upon between the Office of the Prime Minister and the Central Bank of Libya. This lack of integrated planning, oversight or transparency make development spending highly contentious and often ineffective as many projects are abandoned after changes in leadership.


Between 2014 and 2021, the government was divided between Tripoli and al-Bayda resulting in the structural fragmentation of most ministries and financial institutions. While the inability of the east to maintain its parallel source of funding through the issuance of bonds in combination with the creation of the GNU resulted in the nominal unification of the national government, the level of organisational and procedural integration within each entity varies widely and can be reversed depending on the political situation.

OPENNESS, TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY

While Libya ratified the United Nations Convention Against Corruption in 2005, corruption remains systemic across all levels of government and governance and affects all aspects of the country's development trajectory.

Libya ranked 173 out of 180 countries in Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index for 2020, a decline of five places from the previous year.¹²⁸ Libya also ranked 173 out of 194 countries in TRACE International's Bribery Risk Matrix for 2020¹²⁹ and also scores very low in the World Bank's Worldwide Governance Indicators on accountability and control of corruption.

Figure 10: Corruption Perceptions Index Score



While more recent data is unavailable, a 2014 Global Corruption Barometer survey found that 48 per cent of Libyans viewed public officials and civil servants to be either corrupt or extremely corrupt, particularly in the police, health, and oil sectors. Following the revolution, in 2012, the General National Congress tried to strengthen the National Audit Bureau and introduced a National Anti-Corruption Commission, although with negligible results. With 200 employees and an annual budget of US\$ 20 million in 2018, the National Anti-Corruption Commission is perceived to be ineffective.¹³⁰

In addition to its political, social, and economic implications, corruption also poses significant security threats with jihadists highlighting the issue as a recruiting tactic for disaffected youth for groups such as ISIS and al-Qaeda in Syria, Iraq, and Libya.

JUSTICE AND THE RULE OF LAW

Libya's 2011 Constitutional Declaration, which superseded the 1969 Constitution, provides a temporary framework pending a permanent arrangement. A new draft constitution was finalized

in 2017, although it has not yet been formally adopted.

While the Libyan judiciary remained united after the 2011 revolution, challenges to the rule of law remain significant. The security environment and control over institutions and territory by armed groups, as well as tribal and political conflicts, are major factors preventing the effective functioning of the justice system. Some positive developments have ensued as a result of the Libyan Political Dialogue Forum, including the appointment of a new, unified Attorney General. Two specialized appellate courts focusing on violence against women and children have been constituted, with five female judges and a male judge appointed to serve at the bench. The working methods of prosecutors have been further harmonized across the country and the new Libyan Bar Association has adopted a standard code of ethics.

Serious concerns persist across Libya regarding unlawful deprivation of liberty, as well as the issuance of sentences by courts that do not operate in accordance with Libya's national and international legal obligations. In eastern Libya, military judicial authorities are increasingly trying cases that should fall under the jurisdiction of civilian courts, and often do not meet international standards for fair trial.

In 2021, COVID-19 measures had a debilitating effect on the judicial system in general and led to delays and deferrals of criminal as well as civil hearings, particularly affecting smaller cities and the south.

The official number of prisoners in Libyan prisons reached 12,000 in 2021, with thousands of others being held unacknowledged, and often incommunicado, both in official and unofficial places of detention. Prisoners are held in disproportionately prolonged pre-trial detention, while others are held unlawfully as they have not been brought before a court to challenge the legality of their detention. At least 120 child offenders, including those in pre-trial detention, were in prison in 2018 according to UNSMIL reporting. A rising concern is inhuman conditions of detention, widespread torture, and a critical lack of healthcare for detainees. Although women and children make up the minority of those held, they are disproportionately affected by abuse and exploitation in detention centres.

HUMAN RIGHTS

Notwithstanding some progress, human rights abuses in Libya remain ubiquitous. Between 2016 and 2020 there were almost 800 conflict-related civilian fatalities, including 170 in 2020 alone, recorded by UNSMIL, primarily caused by mortars, rockets or artillery shelling, airstrikes, improvised explosive devices, small arms fire, and explosive remnants of war.

While the October 2020 ceasefire resulted in a dramatic reduction in civilian casualties, violations of human rights and international humanitarian law by armed groups as well as different armed units operating as State agencies continue unabated. UNSMIL has documented killings, enforced disappearances, sexual violence, including rape, arbitrary arrests and detentions, torture, attacks

¹²⁸ Transparency International, Corruption Perceptions Index, 2020: <https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2020/index/lyb>

¹²⁹ TRACE, Bribery Risk Matrix, 2020: <https://www.traceinternational.org/trace-matrix#173>

¹³⁰ Transparency International, National Integrity System Assessment: Libya, 2014: https://images.transparencycdn.org/images/2014_NIS_Libya_ENG.pdf

against activists and human rights defenders, and hate crimes.

Migrants and refugees remain vulnerable to forced labour, trafficking, arbitrary detention, sexual violence, torture, and extortion which continue to be committed with impunity as state as well as non-state armed groups consistently fail to take effective measures to prevent and punish infringements.

The National Council for Civil Liberties and Human Rights was established in 2011 and accredited in 2014 by the International Coordinating Committee of National Human Rights Institutions. However, the Council ceased to operate in 2016. As a result, there is no independent monitoring system to receive and investigate complaints of human rights violations, particularly against children.

Libya is party to the main human rights treaties and core international humanitarian law conventions (see Annex II for further information). The country has demonstrated its commitment to its human rights obligations by issuing a standing invitation to Human Rights Council appointed Special Procedures mandate holders, and by supporting the establishment the United Nations Human Rights Council Independent Fact-Finding Mission on Libya in 2020. Nevertheless, UNSMIL and other human rights monitors have been denied unfettered access to main prison facilities in Libya, where human rights violations are known to be rampant.

CIVIC SPACE

While the 2011 Constitutional Declaration guarantees equal rights and equality before the law, as well as equal opportunities and political and civic rights, and a 2012 law allows for freedom of assembly, Libya’s penal code criminalizes certain activities linked to the peaceful exercise of freedom of expression and association, and even mentions the death penalty for acts of speech and association.¹³¹


Measures to curtail civil society organizations continue to be imposed in Libya. Such legislation includes the March 2019 Executive Regulation of the Presidential Council concerning the Civil Society Commission, as well as a new draft law put forward in July 2021, which, while not yet adopted, contains the same restrictions as

the 2019 regulation. These regulations are inconsistent with Libya’s international human rights obligations on freedom of association and expression. For example, civil society organizations can be denied registration or dissolved by the Executive authorities on several broad grounds. Of particular concern is the requirement for civil society organizations to report any interaction with UN officials. The regulations further enable the Commission to cancel the registration and work permission of foreign organizations based on wide-ranging justifications and contain stringent controls over foreign funding.

Protection and support of women to participate actively in public space without the fear of reprisals remains absent, thereby silencing their voices.¹³³

Human rights defenders, journalists, civil society actors, and civilian political figures remain vulnerable to attack, unlawful detention, and hate crimes perpetrated by armed actors and state agencies. While attacks on the press have declined in recent years, Libya scores low in the Reporters Without Borders’ World Press Freedom Index, ranking 165 out of 180 countries in 2021 (lower ranking indicates greater press freedom).

Figure 11: Press Freedom Ranking (out of 180 countries)



¹³¹ Human Rights Watch 2018 in: World Bank, United Nations and European Union, Supporting Peace and Stability in Libya, 2019.
¹³² Freedom House, Freedom in the World, 2020: <https://freedomhouse.org/country/libya/freedom-world/2020>
¹³³ UNSMIL, Women, Peace and Security in Libyan Context, June 2020: <https://unsmil.unmissions.org/women-peace-and-security-libyan-context>

3.5 PARTNERSHIP

GOAL 17: PARTNERSHIP FOR THE GOALS

17 PARTNERSHIPS
FOR THE GOALS




FINANCE

Total government revenues stood at LYD 23 billion in 2020 according to the Ministry of Finance in Tripoli, representing a 60 per cent decline over the previous year.¹³⁴

Total revenues accounted for around 65 per cent of GDP in 2020, a decline from almost 80 per cent in 2019.¹³⁵

Figure 12: Government Revenues and Expenditures
(LYD billions)



Government finances are highly dependent on its oil industry, with hydrocarbons accounting for around 93 per cent of fiscal revenues. However, due to the blockade of oil fields and terminals, revenues from hydrocarbons decreased from LYD 31.4 billion in 2019 to LYD 5.3 billion in 2020, amounting to an 83 per cent decline. According to the Central Bank of Libya, this amounted to a loss in revenues of around US\$ 11 billion. Revenues from non-hydrocarbon sources, primarily from tax revenues and other sources, amounted to LYD 2.5 billion in 2020, similar to the previous year, while a surtax on foreign currency sales for commercial and personal

purposes accounted for two-thirds of government revenues¹³⁶

The large decline in government revenues had a corresponding impact on spending. The government in Tripoli reduced its expenditures by 22 per cent from LYD 46.1 billion in 2019 to LYD 36.2 billion in 2020. Subsidies, including those for fuel, electricity, water and sewage, sanitation, and medical supplies, amounted to 16 per cent of total expenditures. Development expenditures declined from LYD 4.6 billion in 2019 to just LYD 1.8 billion in 2020, while capital expenditures were effectively cancelled.

Government spending in the East averages between only 20 to 25 per cent of that in the West. Salaries and wages accounted for over half of all the LYD 9.7 billion Interim Government expenditures in 2020, while expenditures on goods and services accounted for around 21 per cent. While the Interim Government spent less on subsidies than the government in Tripoli, it spent more on capital investment, both in absolute and percentage terms.

While the blockade and COVID-19 pandemic significantly impacted government finances throughout 2020, renewed oil production and the rise in global oil prices are projected to increase revenues to around LYD 65.3 billion in 2021, a 184 per cent increase over the previous year, with a corresponding increase in government expenditures to LYD 77 billion is projected, a 68 per cent increase.

TECHNOLOGY

Statistics on the proportion of people using the Internet in Libya varies significantly depending on the source, making the level of penetration difficult to assess. While UN data from 2017 puts the figure at just 21.8 per cent accessing the Internet, other sources put the number at 84.2 per cent for 2020.¹³⁷ While more recent data is unavailable, there was only 4.8 fixed-line Internet broadband subscriptions per 100 people in 2017.¹³⁸

Internet connectivity remains inconsistent, with services often interrupted due to power outages, infrastructure damage, high demand, sabotage, unauthorized construction, and theft of equipment. The ongoing conflict and political stalemate have limited cooperation between governing authorities on rebuilding the country's information and communications technology infrastructure.

Despite such challenges, the quality of service for those with access has improved. The launch of 4G mobile services in larger cities increased competition and significantly reduced

¹³⁴ All revenues—hydrocarbon revenues, taxes on income and profits, customs duties, and foreign exchange fees—accrue to the Government of National Accord.

¹³⁵ Calculation based on data from the World Bank Libya Economic Monitor report (Spring 2021) and GDP figures from World Bank national accounts data, and OECD National Accounts data files available here: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CN?locations=LY&most_recent_value_desc=true

¹³⁶ World Bank, Libya Economic Monitor, Spring 2021: <https://thedocs.worldbank.org/en/doc/3d3cd163628175d3add84db3c707eaa5-0280012021/original/ENG-Libya-Economic-Monitor.pdf>

¹³⁷ Internet World Stats: <https://www.internetworldstats.com/africa.htm#ly>

¹³⁸ International Telecommunication Union World Telecommunication/ICT Indicators Database: <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/IT.NET.BBND.P2?locations=LY>

costs for accessing higher speed Internet for customers, resulting in increased usage by the population. There was also a limited roll-out of 5G services in Tripoli at the end of 2019.¹³⁹

In the absence of a separate telecom/ICT regulator, the country's regulatory authority lacks autonomy in decision-making as well as accountability and dispute resolution mechanisms. As far as the competition framework is concerned, the ICT field is practically monopolized and/or state-owned.

CAPACITY-BUILDING

Conflict and political and institutional decline have severely diminished capacities across governmental institutions in Libya and requires significant support to enable the state to deliver in support of its citizens. These needs have recently been highlighted by both the Ministry of Economic Affairs and the Ministry of Planning, noting that institutional capacity building is a key requirement and should be prioritized for support by the international community. While Libya received over US\$ 34 million in official development assistance for technical cooperation in 2018, this is inadequate to address the severe deficiencies within the state apparatus.¹⁴⁰

TRADE

Libya's economy remains highly undiversified with hydrocarbons accounting for around 95 per cent of merchandise exports. Furthermore, oil exports accounted for 60 per cent of GDP in 2019.

As such, the blockade in the first nine months of 2020 resulted in a collapse in oil production and exports. From January to October 2020, oil exports amounted to US\$ 8.9 billion, representing a 61 per cent decline compared the corresponding period in the previous year.

Imports were also impacted, albeit less than exports, and declined to US\$ 10.5 billion between January and October 2020, a 15 per cent reduction when compared to the same period the year before.

Between January and October 2020, Libya had a US\$2 billion trade deficit compared to the US\$9.9 billion surplus over the same period in 2019. This was the first time Libya posted a trade deficit since 1962.¹⁴¹ However, the ceasefire agreement between the Government of National Accord and the Libyan National Army in October 2020 resulted in a rebound in oil production and exports.¹⁴² Libya's largest trading partners in 2020 were Italy, Turkhina, and the United Arab Emirates, in terms of both imports and exports.¹⁴³

MULTI-STAKEHOLDER PARTNERSHIPS

Ongoing conflicts and evolving political dynamics have posed challenges to effective coordination of international development assistance with Libyan authorities. In an attempt to overcome these issues, a multi-level aid coordination structure was established in 2017 to bring together the previous Government of National Accord, international development partners, and the UN to provide coordinated support to national priorities.

At the apex of the structure, the Senior Policy Committee comprised members nominated by the Presidency Council, relevant ministries, UNSMIL, UN Country Team, and the international community. The subsidiary Joint Technical Coordination Committee (JTCC) was to be co-chaired by the Ministry of Planning and the UN through the Assistant Secretary General, Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator, and with additional representatives from the UN and the international community. The Committee was to be supported by a number of technical level working groups co-chaired by government institutions and members of the international community with the appropriate sectoral expertise. However, the Senior Policy Committee last met in 2017. While the JTCC also became stalled in April 2020 with the resumption of conflict, it met in August 2020 and agreed to revive its six working groups, although progress has been limited in this regard.

Efforts are underway to reactivate an international coordination mechanism in a manner that is complimentary and coordinated to the work being undertaken by the Berlin Process working group structure.

The private sector in Libya is very small in comparison to the size of the Libyan economy, accounting for only 5 per cent of GDP while employing 14 per cent of the workforce. Even prior to the 2011 revolution, banks had not supported private businesses due to the lack of financial regulations protecting bank loans.

This background has enabled quasi-public corporations to engage closely in the government's agendas or plans. For example, the Libyan Telecommunications holding company pledged LYD 200 million in 2020 in support of the government's COVID-19 response, however, only LYD 60 million materialized, of which LYD 15 million was used to establish isolation centres, with the remaining amount covering medical staff salaries and equipment. In 2018, the holding company contributed to salaries of Ministry of Education and GECOL employees. The Social Solidarity Fund also contributed to the Government's efforts to combat COVID-19 by providing its hotel facilities in Tripoli, Misrata, and Zwara as isolation centres.

¹³⁹ Freedom House, Freedom in the World, 2020: https://freedomhouse.org/country/libya/freedom-net/2020#footnote8_b7vrgce

¹⁴⁰ UNDESA, SDG Country Profile - Libya: <https://country-profiles.unstats.un.org/lby/goal-17>

¹⁴¹ World Bank, Libya Economic Monitor, Spring 2021.

¹⁴² World Bank, Libya Economic Monitor, Spring 2021.

¹⁴³ IMF Direction of Trade Statistics: <https://data.imf.org/?sk=9D6028D4-F14A-464C-A2F2-59B2CD424B85&slid=1515619375491>

4. LEAVE NO ONE BEHIND



The 2030 Agenda is underpinned by the central principle of leaving no one behind. A core tenet of this is to ensure that the most vulnerable and marginalized individuals and groups realize their rights and the benefits of Libya's development and peacebuilding trajectory.

In doing so, it is essential to identify those who are most at risk of being left behind and to understand the underlying causes and impacts of their vulnerabilities so that they can be appropriately addressed through suitably designed humanitarian, development, and peacebuilding initiatives.

This chapter identifies the various population groups in Libya that face the greatest challenges in realizing their fundamental rights and having their needs met. However, it is important to consider that the causes of their vulnerabilities are not static but can evolve over time based on changes in context, life events and lifecycles, and sociocultural norms and attitudes, amongst others.

These factors are also not mutually exclusive but can often be intersectional with individuals and groups holding multiple identities and vulnerabilities simultaneously which can compound their marginalization and exclusion. As such, while this section is structured under various categories of vulnerable groups, these should not be interpreted as being stand-alone or distinct, but as overlapping, fluid, and changing.

4.1 WOMEN AND GIRLS

As described throughout this document, including under the SDG 5 section of the chapter "Progress Towards the 2030 Agenda...", women and girls face multiple, and often life-long impediments to their active participation of all aspects of social, economic, cultural, and political life. In addition, accounting for around half the population, women and girls comprise a significant proportion of the other groups highlighted in this chapter, thereby amplifying their vulnerabilities.

While equality of the sexes is codified in many aspects of law, a deeply patriarchal social structure and related sociocultural norms and patterns mean that women and girls continue to face significant impediments in the realization of their rights.

Women have lower labour force participation and receive less compensation for their work while social norms mean they have less ownership rights to land and property. As such, many women and girls remain largely or wholly dependent on their male family members to meet their basic needs. Women are severely underrepresented in decision making processes and structures, including in political life.

In rural areas, the formal rights of women and girls are often superseded by conservative tribal traditions, including, in some

instances, early and child marriage which is often facilitated by a poorly capacitated justice system.

Research undertaken in 2019 found that 67 per cent of men surveyed indicated some level of support for violence against women compared to 57 per cent of women while 41 per cent of men agreed on the use of violence to punish a girl for bringing dishonour on the family, compared to 24 per cent of women. In addition, 28 per cent of men and 27 per cent of women agreed or strongly agreed that the marriage contract generally entitles a husband to have sexual relations with his wife, even if she does not want to.¹⁴⁴

While GBV remains prevalent, it is a socially and religiously sensitive issue and therefore not appropriately tackled by authorities, while services for survivors remain inadequate.¹⁴⁵ Gender-discriminatory laws and inadequate justice mechanisms further limit opportunities for redress for violations of their rights. Women are more likely to turn to family members to resolve violent and nonviolent disputes more frequently than men, signalling a lack of suitable options for dispute resolution within the formal justice sector. For instance, women are twice as likely as men to rely on informal justice mechanisms to resolve violent crimes.

As such, while it is important to strengthen the rights of women and girls through legislative and institutional approaches, it will also be essential to address the longer term societal and attitudinal factors that drive gender inequalities for sustainable change to be realized.

4.2 CHILDREN

Approximately 40 per cent of the Libyan population is under the age of 18. A third of Libyan children were multidimensionally poor in 2014 while 244,000 children were in need of humanitarian assistance at the end of 2021.¹⁴⁶ Women and children are disproportionately represented among at-risk populations while particular groups of children are at a higher risk of being left behind, including girls, children with disabilities, displaced children, and child migrant and refugees. Deterioration of basic services, armed conflict, and COVID-19 have aggravated vulnerabilities for children and youth, with a potential long-term impact for the recovery of Libya.

To date, essential parts of the legal system have not been harmonized with the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, ratified by Libya in 1993. However, the government submitted in May 2021 the third and fourth combined State party report of its progress against the Convention. While Libya's domestic laws contain provisions recognizing the need to protect the most vulnerable, they are limited in scope and do not impose an explicit child protection duty on the state. The principle of the best interest of the child is not reflected in legislation and in judicial proceedings for children in contact with the law, including those in conflict with the law. In addition, procedures and systems that place children in public alternative

care institutions are of particular concern.

While Libya has a functional birth registration system, some children may be unable to access birth registration and full nationality rights, including as a result of legal provision that prevent Libyan women to transfer their nationality to their children, that limit registration for children born of unwed parents, or other provisions that impact certain ethnic minorities, migrants, or refugees.

Policy gaps, the lack of administrative data systems, coordination issues at the inter-ministerial level, as well as between the ministry and the municipalities, and capacity gaps at all levels are critically affecting the provision of essential and lifesaving basic services of children in Libya. Of particular concern, education services, WASH, and health and nutrition have deteriorated over the last decade, including as a result of the budget crisis and governance gaps. The consequences for the life cycle of children is enormous. Healthcare gaps and the lack of early child education impact maternal and neonatal wellbeing, nutrition, vaccination, and development for children under five. Deteriorating education and health, nutrition and WASH services impact children's physical wellbeing, access to quality education (and subsequently their ability to find employment), and to develop to their full potential. Weak child protection services affect the prevention, detection, response, and rehabilitation efforts of children at risk of or experiencing violence, abuse, exploitation and neglect in homes, schools, and communities. As a result of the limited space for participation in public decision making, children's issues and voices are often invisible or deprioritized.

Corporal punishment of children at home remains a legitimate practice under Libyan domestic legislation, although they are somewhat better protected from corporal punishment in schools. Despite this, at least 90 per cent of boys and 88 per cent of girls reported in 2017 that they had experienced some forms of violence at home, in school, or in their communities. Sixty-seven per cent of students reported physical violence by their teachers, while 38 per cent experienced violence by their parents in the previous 12 months.¹⁴⁷

Unaccompanied and separated refugee and migrant children face heightened risks of trafficking, sexual exploitation, child labour, and other harmful practices. As of September 2021, there were at least 1,600 refugee and migrant children under arbitrary detention. According to detention centre practice, boys having reached 12 years of age are considered adults, separated from their families, and placed in adult male cells, often under extreme conditions. Refugee and migrant children also have very limited access to school and health services.

In 2020, there was at least a 30 per cent increase in the number of children affected by the armed conflict over the previous year, with 166 verified grave violations perpetrated against 117 children (94 boys, 23 girls). This includes reports of 96 children (79 boys, 17 girls) who were either killed (31) or maimed (65); 67 children and their mothers detained due to their alleged affiliation with ISIL; 22 attacks on schools; 9 cases of child recruitment and

¹⁴⁴ UN Women and Monash University, Gender Equality and Violent Extremism: A Research Agenda for Libya, 2019.

¹⁴⁵ Religious authorities in Libya represented by the Mufti and Dar Iftaa have a very conservative approach to GBV and have issued statements and supported campaigns against CEDAW and UNSCR 1325 on Women, Peace and Security. The State Minister of Women's Affairs has reached out to them to address their concerns but there has been no response to date.

¹⁴⁶ OCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview 2022, December 2021.

¹⁴⁷ National Center for Disease Control, UNICEF, and Coram International

use (all boys); 5 victims of sexual violence (3 boys, 2 girls); 7 children abducted (3 boys, 4 girls); and one incident of denial of humanitarian access for children.

4.3 YOUTH

Despite as many as two thirds of its population being considered as youth (aged below 39 years¹⁴⁸) and with around 18 per cent aged between 15–24 years, young people in Libya are largely excluded from most decision-making processes and institutions, particularly young women. A draft national Youth Policy document described the opportunities and challenges faced by Libyan youth across six main areas: (1) The demographic dividend; (2) Reforming education and curbing unemployment; (3) Youth civic engagement and inclusion; (4) Girls' empowerment; (5) Promotion of healthy behaviours; and (6) Peacebuilding.¹⁴⁹ There are ongoing attempts by the National Economic and Social Development Board and Ministry of Youth to conduct a nationwide consultation on youth priorities and expectations and in drafting a national youth strategy with support from international community.¹⁵⁰

Despite representing about half the workforce in the country, youth unemployment rates remain high, particularly for young women who have very limited access to business and commercial opportunities, leaving many to depend economically on their male family members. The lack of appropriate investment in quality education that meets the requirements of the labour market means that Libya risks missing out of the massive potential of its young women and men to support economic growth, development, and the broader peacebuilding agenda in the country.

Social and economic exclusion also puts young men at further risk of recruitment by armed and criminal groups. Such options can appear extremely lucrative given their potential high return in a short amount of time and the lack of alternative legitimate employment opportunities. The increasing role of social media in promoting extremist ideas, providing platforms for controversial figures and ideas, and increasing divisions and disagreements within Libyan society poses further risks to vulnerable youth.¹⁵¹

The minimum age of marriage is 20 for both women and men, but court can allow persons under this age to marry with the consent of their guardian, hence removing the minimum age threshold for legal marriage.¹⁵² Adolescent girls (both Libyan and non-Libyan) are particularly vulnerable to multiple forms of violence due to their age, gender, a legal system that inherently disadvantages them, in addition to barriers to their movement,

access to education, and life-saving information. Girls dropping out of schools, crowded households, displacement, survivors of sexual assault are at higher risks of child marriage.¹⁵³

There is a general absence of adolescent health services in Libya.¹⁵⁴ Due to a decade of political and security instability, young Libyan men and women experience a variety of psychological and mental health issues, which remains a taboo topic in Libya. Many adolescents face difficulties accessing the limited number of available mental health services in Libya, including stigmatization, social marginalization, and even bullying for those seeking support. Young Libyans are also increasingly engaging in risky behaviours, including substance abuse, insufficient physical activity, violence, tobacco use, and eating disorders.

As such, it is essential that marginalization and exclusion at policy and community levels is addressed through increased support to maximize the leadership potential and opportunities for youth from various backgrounds, particularly young women, in all aspects of society.

4.4 OLDER PEOPLE

Very little data or analysis is available regarding the situation of the elderly in Libya with further research being required to gain a clearer picture on their particular circumstances and needs. However, given the known challenges faced by older people around the world, it can be reasonably inferred that those in Libya face additional vulnerabilities due to the security and socioeconomic conditions in the country over the past decade.

It was estimated that 7 per cent of the population of Libya was aged 60 years or above in 2015 while around 4.6 per cent of the population is aged 65 years or above in 2021.^{155,156} The country is expected to experience a very rapid rise in the proportion of the population aged 60 years and above, with increases to 12 per cent in 2030 and 21.8 per cent 2050. It is also estimated that the proportion of those aged 80 years and above will also increase from 0.7 per cent in 2015, to 0.9 per cent in 2030, and 2.8 per cent in 2050.¹⁵⁷

The old-age dependency ratio is also expected to increase significantly from 6.9 per cent in 2015 to 24.7 per cent in 2050, resulting in an increased burden on those of working age to support economically inactive elderly persons.¹⁵⁸

Older persons in Libya live under varying conditions of demography, society, economy, and family which results in differences in living arrangements, nutritional levels, physical

¹⁴⁸ The Libyan Ministry of Youth expanded the youth age group up to 39 year-old.

¹⁴⁹ Elaborated in 2017 by the National Economic and Social Development Board but not published.

¹⁵⁰ As per the minutes of the Youth Working Group meetings, UNFPA, December 2021.

¹⁵¹ UNFPA, UNESCO, Net Med Youth, 'National Consultation About Youth Peace and Security - Libya Case: Study on Youth, Social Integration and Participation in Building Peace and Security', 2017.

¹⁵² UNICEF, MENA Gender Equality Profile: Status of Girls and Women in the Middle East and North Africa, 2011: <https://www.unicef.org/gender/files/Libya-Gender-Eqaulity-Profile-2011.pdf>

¹⁵³ Adolescent Girls Assessment Report - Tripoli, Libya - March - April 2019; Anne-Marie Akiki; NRC.

¹⁵⁴ Libyan Ministry of Health and WHO, Service Availability and Readiness Assessment of the public health facilities in Libya, 2017.

¹⁵⁵ UNFPA, World Population Dashboard: <https://www.unfpa.org/data/world-population/LY>

¹⁵⁶ UNESCWA, Ageing in ESCWA Member States: Third Review and Appraisal of the Madrid International Plan of Action on Ageing, 2017: https://archive.unescwa.org/sites/www.unescwa.org/files/publications/files/ageing-escwa-member-states-english_3.pdf

¹⁵⁷ UNESCWA, Ageing in ESCWA Member States: Third Review and Appraisal of the Madrid International Plan of Action on Ageing, 2017.

¹⁵⁸ Ebtisam Elghblawi (2013), 'Elderly situation in Libya, the challenge', Middle East Journal of Age and Ageing, Vol 10, No. 1. Available at: <http://www.me-jaq.com/archives/January2013.pdf>

activities, and medical requirements. They often live with their adult children who play a significant role in their care. However, the financial situation in the household as well as intergenerational relationships can be a determining factor in the level and quality of care received by the elderly within the family.¹⁵⁹

While those retiring from the public sector receive a state provided pension through the Libya Social Security Fund, those who have worked outside the sector receive little or no government support. In addition, the Social Security Fund is considered to be financially unsustainable and likely to be in significant pension debt, which raises concerns regarding the long-term viability of an increasing pension burden.¹⁶⁰

Ever increasing healthcare needs of an ageing population and a deterioration of the health system means that the specific medical needs of the elderly are not sufficiently addressed. This is compounded by their reduced mobility as well as damaged infrastructure which complicates access to medical services. Specialized geriatric medical services tend to be limited and concentrated in a few urban centres.

In addition, older persons have also been identified as requiring humanitarian assistance, with five per cent of non-displaced Libya's, IDPs, returnees, and migrants in need being elderly.¹⁶¹

4.5 INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS

Internal displacement is primarily linked to security related concerns, such as the armed conflict in Western Libya between 2019 and 2020 which caused the largest recent spike in displacement within the country. However, most IDPs have lived in protracted displacement since 2017 or before from areas previously affected by outbreaks of conflict in 2011 and 2014. There has been a decrease in the numbers of IDPs following the October 2020 ceasefire, with numbers currently estimated at 212,593.¹⁶² Currently, the top three areas hosting IDPs include the Benghazi (37,815), Tripoli (37,393), and Misrata regions (33,895).

While many have begun returning to their homes following the cessation of fighting (most recent reporting has identified 643,123 returnees), widespread explosive hazard contamination, particularly in areas such as Tripoli, Benghazi, and Sirt, pose risks to many who want to return. Some continue to suffer protracted displacement due damaged infrastructure, a lack of basic services, limited security or social cohesion, and uninhabitable housing due to conflict related damage in their place of origin.

The large numbers of those displaced, as well as damage and destruction of properties, have made housing increasingly scarce and expensive. In addition, those without formal rental

contracts, such as displaced families, face increased risk of eviction, arbitrary rental increases, lack of accommodation maintenance, poor access to services, and lower quality of accommodation.

4.6 MIGRANTS AND REFUGEES

Latest data has identified 610,128 migrants living in Libya, a reduction from 650,000 prior to the pandemic.¹⁶³ Approximately 10 per cent of migrants are children, including more than 1,000 unaccompanied and separated children. In addition, 41,897 refugees and asylum seekers, including 15,000 children, were registered with UNHCR as of September 2021, compared to 46,000 in January 2020. This decline is the result of a combination of factors, including increasing unemployment as well as increased security controls and mobility restrictions compelling refugees and migrants to engage in dangerous journeys.

Discrimination in access to services for migrants and refugees coupled with a lack of legal protection and documentation hinders their access to basic rights and ability to meet their basic needs, including food, housing, employment, education, healthcare, and specialized protection services. Due to poverty and lack of access to livelihood opportunities, many migrants and refugees resort to negative coping mechanisms, including child marriage, prostitution, and attempts to embark on dangerous journeys by sea to Europe. Strengthening the capacities of local governments to document mobile populations and allow access to life-saving services, such as healthcare and housing, are an immediate need. Reframing negative narratives to highlight the positive contributions made by foreign workers in boosting local economies while advocating for decent work will require careful and tailored policy development to reduce vulnerability of mobile populations.

Migrants and refugees are highly vulnerable to protection risks, including, but not limited to, deprivation of liberty and arbitrary detention (UN figures estimate more than 3,400 migrants and 1,100 refugees are currently detained), restricted freedom of movement, forced labour, lack access to housing and essential services, and discrimination. The impacts of COVID-19 on the socioeconomic conditions of mobile populations have further exacerbated these vulnerabilities.¹⁶⁴

Inadequate legal frameworks and weak institutions contribute to insecurity for refugees and asylum-seekers. Libya is not a party to the 1951 Refugee Convention and has no legislation concerning the status and treatment of refugees and asylum-seekers. Refugees are considered illegal migrants under national legislation and are subject to indefinite detention. In addition, Libya lacks a comprehensive migration governance strategy and legal framework that meets international standards to promote safe and regular migration and protect, respect, and

¹⁵⁹ Asharaf Abdul Salam, Mailud El-Amari, and Randa Al Sanoosi (2013), 'Geriatric Needs in Libya: Extracting Predictors through Logistic Regression', International Journal of Humanities and Social Science, Vol. 3, No. 4. Available at: https://www.ijhssnet.com/journals/Vol_3_No_4_Special_Issue_February_2013/20.pdf

¹⁶⁰ EU, UN, World Bank, Supporting Peace and Stability in Libya: A Compilation of Existing Analysis on Challenges and Needs, 2019.

¹⁶¹ OCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview 2021, December 2020.

¹⁶² IOM Displacement Tracking Matrix

¹⁶³ IOM Displacement Tracking Matrix

¹⁶⁴ IOM, Assessment of the Socio-Economic Impact of COVID-19 on Migrants and IDPs in Libya, March 2021: <https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/fr/operations/libya/document/iom-assessment-socio-economic-impact-covid-19-migrants-and-idps-libya>

fulfil migrants' rights.

A lack of documentation coupled with a lack of legal, material, and social protection measures puts many migrants and refugees working in Libya at increased risk within both the formal and informal labour market, with most being concentrated in the informal labour market as work permits are difficult to obtain. While there is a reliance on migrants to meet labour and skills shortages, especially in agriculture, construction, food processing, and the care economy, they tend to have poor working conditions.¹⁶⁵ There are also many accounts of migrants and refugees being subject to various forms of exploitation and abuse, such as forced labour, torture, abduction for ransom, trafficking, and unlawful killings.

Sexual violence, including sexual torture, against female and male refugees and migrants, is widespread in Libya, often occurring in official detention centres, clandestine prisons, in the context of forced labour and enslavement, during random stops and at checkpoints by armed groups, in urban settings by gangs, during human trafficking and smuggling, and in private homes. Gender-based violence against refugee women and girls takes the form of rape, sexual assault, physical assault, and psychological and emotional abuse. Sexual victimization is usually not a single event, with refugees and migrants repeatedly exposed to multiple forms of sexual violence by a variety of perpetrators.¹⁶⁶ Cumulatively, these challenges significantly increase the risk of women and girls resorting to negative coping mechanisms that can detrimentally impact their health, safety, and protection (see section on SDG 5 for further information).

Consequently, many refugees and migrants continue to risk their lives attempting to cross Mediterranean Sea, with 25,285 migrants having attempted the crossing between January and September 2021, surpassing the total number of migrants intercepted in 2020. Of this number, 917 were children (283 girls, 634 boys). More than 767 deaths were recorded off the coast of Libya in the first 6 months of 2021 alone. Of those returned to Libya, most are arbitrarily detained without due process, including children, where they continue to face widespread abuse, with many migrants and refugees within the detention system having disappeared or are unaccounted for. While some efforts have been made to address trafficking and smuggling, there are significant challenges with holding perpetrators accountable with no systems in place to ensure victim protection.

4.7 PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES

There is limited accurate data on the numbers of persons living with disabilities in Libya, with estimates ranging from 2.9 per cent to 14.3 per cent of the population.¹⁶⁷ The conflict has left many Libyans with permanent and life-long disability and psychological trauma.¹⁶⁸

A third of disabilities are estimated to be linked to conflict related injuries resulting from small arms and light weapons and landmines and unexploded ordnances. According to a 2018 survey, an estimated four per cent of displaced households reported at least one member having been injured by unexploded ordnances.¹⁶⁹ Accidents involving unexploded ordnances often result in lower and/or upper limb amputation and other physical, visual, and hearing impairments.¹⁷⁰

According to the 2021 Humanitarian Needs Overview, of those identified as being in need of humanitarian assistance, 15 per cent (188,000 people) are persons with disabilities, of whom 60 per cent are male and 40 per cent are female.¹⁷¹ Within crisis-affected communities, children and adults with disabilities are usually among the most marginalized, but do not benefit from humanitarian assistance and face challenges in accessing basic services.¹⁷²

Persons with disabilities are subject to negative stereotypes and there is severe social stigma around mental illness.¹⁷³ Persons with disabilities face significant barriers to their full social and economic inclusion and realization of their rights. Stigmatization, a lack of inclusive employment policies and opportunities, and the lack of adapted professional training further hamper the socioeconomic inclusion of persons with disabilities.¹⁷⁴

The 2019 Joint Education Needs Assessment estimated that 0.5 per cent of school age children were reported to have a disability. Representatives of organizations of persons with disabilities highlight the lack of access to inclusive education resulting in non-attendance or dropping out from school.¹⁷⁵ Boys with disabilities are more likely to go to school than girls with disabilities. In 2014, it was estimated that 39.7 per cent of people with disabilities were illiterate compared to 12.2 per cent of the total population, with rates for females being significantly higher than males at 54.8 per cent and 28.8 per cent respectively.¹⁷⁶ In addition, special education teachers often lack necessary skills and there are low expectations of the potential of children with disabilities.

To address these challenges, the Disabilities Office in the Ministry

¹⁶⁵ IOM, Labour Market Assessment Libya, August 2021: https://libya.iom.int/sites/g/files/tmzbdl931/files/documents/20210811_LMA%20Collated%20Report%20ENG.pdf

¹⁶⁶ Women's Refugee Commission (2019), "More Than One Million Pains: Sexual Violence Against Men and Boys on the Central Mediterranean Route to Italy". [online]: <https://www.acaps.org/sites/acaps/files/key-documents/files/libya-italy-report-03-2019.pdf>

¹⁶⁷ OCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview 2021, December 2020.

¹⁶⁸ Brigitte Rohwerder (April 2018), 'Disability in North Africa', Institute of Development Studies.

¹⁶⁹ Multi-Sector Needs Assessment 2018, 2019

¹⁷⁰ UNMAS, Victim Assistance in Libya Position Paper, 2019: https://unmas.org/sites/default/files/va_report_libya_2019-libmac-unmas_0.pdf

¹⁷¹ OCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview 2021, December 2020.

¹⁷² OCHA, Humanitarian Response Plan, 2019: https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/2019_LBY_HRP-FINAL.pdf

¹⁷³ Brigitte Rohwerder (April 2018), 'Disability in North Africa', Institute of Development Studies.

¹⁷⁴ UNMAS, Victim Assistance in Libya Position Paper, 2019

¹⁷⁵ UNMAS, Victim Assistance in Libya Position Paper, 2019.

¹⁷⁶ Heinsjo-Jackson & Ismail, 2014 cited in: Brigitte Rohwerder (April 2018), Disability in North Africa, Institute of Development Studies.

of Education is working to assist students with disabilities to complete their education within the public school system through provision of direct support to students and teachers and by supplying the necessary tools, equipment, and training.¹⁷⁷

While the Ministry of Social Affairs provides persons with disabilities with pensions, entitlements, and access to free treatment in government rehabilitation centres, significant challenges remain in accessing necessary support.¹⁷⁸ Disability services are centred mainly in Benghazi, Misrata, Sebha, and Tripoli. Mental health services are available in Tripoli but are mostly absent in the rest of the country.¹⁷⁹

A 2018 assessment found that only 12 per cent of households with a member reported to have a physical disability had adequate access to the needed healthcare, while 85 per cent had limited or no access.¹⁸⁰ Only 5 per cent of Libyan households with a member reported to have mental disability could access the appropriate healthcare services, with 47 per cent having no access and 44 per cent having limited access.¹⁸¹

The lack of adequate services has been attributed to various factors including, closures of services due to the conflict, the high prices of essential assistive technologies, logistical challenges in supply routes such as road blockages, and a lack of trained medical staff.

Despite having signed the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities a decade earlier, it was only ratified by Libya in February 2018. However, laws and policies are insufficient to guarantee the rights of persons with disabilities and require ongoing advocacy, especially for compliance and implementation of outstanding commitments under the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.

4.8 MINORITY ETHNIC GROUPS

Libya is historically a diverse country, rich in ethnic and linguistic groups, such as Amazigh, Tebu, Tuareg, and Tawargha. Such group identities are amplified by tribal and geographical identities.

Libya continues to struggle with the legacy of repressive regimes and their practice of exploiting ethnic, tribal, racial, and regional differences to retain power. Some of these tensions were exacerbated in the last days of the Ghaddafi regime, whose reliance on the allegiance of members of certain groups had repercussions for entire communities. Prevailing racist attitudes further fuelled politically manipulated animosities. For example, over 35,000 Tawergha, a community of black Libyan's descended from slaves, remain displaced after being forcibly expelled from their homes in Tawergha town by Misratan armed groups during the 2011 revolution.¹⁸² Despite the signing of a reconciliation agreement between the groups in 2017 which

envisaged the return of displaced persons, the Tawergha are still unable to go back to their homes.

In addition, the Tuareg community, members of whom reportedly provided militarily support to pro-Ghaddafi forces during the revolution, were stigmatized as pro-regime and resulted in their large-scale displacement, including from areas such as Ghedames.

Several localized conflicts between Arab and non-Arab Libyan communities originating in 2011 persist today which has constrained minority communities' access to basic services. This includes places such as Sabha in the south and Kufra in the south-east where Tebu communities face challenges in accessing hospitals and medical services due to fear of violence or discrimination.¹⁸³ Insecurity and violence also impacts access to schools and universities for Tebu children and young men and women. While some enrol in universities in other cities, the associated increased cost of living limits opportunities to attend higher level education.

While the revolution may have created new tensions between majority and minority groups, discrimination against minorities is primarily rooted in practices and policies instituted during the Ghaddafi-era, including the former dictator's pro-Arab ideology, as well as Libya's involvement in regional conflicts.

Following conflict in 1973 through which Libya seized control of the Aouzou Strip from Chad, the International Court of Justice ruled in 1994 that the land should be returned to Chad. Libya subsequently issued decision 13 of 1998, revoking Libyan citizenship of all persons born in the territory. Although this decision was overturned in 2010, its consequences remain an obstacle for many of the Tebu population. Other non-Arab minorities who were recruited from neighbouring countries to participate in regional wars and later settled in Libya have also been denied citizenship despite promises made by Ghaddafi. As a result, a number of Tebu and Tuareg who were born in Libya were not granted citizenship and denied a family booklet, effectively rendering them stateless.

Tebu and Tuareg, as well as minorities such as Amazigh, have also been denied their cultural rights, including through non-recognition of their languages by the state. For instance, the Amazigh community struggled to register traditional names on birth certificates and were obliged to give Arab names to newborn children. Amazigh followers of Ibadi Islam, the predominant Islamic school of thought among this group, have been subject to hate speech from extremist Islamic factions.

Minority groups have also faced difficulties in engaging and participating in political processes. During Libya's post-revolution elections in 2012, some minority group members were unable to exercise their right to vote, although others were able to cast their ballot through alternative means of identification. More recently, minority representatives have complained that they

¹⁷⁷ UNESCO, Libya Education Inclusion Profile: <https://education-profiles.org/northern-africa-and-western-asia/libya/-inclusion#Laws.%20Plans.%20Policies%20and%20Programmes>

¹⁷⁸ Brigitte Rohwerder (April 2018), 'Disability in North Africa', Institute of Development Studies.

¹⁷⁹ OCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview 2021, December 2020.

¹⁸⁰ REACH, Multi-Sector Needs Assessment 2018, Mine Action Indicators, provided by REACH to UNMAS Libya.

¹⁸¹ REACH, Multi-Sector Needs Assessment 2018, 2019

¹⁸² The UN Human Rights Council, Investigation by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on Libya: detailed findings, 15 February 2016

¹⁸³ UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Support Mission in Libya, 25 February 2016, S/2016/182, available at: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/56d697d84.html>

were not adequately represented during peace negotiations at the Libyan Political Dialogue Forum.

4.9 PEOPLE LIVING WITH HIV/AIDS

Information on the HIV situation in Libya is very limited. Although increasing, the numbers of people living with HIV in Libya is quite low, with between 6,100 and 7,400 adults and children living with the disease in 2020. The HIV prevalence rate of adults (aged 15–49) rate stood at 0.1 while the incidence of HIV in the same age group was 0.08 per 1,000 population. It is estimated that around 70 per cent of adults aged 15 years and above living with HIV are male. While it is estimated that there were over 500 new HIV infections in 2020, the death rate from AIDS in the country in the same year was estimated as 378.¹⁸⁴

Injecting drug use is the dominant mode of transmission, which accounted for as many as 90 per cent of infections in the past. However, government sources have indicated an increasing trend toward sexual transmission.¹⁸⁵

Gay men and other men who have sex with men, transgender people, sex workers and their clients, people who inject drugs, and prisoners are at particular risk of contracting HIV. These groups face stigmatization and discrimination, including within the health sector, meaning they are less likely to seek potentially lifesaving testing and treatment. This is compounded by the criminalization of homosexuality, transsexuality, and prostitution. Migrants and displaced people are also at risk due to their particular vulnerabilities.

There is almost no civil society engagement in the areas of HIV prevention, treatment, and support. Libya's most vulnerable groups and those with the highest HIV prevalence rates are not a key focus for any civil society group's efforts.¹⁸⁶

Supply disruptions of antiretroviral drugs have resulted in delays in treatment and pose a risk of increased transmission, drug resistance, and mortality. This has been exacerbated by instability within the Ministry of Health and a complex and bureaucratic pharmaceutical supply chain.

To tackle the growing challenge of HIV/AIDS, the then government of Libya launched its National AIDS Program in 2002 which culminated in the finalization of the National Strategy for HIV and AIDS in 2010. National HIV/AIDS Strategic Plan 2011–2013 was later developed and updated for the 2018–2020 period. A further update is underway for the 2020–2023 period to help prioritize, coordinate, and monitor Libya's response to the HIV/AIDS epidemic.

¹⁸⁴ UNAIDS, Libya Country Profile: <https://www.unaids.org/en/regionscountries/countries/libya>

¹⁸⁵ WHO, HIV Libya Profile (draft), 2021.

¹⁸⁶ WHO, HIV Libya Profile (draft), 2021.

5. GAPS AND CHALLENGES IN DATA AVAILABILITY AND ANALYSIS

The ability of government, international institutions, and other stakeholders effectively assess the economic and socio-demographic situation in the country to enable them to effectively prioritize and design quality and informed development interventions is predicated on the availability of reliable and up-to-date data and analysis. However, following a decade of conflict and political and institutional decline, Libya's institutional statistical capacity has been decimated.

Libya's overall World Bank Statistical Capacity average score, which provides a composite score assessing the capacity of a country's statistical system, declined to just 25.6 out of 100 in 2020, the second lowest score of countries assessed after Syria.¹⁸⁷ Libya also saw a corresponding reduction in its Statistical Performance Indicator score which declined to 21.4 out of 100

in 2019, the third lowest of all countries monitored (no data available for 2020).¹⁸⁸ Furthermore, Libya scored just 20 out of 100 in 2020 (ranked 180 out of 187 countries) in the Open Data Inventory which measures a country's statistical offerings and whether their data meets international standards of openness.¹⁸⁹

While a national population survey was conducted in 2012, the last full census was undertaken in 2006 meaning the most basic data is unreliable or unavailable.


To address the shortcomings in national statistical capacity and overall availability of quality data, the Libyan National Statistics Development Strategy 2018–2023 was endorsed in December 2017, although funding is required for its operationalization. Most recent data from 2018 indicates that only US\$ 78.5 thousand was received in international support to rebuild the country's statistical capacity and infrastructure, significantly below what is required.¹⁹⁰

This general weakness in national statistical capacity has also posed challenges in monitoring progress towards the SDGs, including for this CCA, and severely impedes the ability of international development partners to provide targeted and coordinated support where needed.

The lack of disaggregated data also means that it is very difficult to assess the situation of various population groups in the country, including those most vulnerable highlighted in the 'Leave No One Behind' chapter, thereby increasing the risk of their specific needs not being addressed. For instance, only 17.3 per cent of indicators needed to monitor the SDGs from a gender perspective were available as of December 2020.

As such, it will be imperative that challenges around availability of reliable data and weaknesses in national statistical capacities are tackled through sustained and coordinated international support moving forward.

Figure 13: Statistical Capacity and Performance Scores



¹⁸⁷ World Bank, Bulletin Board on Statistical Capacity: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/IQ.SCI.OVRL?locations=LY&most_recent_value_desc=true

¹⁸⁸ The Statistical Performance Indicator overall score is a composite score measuring a country's performance across five pillars: data use, data services, data products, data sources, and data infrastructure. https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/IQ.SPI.OVRL?locations=LY&most_recent_value_desc=true

¹⁸⁹ Open Data Watch, Open Data Inventory, 2020: <https://odin.opendatawatch.com/Report/countryProfileUpdated/LBY?year=2020>

¹⁹⁰ UNDESA, SDG Country Profile - Libya: <https://unstats.un.org/sdgs/indicators/database/>

6. NATIONAL VISION FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT

Although the Ministry of Planning is supposed to be responsible for setting national development policies, plans, or frameworks, Libya has had no national development plan since 2011, chiefly due to the east-west split and fragmented government structure. Consequently, there is no framework to assess the level of national integration of the SDGs or progress made against their targets. While some sectoral strategies exist, the lack of a national development plan also hampers the ability of international development partners, including the UN, to align its support to clearly identified and agreed national priorities across sectors.

In a positive step, the Ministry of Planning adopted an institutional framework for the localization and implementation of the SDGs through the establishment of the Sustainable Development

Committee in 2018. A core function of the Committee is to harmonize and integrate the SDGs into national strategies and plans through coordination with actors from across various sectors. In 2020, the Committee submitted its first Voluntary National Review report to the High-Level Political Forum on its progress towards achieving the SDGs. While a positive first step, the review suffered from an acute lack of reliable data to adequately assess progress towards the Global Goals.

Following official endorsement of the GNU, the UN, World Bank, and European Union supported Recovery and Peacebuilding Assessment process commenced in November 2021 with the aim of formulating a set of agreed strategic priorities which will assist the government in the formulation of a new national development plan envisaged to be completed by mid-2023.

7. MULTI-DIMENSIONAL RISKS



Libya's context makes it particularly vulnerable to multiple factors that can undermine its already constrained progress towards sustainable peace and development. These risks are wide-ranging across all sectors, which mainly derives from high possibility of armed conflict, limited coping mechanisms, and weak governance capacity. The most vulnerable groups, particularly people on the move, are significantly more vulnerable to these risks than other groups.¹⁹¹

This section highlights and describes the main risk areas where potential shocks may occur, as well as assesses their likelihood and potential impacts on Libya's progress toward implementing and achieving the 2030 Agenda and the SDGs. These factors

are highly interconnected, with threats in one area having the potential to negatively impact progress across various others. Consequently, they should not be interpreted in isolation, but as part of a broader integrated and interdependent network of risks. Although not exhaustive, the matrix also proposes some early warning indicators and potential mitigation measures.

It should be noted that specific risks to the UN's safety and security, operations, and ability to implement identified priorities and outcomes will be examined in the new United Nations Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework and associated risk management processes.

¹⁹¹ European Commission, INFORM Risk Country Profile: <https://drmkc.jrc.ec.europa.eu/inform-index/INFORM-Risk/Country-Profile>

TABLE 1: SDG RISK MATRIX

Likelihood	Impact	Time Horizon
• High	• High	• Immediate
• Medium	• Medium	• Near
• Low	• Low	• Long

SDGs	Risk Areas	Risk Factors	Likelihood	Impact	Time-horizon	Early Warning Indicators	Mitigation Measures
All <i>particularly 5, 16, 17</i>	1. Political Stability <i>Further destabilization of political dynamics threatens ceasefire agreement and viability of the government and risks a resumption of violent conflict.</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Fragile relations between different branches and/or ministries of government. <i>De facto</i> lack of unified government and governance institutions (including Central Bank and security institutions). Inequitable allocation and distribution of government revenues across the country. Political manoeuvring contrary to broader national interests. Limited implementation of political agreement and road map agreed at the Libyan Political Dialogue Forum. Continued postponement of national elections. Reduced perceived legitimacy of government and institutions by citizens. 	•	•	•	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Increase in divisive political rhetoric, including through social media. Reduced commitment by political actors to implementation of agreed commitments. Delayed withdrawal of mercenaries, foreign fighters and foreign forces Increased rearmament and mobilization of armed groups aligned to political factions. Increased influence of external state and non-state actors. Cancellation/postponement of elections. <p>National Capacity to Respond: Low</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Advocacy for implementation of commitments agreed at the Libyan Political Dialogue Forum and the 5+5 Joint Military Commission towards Libyans as well as external actors. Continued dialogue between political factions on outstanding areas of contention. Provision of mediation and good offices support by the international community, including the UN.
All	2. Internal Security <i>Reignition of violent conflict and ongoing militant activity threatens internal security and stability, increases injuries, deaths, internal displacement, and exacerbates</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Fragile peace agreement and unresolved political fissures. Continued fragmentation of security institutions and lack of an agreed centralized military structure under civilian oversight. High numbers of militias and armed groups (including mercenaries) supported by global and regional actors. Tensions increased due to excessive tribalism. Presence of various violent extremist terrorist groups. 	•	•	•	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <i>Also see early warning indicators for Risk Area 1: Political Stability.</i> Increase in intercommunal/inter-tribal tensions. Increased movement of illicit arms into the country. Lack of movement on unifying security institutions and demobilization of politically affiliated armed groups. Growing number of incidents claimed by violent extremist groups. Further internal displacement or declining rates of return of IDPs due to security 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <i>Also see mitigation measures for Risk Area 1: Political Stability, particularly on mediation and good offices support.</i> Formulate and implement strategies for comprehensive preventing and countering violent extremism, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration and security sector reform, in

SDGs	Risk Areas	Risk Factors	Likelihood	Impact	Time-horizon	Early Warning Indicators	Mitigation Measures
	<i>humanitarian needs of the most vulnerable.</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Abundance of weapons, explosive remnants and military equipment and continued illicit smuggling of arms. 				<ul style="list-style-type: none"> concerns. <p>National Capacity to Respond: Low</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> collaboration with neighbouring countries. Increase awareness and response capacity to reduce the threat of explosive remnants of war. Support to improved border management and security.
All particularly 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 8, 9, 10, 16, 17	3. Economic Stability <i>Weak economic performance and fragile macroeconomic environment increase unemployment, and impede poverty reduction, particularly for the most vulnerable, and overall socioeconomic stability and peace.</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> High dependence on state-operated and subsidized hydrocarbon sector for export revenues and a lack of economic diversification. Disruption to oil and gas production impacting exports and domestic energy generation. Poor business enabling environment to stimulate private sector development and growth. Weak manufacturing, industrial, and high-tech sectors. Disproportionate employment in public sector institutions. Evolving labour market needs not being met. Lack of a conducive environment to attract foreign direct investment. Vulnerability to global economic shocks. 				<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Limited progress in unifying Libya's Central Banks and other financial institutions. Deteriorating employment rates, including those in non-governmental sector. Increasing inflation rates and macro fiscal instability. Low or negative GDP and GDP per capita growth. Limited improvement in rate of economic diversification and proportion of government revenues originating from oil revenues. Global supply chain disruption. <p>National Capacity to Respond: Medium</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Promote economic diversification through export oriented private sector development and industrialization. Support banking sector and economic reforms and improved business regulatory environment. Improve and match workforce skills with emerging labour market needs.
	4. Regional and Global Influences <i>Global and regional actors threaten domestic political, security, economic, and social stability.</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> External actors exacerbate internal political tensions and support various armed factions to advance geostrategic interests. Continued supply weapons and arms into Libya to various armed groups in contravention of arms embargo. Increased presence of armed groups, mercenaries and foreign fighters, as well as regional radical Islamist militant groups. 				<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Also see early warning indicators for Risk Area 1: <u>Political Stability</u> and Risk Area 2: <u>Internal Security</u>. Deterioration in political, security, and/or economic situation in neighbouring countries. Increased attacks by violent extremist groups. Continued presence of external state-backed mercenaries and foreign fighters. Ongoing cross-border criminal activity. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Also see mitigation measures for Risk Area 1: <u>Political Stability</u> and Risk Area 2: <u>Internal Security</u>. Advocate with external state actors to end destabilizing activities. Unify and strengthen security institutions to combat violent extremist

SDGs	Risk Areas	Risk Factors	Likelihood	Impact	Time-horizon	Early Warning Indicators	Mitigation Measures
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Increased trafficking of refugees, asylum seekers, and migrants by regional criminal enterprises. A large influx of migrants, refugees, and asylum seekers from neighbouring countries due to instability in Libya and/or the region. Lack of government capacity and resources to manage migration and tackle predatory groups engaging in human trafficking and other abuses. 				<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Increased levels of exploitation and abuse of non-Libyan migrants, refugees, and asylum seekers, as well as sea crossings. <p><i>National Capacity to Respond: Low</i></p>	<p>groups and other nefarious external forces.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Strengthen capacity of justice and rule of law institutions to tackle cross-border criminal activities and protect rights of Libyans and non-Libyans. Formulate legislation on the status and treatment of non-Libyans in line with international norms and standards.
1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17	<p>5. Environment and climate change</p> <p><i>Human induced environmental degradation impacts the natural environment and biodiversity. Increased frequency, intensity, and duration of disasters, exacerbated by climate change, resulting in increased displacement and/or humanitarian needs.</i></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Concentration of the population in coastal urban centres. Accelerated decline in available freshwater water resources and poor water management policies, strategies, and plans. Increased desertification. Pollution and contamination of the air, water, and land, particularly from the petrochemical sector. Increased frequency and severity of extreme climactic events. Poor disaster risk reduction/mitigation policies, plans, and capacities. 				<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Reduced availability of freshwater resources. Reduced food security. Changing weather patterns and increased frequency and intensity of extreme weather events. Rise in sea levels and increase in coastal flooding, including in urban areas. Increase in climate related migration and displacement. Increase in prevalence of diseases related to environmental pollution and contamination. Decline in biodiversity. <p><i>National Capacity to Respond: Low</i></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Formulation and implementation of integrated natural resource management plans and strategies, including for water. Improved protection of the natural environment (air, water, land). Development and implementation of disaster risk reduction and climate change mitigation and adaptation strategies. Improved climate change impact assessment systems. Stakeholder engagement through national campaign, alliances, and forums. Advocate for adoption and ratification of relevant outstanding global environmental agreements.

8. PREVENTION AND HUMANITARIAN-DEVELOPMENT-PEACE ANALYSIS

In the context of the broader regional Arab Spring movement, the 2011 popular uprising and subsequent overthrow of Muammar Gaddafi offered the prospect of transitioning towards a peaceful, democratic, and inclusive Libya. However, the absence of a centralized authority and national security apparatus fomented competition between various factions for control over state institutions and resources in 2012–2013. A lack of political consensus on a future vision for the country and fears of certain political, community, and tribal groups of being marginalized in any new political arrangement escalated into violent conflict in 2014 which culminated in the fragmentation of the country between eastern and western factions between 2016 and 2018, resulting in the establishment of duplicate political, governance, economic, and security institutions in each sector. Notably, the division of the Central Bank of Libya has been a significant source of contention as it deprives the GNU of effective control over the eastern and southern regions of the country. (See 'Political Analysis' and 'Governance' sections under the SDG 16 sub-section of Chapter 3 for related contextual information).

Tripoli, the western region, and the coastal areas from Sirte to the Tunisian border are nominally under control of the interim GNU — although their actual control is contested with various militias retaining significant influence — while the rest of the country, including Libya's oil fields, gold mines, and water reservoirs, remain under the influence of General Haftar's Libyan Arab Armed Forces.

This division has been further entrenched through financial and military support to both sides by regional and global powers in pursuit of their own geostrategic interests. Competing national interests between external actors has also posed challenges in reaching an international consensus through UN-facilitated peace efforts.

Established as an outcome of the January 2020 Berlin Conference, the Libyan Political Dialogue Forum has facilitated discussions among the parties, as well as civil society, to resolve outstanding political issues, such as those related to the conduct of the planned 24 December 2021 elections. However, disagreements between the parties on the constitutional basis for the elections resulted in the poll being postponed, thereby potentially undermining confidence in the peace process and threatening the October 2020 Ceasefire Agreement.

The 5+5 Libyan Joint Military Commission (JMC), comprising five military officials from each the eastern and western sides

of the conflict, has also provided a platform for progressing on commitments under the military track of the peace process. Notably, in October 2021, the JMC reached a landmark agreement for a gradual and balanced withdrawal of mercenaries, foreign fighters, and foreign forces from Libya. However, it is too early to determine the level of commitment and compliance by internal and external parties to the agreement.

Despite movement in the peace process, the multitude of militias throughout the country, including those aligned to the eastern and western factions, as well as non-affiliated armed groups, pose a significant ongoing challenge to peace and stability, with intermittent clashes between parties continuing to be reported in Tripoli and parts of eastern, western, and southern regions. In addition, eastern and western blocks also seek to foster alignment of various armed groups to their respective sides, although such allegiances are tenuous and often subject to change based on evolving interests. Each side of the east-west divide has also sought to consolidate their respective influence and geographical control through soliciting support from municipalities and associated community/political/tribal constituencies, particularly in the south-west. In addition, Government resources in the form of salaries and subsidies have been utilized to mitigate potential unrest, solicit allegiance, and reduce threats from armed actors, at the expense of efforts to grow the real economy.

Economic marginalization and inequitable allocation of state resources, particularly in the south, has led to a proliferation in organized criminal networks and armed groups taking advantage of an extremely profitable illicit economy, including through cross-border smuggling, people trafficking, protection rackets, taxation at checkpoints, oil smuggling, and other black-market activities. Economically disenfranchised youth, particularly young men, remain susceptible to recruitment by such criminal networks or violent extremist groups. The current lack of alternative economic opportunities threatens any future agreed disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration initiatives and has the potential to drive former fighters towards criminal networks or other armed movements to earn a living.

The limited capacity for governance and the rule of law, differing alliances with eastern and western blocks, and competition over the spoils of the lucrative illicit economy have also exacerbated longstanding inter-tribal rivalries which destabilize tribal power dynamics and undermine national cohesion and identity. Communities and tribes perceived as being affiliated with the former Ghaddafi regime fear being excluded, disenfranchised,

or targeted by opponents of the former ruler. Inter- and intra-municipal tensions based on historical grievances, often along ethnic/tribal or pro-/anti-revolutionary lines, can escalate into violent conflict, causing injuries, deaths, and displacement. The absence of adequate conflict management or reconciliation mechanisms means that longstanding grievances are often left to fester, risking further escalations.

Instability deriving from limited unification of security and finance institutions and weak government capacity, in addition to an abundance of weapons, has enabled ISIL and Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb to establish themselves throughout Libya, including in ungoverned areas of the south as well as in some coastal cities. Disillusionment with political dysfunction, weak governance, and deteriorating socioeconomic conditions have resulted in moderate Islamists increasingly gravitating towards more radical foreign movements who profess their ability to provide greater stability and rule of law in areas under its control, although certainly to the detriment of vulnerable population groups, particularly women and girls.

As the country's main export and source of revenues, control over oil resources and infrastructure has played a key role in Libya's conflict dynamics. While most of the major oil fields lay within General Haftar's areas of control, some pipelines and facilities are located in territories under the control of armed groups affiliated with the western government, which has seriously disrupted oil production and been a catalyst for conflict over control of oil infrastructure and facilities. Armed groups also compete for physical control over oil facilities, including through provision of security services to oil installations, which has provided the possibility for earning state

salaries as well as increasing their political and tribal leverage, particularly given their ability to disrupt the sector. Smuggling of oil from facilities for sale on the domestic and international black market has provided a lucrative source of revenues for various armed groups who control such installations.

Armed groups also source revenues through other illicit activities, such as the imposition of taxes on businesses in urban centres, usually for 'protection'. Outside of urban areas, particularly in the south, taxes are collected at checkpoints. However, this inhibits the flow of goods and increases the cost of living in these areas.

IMPLICATIONS FOR HUMANITARIAN NEEDS AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT

The abovementioned conflict dynamics and political instability and fragmentation, as well as the associated deterioration in socioeconomic conditions, have been the primary driver of humanitarian needs and impediments to sustainable development in Libya over the past decade.

While the October 2020 Ceasefire Agreement resulted in a significant decline in the number of civilian casualties and those living in displacement, humanitarian needs remain high, with the number of people categorized as being in need of assistance standing at over 800,000 in 2021.¹⁹² However, it is projected that this number will increase to 1.5 million for 2022. In terms of severity of needs of those requiring assistance in 2021, 54 per cent were

CLIMATE CHANGE AND WATER SCARCITY AS EMERGING DRIVER OF CONFLICT AND HUMANITARIAN NEEDS

Globally, the impacts of climate change and climate related disasters, including increased displacement and migration, disruption to livelihoods, and dwindling available natural resources, are increasingly contributing factors to conflict dynamics and humanitarian needs.

While not a significant factor in its current conflict landscape, Libya is one of the most water scarce countries in the world, within a region with already limited water availability. It is estimated that Libya's available natural freshwater resources may be exhausted in the coming one to two decades due to over-exploitation, poor infrastructure, and unsustainable water management practices, including in agricultural production. Changing weather patterns are likely to result in increasingly extreme weather conditions, particularly drought, and accelerate desertification.

Most of Libya's available freshwater resources are concentrated in a few locations, mostly under the control of the General Haftar's Libyan Arab Armed Forces, making access to these resources a potential cause of friction in the future in lieu of a comprehensive peace agreement, including on the equitable allocation of key resources.

Already, attacks on and threats against water infrastructure have been used as a weapon of war during the recent armed conflict in Libya and more recently, including the politically motivated closure of the Man-Made River Project in August 2021 which cut supplies to an estimated 3 million people.

Declining availability of water in already arid regions, particularly in the south of the country, have the potential to trigger migration towards the north, putting additional strain on urban centres. The fact that neighbouring countries already see impacts of climate change, water scarcity, and desertification would also likely increase poverty and instability in the region, and could drive further mass migration, including into and through Libya.

¹⁹² Of those in need, 16 per cent are IDPs (131,832), 29 per cent are migrants (232,000), 35 per cent are non-displaced Libyans (281,316), 5 per cent (43,000) are refugees, and 14 per cent (115,439) are returnees.

minimal, 36 per cent were under stress, 9 per cent were severe, and 1 per cent were extreme.¹⁹³ The situation for non-Libyans, including migrants, refugees, and asylum seekers, remains precarious as they continue to face discrimination, exploitation, and abuse, including by armed groups, in the absence of adequate legal protections and capable and rights-based rule of law institutions. The large-scale crackdown and detention of over 5,000 migrants, as well as the killing of six at an overcrowded detention centre on 8 October 2021, further exemplifies their significant protection needs. (See 'Displaced Populations, Migrants, and Refugees' section under Chapter 4 for further information).

Ongoing conflicts, political instability, and poor economic prospects in neighbouring countries threaten to drive continued mixed migration flows by those seeking economic opportunities in Libya or as a base for onward travel to Europe.

The political crisis and associated conflict have also significantly curtailed economic performance and poverty reduction efforts in Libya, while the limited capacity of the state to meet the basic needs of the population has resulted in a deterioration in the resilience of large segments of the population to further shocks. Constraints on humanitarian access since the beginning of the conflict has severely limited the ability of humanitarian organizations to reach locations to provide assistance to those most in need. While challenges remain, there has been a significant reduction in restrictions on humanitarian access in most parts of the country since the October 2020 Ceasefire Agreement, although further outbreaks of violence could reverse such progress.

OPERATIONALIZING THE NEXUS FOR LIBYA

Any efforts to reduce the underlying causes of vulnerability, fragility, and conflict and to advance Libya's efforts and path to sustainable and inclusive development will require complementary and mutually reinforcing responses across the humanitarian-development-peace nexus by the government, international partners, and other stakeholders. While there is a clear commitment to integrating cross-pillar approaches, there is currently no unified vision among stakeholders, including within the UN system, as to what the nexus entails and how it should be operationalized in the Libyan context.

The fragmentation in national institutions and the decentralized authority has resulted in the slow allocation of resources and implementation of projects, and further complicates the work of the international humanitarian and development partners as there are no clear counterparts with whom to engage on a sectoral basis.

The country is currently covered by a Humanitarian Response Plan and the current UN Strategic Framework combines the planning processes of the UN Country Team and UNSMIL, while a Nexus Working Group was established to roll out a pilot of the nexus strategy in Sebha. Despite this, there has been little clear and deliberate interface between the three pillars of the nexus in terms of integrated analysis, planning, programming, implementation, and monitoring and reporting.

However, starting from this CCA, developed in close consultations with UNSMIL and OCHA, it is envisaged that the new United Nations Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework and its associated coordination and implementation arrangements to be instituted should foster greater cross-pillar approaches to the work of the UN in Libya over the coming years. Chapter 10 of this document will further explore potential opportunities and entry points, including for the UN, for catalytic interventions to tackle the multidimensional causes of fragility and vulnerability in Libya in accordance with the New Way of Working.

¹⁹³ OCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview 2022, December 2021: https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/sites/www.humanitarianresponse.info/files/documents/files/libya_hno_2022_6dec21.pdf

9. FINANCIAL LANDSCAPE ANALYSIS


Achieving the SDGs in Libya will require leveraging all available financial resources in a coordinated manner across all national and international stakeholders. This analysis aims to provide an overview of Libya's financing landscape by examining trends in financial flows from various sources over recent years. It is informed by a desk review, a series of interviews with the government and development partners, and an ad hoc mapping of official development assistance (ODA) conducted in October 2021.¹⁹⁴ It also integrates a nexus perspective to help identify resource allocations to humanitarian, development, and peacebuilding-oriented interventions.

BROADER FINANCING LANDSCAPE

The financial landscape in Libya is marked by a distinct lack of diversity, as the Libyan economy is highly dependent on oil. According to the 2021 World Bank Libya Economic Monitor, oil and gas accounted for over 60 per cent of aggregate economic output and over 90 per cent of both fiscal revenues and merchandise exports.¹⁹⁵ Given this reliance, Libya is highly vulnerable when oil prices fall or output slows, as it did in 2020 when there was a blockade on oil terminals and oil fields for nine months.

Government revenue dominates the financing landscape as the biggest financial flow in Libya (ratio of revenue to GDP 65 per cent in 2020).¹⁹⁶ In comparison, the ratio of ODA to GDP over the past 5 years has been between 1–2 per cent. Without foreign direct investment,¹⁹⁷ remittances or other official flows,¹⁹⁸ government revenue from oil remains the biggest flow with the potential to invest in nexus needs (i.e., “reducing people’s needs, risks and

Figure 14: Total Revenues and ODA as Proportion of GDP



vulnerabilities, supporting prevention efforts and thus, shifting from delivering humanitarian assistance to ending need”).¹⁹⁹

As an upper middle-income country, there is great potential for government revenue to be invested in ways that addresses poverty and fragility. However, the government is not currently investing in sustainable development. In 2020, 61 per cent of government expenditure went towards the wage bill of what the World Bank has called “the costliest and least cost-efficient public sector in the world”, through which cash transfers are made without expectations of many of those on the wage bill to deliver any services.²⁰⁰

¹⁹⁴ See Explanatory Note on Data Sources pg. 45.

¹⁹⁵ World Bank, Libya Economic Monitor, Spring 2021.

¹⁹⁶ Author’s calculations based on: i) revenue and GDP figures from the World Bank Libya Economic Monitor – Spring 2021; ii) ODA figures from the OECD CRS for 2017–2019, iii) and ODA estimates calculated using humanitarian data for 2020–2021 exported from the OCHA Financial Tracking Service on 13 October 2021, development partner reporting to an ad hoc mapping exercise conducted in October 2021 and data collected in 2020 by another development partner.

¹⁹⁷ The Libyan Government has not published figures for FDI since 2013. While there may be some flows that are simply not reported, the context is not currently conducive for attracting FDI.

¹⁹⁸ Other official flows (OOF) are transactions that do not meet the criteria to be considered ODA. The OECD definition of OOF explains that they include: “grants to developing countries for representational or essentially commercial purposes; official bilateral transactions intended to promote development, but having a grant element of less than 25%; and, official bilateral transactions, whatever their grant element, that are primarily export-facilitating in purpose.”: https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/development/other-official-flows-oof/indicator/english_6afef3df-en

¹⁹⁹ OECD, DAC Recommendation on the Humanitarian-Development-Peace Nexus, 2021: <https://legalinstruments.oecd.org/public/doc/643/643.en.pdf>

²⁰⁰ World Bank, Libya Economic Monitor, Spring 2021.

The public sector employs an estimated 85 per cent of Libya’s active labour force.²⁰¹

Some government representatives interviewed recognize the need not just to build back, but build afresh, welcoming technical assistance from development partners and recognizing the need to diversify the economy and government revenue sources, pursue public administration reform, and enhance public service delivery. However, even initiating a substantive reform agenda would be a significant challenge given the level of vested interests in the status quo, especially in the current political environment with elections on the horizon.

Political instability and the potential for relapse into violent conflict incentivize short term spending and discourages longer term investments and reforms. For example, Libya is highly vulnerable to the impact of climate change, with severe water shortages expected within a decade. Yet, neither government nor development partners are talking about the necessary investments needed now to stave off the worst effects of climate change.

Private sector growth in Libya is constrained by a wide range of issues including political instability, macroeconomic uncertainty, a liquidity crisis, the lack of a cohesive legal framework and insufficient access to finance. For decades, government policies “worked to limit the size of the private sector and ensured the state’s control of key industries and services,”²⁰² which has also created hurdles in terms of the mindset the public holds about the role of the private sector in Libya. The financial sector is also dominated by state-owned banks and FDI was reduced not


just through a poor business environment, but an active “anti-FDI approach” taken by the state to discourage investment by foreign companies.²⁰³

OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE IN LIBYA

Libya is not a major recipient of aid in terms of overall volume compared with other fragile states. The overall volume of aid for Libya is unlikely to increase significantly given its status as an upper middle-income country, however, increased stability could enable some development partners to deploy a broader range of financing instruments, notably blended financing tools (discussed below). On a per capita basis, Libya receives slightly less than the average fragile state with US\$ 46.60 compared with US\$ 53.8 per capita in net ODA from all donors based on 2019 figures.²⁰⁴

For relatively small flows of ODA to have impact in Libya, they need to be catalytic, strategically targeted, and better coordinated. Dialogue between the government and development partners on ODA need to focus on how aid can help the government better target its own resources towards the SDGs. This should largely be delivered through technical assistance, which is needed to support the government diversify the economy and government revenue sources, pursue public administration reform, and enhance public service delivery. More support for public private dialogue is also needed to create an enabling environment for private sector growth.

Figure 15: Financing Landscape Beyond Government Resources



*Figure shows available data on foreign direct investment (FDI), remittances, official development assistance (ODA) and other official flows (OOF).

²⁰¹ World Bank. 2015. Labor Market Dynamics in Libya: Reintegration for Recovery. World Bank Study. Washington, DC: World Bank. <https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/22015>.
²⁰² UNDP, Labour Market Assessment, September 2021: <https://www.ly.undp.org/content/libya/en/home/library/SustainableDevelopment/Labour-Market-Assessment.html>.
²⁰³ Rahman, Aminur and Michele di Maio. 2020. The Private Sector amid Conflict: The Case of Libya. International Development in Focus. Washington, DC: World Bank: <https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/34818>.
²⁰⁴ States of Fragility: Compare your country: <https://www3.compareyourcountry.org/states-of-fragility/flows/2/>

Figure 16: Volume of ODA Compared with Other Fragile States.²⁰⁵



EXPLANATORY NOTE ON DATA SOURCES

The 2019 ODA figures presented in this analysis provide the most recent, reliable basis for comparison, as they are drawn from development partner reporting to the OECD Creditor Reporting System (CRS). This analysis also presents estimates for 2020 and 2021 based on calculations using humanitarian data exported from the OCHA Financial Tracking Service, development partner reporting to an ad hoc mapping exercise conducted in October 2021 and data collected in 2020 by another development partner. Actual figures are expected to change once development partners have reported to the OECD CRS.

development.²⁰⁶ Some development partners in Libya are already considering potential instruments that could be mobilized if the situation were to improve and become more stable.


Many development partners are in “wait and see” mode, uncertain about the next phase of their engagement without clarity on the needs. Estimated figures for 2020 and 2021 indicate there has been a continuation of ODA trends over the past five years, with overall aid consistently above the overall average for the past ten years.²⁰⁷ While overall aid volumes are not expected to significantly change in 2022, the sectoral focus of that aid would likely shift depending on the evolving context.

Development partners are deploying a variety of flexible financing instruments that allow for adaptation and iteration across the nexus. From contingency financing allocated at the regional level to respond to both positive opportunities and situations of urgent need to agile tools for short-term interventions that are responsive to conflict dynamics, development partners are using a mix of financing instruments to adapt to the dynamic situation on the ground.

With numerous development partners in Libya providing technical assistance, strengthened coordination of this support would help ensure these efforts are complementary and reinforcing. No actor seems to have a full picture of who is doing what and partners have regularly conducted their own mapping exercises to inform their planning. Despite being the recipient of this support, the government also lacks a clear picture of which partners are providing technical assistance and to which parts of government. The lack of internal communication and centralized coordination mechanisms within government also increases the risk that development partners duplicate efforts in an area that should be low hanging fruit for strong government coordination and ownership.

There is potential for deploying blended financing instruments in Libya, but more political stability would be a necessary precondition. Blended financing refers to the use of ODA to mobilize other sources of financing – notably commercial finance that does not have an explicit development aim – for sustainable

Figure 17: ODA to Libya and 10-Year Average



²⁰⁵ States of Fragility: Compare your country: <https://www3.compareyourcountry.org/states-of-fragility/flows/2/>

²⁰⁶ OECD, DAC Blended Finance Guidance, May 2021: https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/development/the-oecd-dac-blended-finance-guidance_ded656b4-en?_ga=2.34172833.1005426667.1635883734-1938776148.1635871432


²⁰⁷ Data from 2012-2019 based on author's calculations using data exported from the OECD CRS on 18 October 2021. Data from 2020-21 are estimates based on author's calculations using humanitarian data exported from the OCHA Financial Tracking Service on 13 October 2021, development partner reporting to an ad hoc mapping exercise conducted in October 2021 and data collected in 2020 by another development partner.

While many development partners are taking a holistic view of their own portfolios across the nexus, more coordination is needed across international partners to better leverage the comparative advantages of different aid instruments and modalities.

Analysis of ODA in Libya reveals significant investments the peace pillar of the nexus.²⁰⁸ Whereas Libya receives significantly less ODA than regional neighbours Egypt and Sudan, a greater proportion of aid in Libya is directed toward the Peace pillar of the nexus.²⁰⁹ To provide more nuance to the categories, a distinction has been made between “core peacebuilding” and “secondary peacebuilding” using a breakdown applied by the OECD (see Annex III on categories of peacebuilding expenditures). Core peacebuilding includes activities related to basic safety and security such as security system management and land mines removal. Secondary peacebuilding includes categories related to inclusive political processes and core government functions. Both areas have strong overlaps with development activities.

It is estimated that around two-thirds of total overall ODA is for humanitarian aid, which increased to from US\$ 132 million in 2019 to US\$ 207 million in 2020²¹¹; however, this is likely due to differences in reporting practices across instruments. When reporting to the OECD CRS, partners apply a narrow definition of humanitarian aid. Reporting to the OCHA Financial Tracking Service tends to include a broader range of activities, notably as it is the only instrument available at country level through which partners can report their aid in Libya. A more detailed breakdown of ODA by sector is provided in Annex IV.

Figure 18: ODA to Libya Across the Nexus



With the improved humanitarian situation in the country and the prospect of relative stability since the ceasefire agreement in October 2020, there is increased likelihood of a decline in humanitarian funds as donors redirect their resources to other emergency contexts, despite continued lifesaving needs in Libya.

Without a costed national development plan, analysis of the alignment of ODA with national priorities is currently not possible. ODA flows appear to be directed towards the priorities of development partners, notably inclusive political processes

Table 2: ODA to Libya Across the Nexus
(broad sector categories)²¹⁰

		2017	2018	2019	2020 (est)	2021 (est)
Core peacebuilding	Basic Safety and security	14.5	39.7	10.5	29.8	0.4
	Inclusive political processes	191.7	47.7	85.1	46.8	29.7
Secondary peacebuilding	Core government functions	37.2	22.1	13.4	50.4	10.2
	Inclusive political processes	31.7	21.0	22.1	11.7	14.8
Development	Core government functions	1.0	4.2	10.1	--	--
	Economic growth	8.6	6.3	9.3	4.8	15.3
	Inclusive political processes	8.0	6.9	10.7	6.3	9.3
	Other	4.5	4.3	2.4	--	--
	Restoration of Basic Services*	23.3	38.3	30.5	77.2	116.4
Humanitarian	Emergency Response	117.8	106.3	100.1	207.3	150.5
Other	Sector not specified	5.0	0.3	0.8	0.4	0.4
Totals		443.2	297.2	295.1	434.7	346.9

²⁰⁸ Data from 2012-19 based on author's calculations using data from the OECD CRS on 18 Oct 2021. Estimates for 2020-21 are based on author's calculations using humanitarian data exported from OCHA FTS on 13 Oct 2021, development partner reporting to an ad hoc mapping exercise conducted in Oct 2021 and data collected in 2020 by another development partner.

²⁰⁹ States of Fragility: Compare your country: <https://www3.compareyourcountry.org/states-of-fragility/flows/2/>

²¹⁰ States of Fragility: Compare your country: <https://www3.compareyourcountry.org/states-of-fragility/flows/2/>

²¹¹ OCHA Financial Tracking Service: <https://fts.unocha.org/countries/127/summary/2020>

(e.g., public financial management and public administration). However, there is significant fluctuation within sectors from year-to-year (see Annex IV for more detailed breakdown). This may be a reflection of the dynamic situation, which prevents longer term planning and inhibits multi-year programmes. Whereas volatility is to be expected in humanitarian support, greater reliability and consistency of development financing and the core government functions aspects of peace financing would enhance aid effectiveness in Libya.


It is currently not possible to explore the geographic breakdown of ODA in Libya. Beyond the triple nexus and sectoral breakdowns, greater understanding and information sharing around the geographic focus of aid would help inform conflict sensitive approaches and ensure underserved/marginalized communities are not left behind. The need for greater transparency around how government directs its own resources for the benefit of specific areas is even greater, given the magnitude of government resources relative to ODA.

PROVIDERS OF ODA ACROSS THE NEXUS

In 2019, 75 per cent of ODA to Libya was provided by 5 development partners: the European Union, United States, Germany, United Kingdom, and Italy.²¹² A more recent comparison is not possible due to the lack of publicly available data on donor envelopes. However, while the exact envelope figures will have changed, these partners are estimated to continue to be the largest providers of aid. Based on the 2019 data, four of these five development partners provided financing across the nexus. The United Kingdom did not


provide humanitarian assistance based on reporting to the OECD CRS, but rather financed activities in peace and development.

Figure 19: Share of ODA by Provider



The mix of development partners is positive as there is not overreliance on one partner. With more than 20 partners providing the remaining 20 per cent of the ODA, the level of fragmentation is somewhat concerning. Development partners can be impactful even with smaller ODA envelopes, especially given the importance of technical assistance in Libya. A large number of partners providing small volumes of aid simply creates a more challenging environment for coordination which requires that partners spend more time trying to figure out who does what when planning where to direct their financing.

Figure 20: Largest providers of ODA to Libya, 2019



²¹² States of Fragility: Compare your country: <https://www3.compareyourcountry.org/states-of-fragility/flows/2/>

²¹³ Ibid.

10. CONCLUSIONS AND OPPORTUNITIES



As outlined in the preceding chapters, Libya faces a multitude of impediments on its path to sustainable, peaceful, and inclusive development. They are wide-ranging in scope, covering areas of political stability, conflict and security, economic and social development, justice and the rule of law, and climate and environmental issues. They also include transversal issues around human rights, gender equality and women's empowerment, and the broader inclusion of vulnerable and marginalized groups.


While complex and multifaceted in nature, many opportunities exist to tackle these interconnected and multidimensional challenges through integrated and coordinated responses across the humanitarian-development-peace nexus and anchored in the principle of leaving no one behind.

The opportunities highlighted in this section provide potential entry points for UN support to Libya's peace and development agenda in accordance with its collective mandates, capacities, and comparative advantages, resulting in the formulation of a set of mutually reinforcing and catalytic strategic priorities and outcomes to be codified in the forthcoming United Nations Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework.

EXPLANATORY NOTE ON FISHBONE DIAGRAM

The 2019 ODA figures presented in this analysis provide The below diagram summarizes the seven main opportunity area categories (in boxes) emerging from the collective analysis undertaken in this CCA that can contribute to progressing towards the 2030 Agenda and the SDGs. While not exhaustive, the **green arrows** indicate factors which can contribute to progress towards the main opportunity areas. **Orange arrows** are included in some instances to highlight sub-contributions to the green arrows. Arrows whose points touch across a dotted line (/) denote direct relationships or continuity between factors. However, these should not be considered exhaustive, with many interconnections not highlighted due to practical design limitations. Texts denoted with red asterisk (*) are applicable or contribute across multiple or all opportunity areas. It is important to note that the placement of the boxes, lines, and associated texts does not imply levels of priority or a hierarchy of importance and are positioned based largely on spacing and design considerations.

Figure 21: Opportunities and Entry Points for Progressing on Agenda 2030 and SDGs



10.1 POLITICS AND GOVERNANCE

The core of many of Libya's peace and development challenges emanate from the decade long conflict and divided political and governance structures between the east and west of the country, and the various factors contributing to this fragmentation. As such, overcoming the central political and security challenges is a prerequisite for progress across all SDGs.

The Libyan Political Dialogue Forum and its road map concluded in November 2020 has been providing opportunities to overcome outstanding political challenges through positive international engagement, including through the UN's good offices and mediation support. While the planned December 2021 polls were postponed, it is imperative to focus on transitional justice, accountability, and national reconciliation in parallel to keeping the electoral process on track, as a future electoral process offers the prospect of democratic and representative governance for the first time in the country's history. Agreement and endorsement of a codified constitutional document can contribute to resolving outstanding questions around the country's legal and political institutional framework.

Significantly increasing the representation of women and youth in politics and government, including through advocacy for adherence to the Libyan Political Dialogue Forum agreement that women should occupy at least 30 per cent of leadership positions, is required for inclusive and representative governance while capacity development support to democratic institutions and elected representatives can enable them to

govern effectively for the benefit of their constituents (see section 10.7 below regarding broader inclusion of marginalized groups).

Unification of government and governmental institutions, as well as reform of the civil service, including through targeted institutional capacity development initiatives and a unified national budget approval and implementation, will help national institutions to become more streamlined, efficient, responsive, and cost-effective in the execution of their functions. Tackling corruption and increasing accountability is also essential to advancing good governance. Strengthening national statistical capacities will enable informed sectoral and cross-sectoral planning while the formulation of a new national development plan could provide a coherent and integrated country-wide framework against which the Libyan government and the international community can align their support.

Inclusion of all segments of society can help ensure that institutions and decision-making mechanisms are representative to their constituents, thereby enhancing their legitimacy. Strengthening of local governance and decentralized service delivery, financed through a more equitable distribution of government revenues, can strengthen quality social services for all communities and contribute to broader stabilization efforts.

10.2 PEACE AND SECURITY

Directly linked to the longstanding political and governance crisis outlined above, the fragile security environment and the

lack of a sustainable peace have been a key impediment across all aspects of Libya's development trajectory. Many of the contributing factors to instability are described in Chapter 8 on 'Prevention and Humanitarian-Development-Peace Linkages'.

Ongoing international support to the peace process is key to resolving outstanding contentious political issues. Support to the unification of security institutions, including military forces, and broader security sector reform can increase the capabilities of national security institutions, operating under civilian oversight and in accordance with international human rights obligations, to restore and expand state authority. International support for the implementation of the October 2021 Action Plan on the withdrawal of foreign mercenaries should further contribute to peace and stability and additionally aid the functional unification of security institutions.

Support for national reconciliation processes underpinned by transitional justice and between various factions, including those based on regional and intertribal dynamics, can assist in addressing the root causes of localized conflicts and instability, and strengthen social cohesion. A multi-pronged approach to disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of members of militias and other armed groups will be needed to address issues around the potential integration of irregular forces into formal security and rule of law structures, while providing education and economic opportunities for those becoming disengaged to mitigate a relapse into violent groups. Integrated stabilization approaches, particularly at community level, can further support the national peacebuilding agenda and increase the legitimacy of the state in the eyes of the population. Increasing national capacity in explosive hazard management could enable the removal of explosive remnants of war and facilitate the return of those displaced by the conflict.

Strengthening border management capacity could help to mitigate the trafficking of persons and weapons, and other illicit goods, as well as countering the movement of foreign extremist elements into the country. Development of preventing and countering violent extremism initiatives through an integrated package of interventions (e.g., security, social, and economic, etc.) would contribute to tackling radical groups and reach those susceptible to potential radicalization.

10.3 JUSTICE, THE RULE OF LAW, AND HUMAN RIGHTS

The finalization and adoption of a revised constitution will be an essential component in codifying the overarching legal framework in the country, including for enshrining human rights related commitments. Support to national legislative bodies should help ensure that legislation is developed in accordance with international human rights obligations, including with regard to civic engagement and freedom of expression. Capacity development support to the justice sector can also enable the judiciary to operate independently and in line with global standards, including in relation to the rights of women and girls. Additional technical support and advocacy will be required to eliminate violations and improve conditions within the corrections system and detention centres, as well as to gain unrestricted access to facilities by human rights monitors.

Support for the establishment of a new and capacitated

independent national human rights monitoring institution, or the reinvigoration of the now defunct National Council for Civil Liberties and Human Rights, will be essential for investigating cases and holding perpetrators of violations accountable. Continued international human rights monitoring and advocacy will also be necessary in this regard. Support for transitional justice processes can contribute to overcoming the consequences of long-standing and systemic abuses and injustices.

10.4 SUSTAINABLE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

Advancing sustainable, inclusive, and equitable economic development is crucial for reducing poverty in Libya. The improvement in the security situation and the progressive unification of government institutions provides the opportunity to accelerate economic growth and employment generation across the country, particularly for women and youth.

Implementation of economic reforms that facilitate economic diversification and remove impediments to private sector development and foreign direct investment should help to stimulate employment generation outside of the public sector, thereby decreasing the financial burden on the state. Improvements in productivity and efficiencies in the manufacturing sector are required to increase competitiveness. Upskilling through the provision of education and training opportunities, particularly for women and youth, should help meet the needs of a diversified labour market.

The unification of the Central Bank of Libya, and reform of the banking sector more broadly, is essential for financial institutions to become enablers of private sector development while a stable security, political, and business friendly environment can help incentivize foreign direct investment.

A transition to renewable energy production will reduce the environmental impact of the electricity network and increase high-tech employment while ensuring longer-term sustainability of supply. Expansion of the electricity distribution network and other key infrastructures to areas not currently reached can stimulate economic activity in peripheral or traditionally excluded and underserved areas, thereby contributing to more balanced economic development and reconciliation across the country.

Improved formal employment opportunities in traditionally marginalized areas could also reduce incentives for engaging in criminal or other deleterious activities. Supporting greater labour market participation by women, particularly in emerging sectors, should further contribute to their empowerment and independence.

10.5 SOCIAL AND HUMAN CAPITAL DEVELOPMENT

As previously noted, significant reform of the public sector, including the structural and operational unification of government institutions, will be required for the efficient and effective delivery of quality social services to the population. Formulation of a national development plan and sectoral strategies should provide strategic frameworks and increase accountability for

the implementation of necessary reforms.

Improving health and education outcomes requires the strengthening of capacities of educators and health workers to ensure that they have the appropriate combination of skills required for the effective execution of their duties. New and rehabilitated health and education facilities, as well as necessary equipment (particularly in medical facilities), can further improve the quality of services. The appropriate allocation of finances and addressing supply chain constraints could increase availability of medicines and vaccines for health centres. Regulatory oversight of private sector healthcare providers can ensure that they operate in accordance with national and international standards.

Strengthening the capacity of local governments should facilitate effective decentralization of social services to reach those on the periphery. The roll-out and utilization of information management systems across sectors, particularly health and education, is key for the government to undertake more effective sectoral and cross-sectoral planning.

The significant challenge of water scarcity will need to be tackled to ensure continued access to water, sanitation, and hygiene services (see next section on water management). Improved household food security and access to nutrition services could further improve social development outcomes, particularly in health and education.

Strengthened social safety nets and increased capacity of the government for the effective delivery of shock responsive social protection services, including for IDP, migrants, and refugees, can increase the resilience of the most vulnerable and underserved. Access to protection services will improve the physical and psychological safety of victims of abuse, neglect, and violence, particularly women and children.

10.6 CLIMATE CHANGE RESILIENCE, THE ENVIRONMENT, AND NATURAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT

Libya's vulnerability to the impacts of climate change and environmental degradation necessitates proactive measures against their potential consequences. The development and implementation of national disaster risk reduction and climate change adaptation policies and strategies can help mitigate the worst impacts of climate change, including desertification and the protection of coastal urban centres from rising sea levels.

Various measures will be needed to address water scarcity as one of the greatest emerging threats facing Libya and to ensure equitable access to water for domestic and economic purposes. These include the development and implementation of integrated water management policies and strategies, water conservation, wastewater recycling, improved water distribution networks, and desalination.

Accelerating the adoption of sustainable forms of consumption and production, including the expansion of renewable energy production, will minimize environmental impacts across all economic sectors. Climate smart agricultural methods

should reduce the overuse of water resources and other environmentally damaging practices that contribute to soil erosion and desertification, which further impact productive sectors and food security. Strengthening national capacity for the implementation of international environmental obligations could also facilitate the protection marine and terrestrial habitats and ecosystems.

10.7 LEAVING NO ONE BEHIND

As a central tenet of the 2030 Agenda, leaving no one behind is critical for making progress on all SDGs, as well as the other opportunity areas highlighted above. This will require addressing the multitude of factors which contribute to the marginalization and exclusion of different elements of society, including those highlighted in Chapter 4 'Leave no one behind'.

Support for the meaningful inclusion of marginalized and vulnerable groups in all aspects of society, including in decision making processes, platforms, and institutions will help ensure that they participate in and benefit from Libya's peace and development agenda. These efforts should cut across from political, economic to societal aspects, including through advocacy with political leaders and institutions for the inclusion of traditionally marginalized groups; strengthening the capacities of such groups, representative organizations, and networks to engage in and advocate for their participation in decision making bodies and processes; supporting anti-discrimination public awareness and outreach initiatives; addressing policy and legislative impediments contributing to their marginalization; and empowering them through economic and financial inclusion to reduce inequality and ensure longer-term development.

Tackling the underlying causes of discrimination against various groups, including legal, societal, cultural, economic, attitudinal, and others, can help overcome patterns of systemic exclusion. Building the resilience to various vulnerabilities could also contribute to increased capacities to withstand and respond to shocks.

Strengthening the capacity of the state to operate in accordance with its international obligations will help enhance the protection of the rights of vulnerable populations and increase accountability of perpetrators of violations of those rights. This should include the adoption and domestication of outstanding international legal commitments and strengthening the capacity of the justice sector to operate in accordance with international norms and standards.

Achieving durable solutions for displaced populations would reduce humanitarian and protection needs of those living in displacement, while the development of a comprehensive migration governance strategy and legal framework in line with international standards can promote safe and regular migration and protect, respect, and fulfil the rights of migrants.

ANNEX I: SDG TARGETS ANALYSIS

NOTE: the below table only provides data for indicators against the global SDG indicator framework. It does not include other non-SDG indicator specific data utilized in this CCA.

<i>Goals and targets (from the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development)</i>	<i>Indicators</i>	<i>Baseline data</i>	<i>Data year</i>
Goal 1. End poverty in all its forms everywhere			
1.1 By 2030, eradicate extreme poverty for all people everywhere, currently measured as people living on less than \$1.25 a day	1.1.1 Proportion of the population living below the international poverty line by sex, age, employment status and geographic location (urban/rural)	Data unavailable	
1.2 By 2030, reduce at least by half the proportion of men, women and children of all ages living in poverty in all its dimensions according to national definitions	1.2.1 Proportion of population living below the national poverty line, by sex and age	Data unavailable	
	1.2.2 Proportion of men, women and children of all ages living in poverty in all its dimensions according to national definitions	9%	2016
1.3 Implement nationally appropriate social protection systems and measures for all, including floors, and by 2030 achieve substantial coverage of the poor and the vulnerable	1.3.1 Proportion of population covered by social protection floors/systems, by sex, distinguishing children, unemployed persons, older persons, persons with disabilities, pregnant women, newborns, work-injury victims and the poor and the vulnerable	Data unavailable	
1.4 By 2030, ensure that all men and women, in particular the poor and the vulnerable, have equal rights to economic resources, as well as access to basic services, ownership and control over land and other forms of property, inheritance, natural resources, appropriate new technology and financial services, including microfinance	1.4.1 Proportion of population living in households with access to basic services	Data unavailable	
	1.4.2 Proportion of total adult population with secure tenure rights to land, (a) with legally recognized documentation, and (b) who perceive their rights to land as secure, by sex and type of tenure	Data unavailable	
1.5 By 2030, build the resilience of the poor and those in vulnerable situations and reduce their exposure and vulnerability to climate-related extreme events and other economic, social and environmental shocks and disasters	1.5.1 Number of deaths, missing persons and directly affected persons attributed to disasters per 100,000 population	Data unavailable	
	1.5.2 Direct economic loss attributed to disasters in relation to global gross domestic product (GDP)	Data unavailable	
	1.5.3 Number of countries that adopt and implement national disaster risk reduction strategies in line with the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015–2030	Data unavailable	
	1.5.4 Proportion of local governments that adopt and implement local disaster risk reduction strategies in line with national disaster risk reduction strategies	Data unavailable	
1.a Ensure significant mobilization of resources from a variety of sources, including through enhanced development cooperation, in order to provide adequate and predictable means for developing countries, in particular least developed countries, to implement programmes and policies to end poverty in all its dimensions	1.a.1 Total official development assistance grants from all donors that focus on poverty reduction as a share of the recipient country's gross national income	Data unavailable	
	1.a.2 Proportion of total government spending on essential services (education, health and social protection)	Data unavailable	
1.b Create sound policy frameworks at the national, regional and international levels, based on pro-poor and gender-sensitive development strategies, to support accelerated investment in poverty eradication actions	1.b.1 Pro-poor public social spending	Data unavailable	

Goal 2. End hunger, achieve food security and improved nutrition and promote sustainable agriculture			
2.1 By 2030, end hunger and ensure access by all people, in particular the poor and people in vulnerable situations, including infants, to safe, nutritious and sufficient food all year round	2.1.1 Prevalence of undernourishment	Data unavailable	
	2.1.2 Prevalence of moderate or severe food insecurity in the population, based on the Food Insecurity Experience Scale (FIES)	Total: 511.30 Male: 208.60 Female: 302.60	2021
2.2 By 2030, end all forms of malnutrition, including achieving, by 2025, the internationally agreed targets on stunting and wasting in children under 5 years of age, and address the nutritional needs of adolescent girls, pregnant and lactating women and older persons	2.2.1 Prevalence of stunting (height for age <-2 standard deviation from the median of the World Health Organization (WHO) Child Growth Standards) among children under 5 years of age	43.5%	2020
	2.2.2 Prevalence of malnutrition (weight for height >+2 or <-2 standard deviation from the median of the WHO Child Growth Standards) among children under 5 years of age, by type (wasting and overweight)	Prevalence of wasting: 10.2%	2014
	2.2.3 Prevalence of anaemia in women aged 15 to 49 years, by pregnancy status (percentage)	Total: 29.9 Non-pregnant: 29.9 Pregnant: 29.4	2019
2.3 By 2030, double the agricultural productivity and incomes of small-scale food producers, in particular women, indigenous peoples, family farmers, pastoralists and fishers, including through secure and equal access to land, other productive resources and inputs, knowledge, financial services, markets and opportunities for value addition and non-farm employment	2.3.1 Volume of production per labour unit by classes of farming/pastoral/forestry enterprise size	Data unavailable	
	2.3.2 Average income of small-scale food producers, by sex and indigenous status	Data unavailable	
2.4 By 2030, ensure sustainable food production systems and implement resilient agricultural practices that increase productivity and production, that help maintain ecosystems, that strengthen capacity for adaptation to climate change, extreme weather, drought, flooding and other disasters and that progressively improve land and soil quality	2.4.1 Proportion of agricultural area under productive and sustainable agriculture	Data unavailable	
2.5 By 2020, maintain the genetic diversity of seeds, cultivated plants and farmed and domesticated animals and their related wild species, including through soundly managed and diversified seed and plant banks at the national, regional and international levels, and promote access to and fair and equitable sharing of benefits arising from the utilization of genetic resources and associated traditional knowledge, as internationally agreed	2.5.1 Number of (a) plant and (b) animal genetic resources for food and agriculture secured in either medium- or long-term conservation facilities	Data unavailable	
	2.5.2 Proportion of local breeds classified as being at risk of extinction	Data unavailable	
2.a Increase investment, including through enhanced international cooperation, in rural infrastructure, agricultural research and extension services, technology development and plant and livestock gene banks in order to enhance agricultural productive capacity in developing countries, in particular least developed countries	2.a.1 The agriculture orientation index for government expenditures	Data unavailable	
	2.a.2 Total official flows (official development assistance plus other official flows) to the agriculture sector	Data unavailable	

2.b Correct and prevent trade restrictions and distortions in world agricultural markets, including through the parallel elimination of all forms of agricultural export subsidies and all export measures with equivalent effect, in accordance with the mandate of the Doha Development Round	2.b.1 Agricultural export subsidies	Data unavailable	
2.c Adopt measures to ensure the proper functioning of food commodity markets and their derivatives and facilitate timely access to market information, including on food reserves, in order to help limit extreme food price volatility	2.c.1 Indicator of food price anomalies	Data unavailable	
Goal 3. Ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for all at all ages			
3.1 By 2030, reduce the global maternal mortality ratio to less than 70 per 100,000 live births	3.1.1 Maternal mortality ratio	72 deaths per 100,000 live births	2017
	3.1.2 Proportion of births attended by skilled health personnel	99.9	2018
3.2 By 2030, end preventable deaths of newborns and children under 5 years of age, with all countries aiming to reduce neonatal mortality to at least as low as 12 per 1,000 live births and under-5 mortality to at least as low as 25 per 1,000 live births	3.2.1 Under-5 mortality rate	11.5 per 1,000 live births	2019
	3.2.2 Neonatal mortality rate	6.5 per 1,000 live births	2019
3.3 By 2030, end the epidemics of AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and neglected tropical diseases and combat hepatitis, water-borne diseases and other communicable diseases	3.3.1 Number of new HIV infections per 1,000 uninfected population, by sex, age and key populations	0.04	2018
	3.3.2 Tuberculosis incidence per 100,000 population	9	2018
	3.3.3 Malaria incidence per 1,000 population	0.04	2018
	3.3.4 Hepatitis B incidence per 100,000 population	0.003	2018
	3.3.5 Number of people requiring interventions against neglected tropical diseases	Data unavailable	
3.4 By 2030, reduce by one third premature mortality from non-communicable diseases through prevention and treatment and promote mental health and well-being	3.4.1 Mortality rate attributed to cardiovascular disease, cancer, diabetes or chronic respiratory disease	54%	2016
	3.4.2 Suicide mortality rate	5	2016
3.5 Strengthen the prevention and treatment of substance abuse, including narcotic drug abuse and harmful use of alcohol	3.5.1 Coverage of treatment interventions (pharmacological, psychosocial and rehabilitation and aftercare services) for substance use disorders	Data unavailable	
	3.5.2 Alcohol per capita consumption (aged 15 years and older) within a calendar year in litres of pure alcohol	0	2020
3.6 By 2020, halve the number of global deaths and injuries from road traffic accidents	3.6.1 Death rate due to road traffic injuries	27.8	2018
3.7 By 2030, ensure universal access to sexual and reproductive health-care services, including for family planning, information and education, and the integration of reproductive health into national strategies and programmes	3.7.1 Proportion of women of reproductive age (aged 15–49 years) who have their need for family planning satisfied with modern methods	24	2014
	3.7.2 Adolescent birth rate (aged 10–14 years; aged 15–19 years) per 1,000 women in that age group	10.9	2014
3.8 Achieve universal health coverage, including financial risk protection, access to quality essential health-care services and access to safe, effective, quality and affordable essential medicines and vaccines for all	3.8.1 Coverage of essential health services	64	2017
	3.8.2 Proportion of population with large household expenditures on health as a share of total household expenditure or income	Data unavailable	

3.9 By 2030, substantially reduce the number of deaths and illnesses from hazardous chemicals and air, water and soil pollution and contamination	3.9.1 Mortality rate attributed to household and ambient air pollution	43	2016
	3.9.2 Mortality rate attributed to unsafe water, unsafe sanitation and lack of hygiene (exposure to unsafe Water, Sanitation and Hygiene for All (WASH) services)	0.6	2016
	3.9.3 Mortality rate attributed to unintentional poisoning	0.8	2019
3.a Strengthen the implementation of the World Health Organization Framework Convention on Tobacco Control in all countries, as appropriate	3.a.1 Age-standardized prevalence of current tobacco use among persons aged 15 years and older	25.10%	2008
3.b Support the research and development of vaccines and medicines for the communicable and non-communicable diseases that primarily affect developing countries, provide access to affordable essential medicines and vaccines, in accordance with the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, which affirms the right of developing countries to use to the full the provisions in the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights regarding flexibilities to protect public health, and, in particular, provide access to medicines for all	3.b.1 Proportion of the target population covered by all vaccines included in their national programme	97%	2018
	3.b.2 Total net official development assistance to medical research and basic health sectors	2.86	2019
	3.b.3 Proportion of health facilities that have a core set of relevant essential medicines available and affordable on a sustainable basis	Data unavailable	
3.c Substantially increase health financing and the recruitment, development, training and retention of the health workforce in developing countries, especially in least developed countries and small island developing States	3.c.1 Health worker density and distribution	76	2017
3.d Strengthen the capacity of all countries, in particular developing countries, for early warning, risk reduction and management of national and global health risks	3.d.1 International Health Regulations (IHR) capacity and health emergency preparedness	40	2020
	3.d.2 Percentage of bloodstream infections due to selected antimicrobial-resistant organisms	58.3	2019
Goal 4. Ensure inclusive and equitable quality education and promote lifelong learning opportunities for all			
4.1 By 2030, ensure that all girls and boys complete free, equitable and quality primary and secondary education leading to relevant and effective learning outcomes	4.1.1 Proportion of children and young people (<i>a</i>) in grades 2/3; (<i>b</i>) at the end of primary; and (<i>c</i>) at the end of lower secondary achieving at least a minimum proficiency level in (i) reading and (ii) mathematics, by sex	Data unavailable	
	4.1.2 Completion rate (primary education, lower secondary education, upper secondary education)	Data unavailable	
4.2 By 2030, ensure that all girls and boys have access to quality early childhood development, care and pre-primary education so that they are ready for primary education	4.2.1 Proportion of children aged 24–59 months who are developmentally on track in health, learning and psychosocial well-being, by sex	Data unavailable	
	4.2.2 Participation rate in organized learning (one year before the official primary entry age), by sex	Data unavailable	
4.3 By 2030, ensure equal access for all women and men to affordable and quality technical, vocational and tertiary education, including university	4.3.1 Participation rate of youth and adults in formal and non-formal education and training in the previous 12 months, by sex	Data unavailable	
4.4 By 2030, substantially increase the number of youth and adults who have relevant skills, including technical and vocational skills, for employment, decent jobs and entrepreneurship	Global Health Estimates 2019: Deaths by Cause, Age, Sex, by Country and by Region, 2000–2019. Geneva, World Health Organization, 2020	Data unavailable	

4.5 By 2030, eliminate gender disparities in education and ensure equal access to all levels of education and vocational training for the vulnerable, including persons with disabilities, indigenous peoples and children in vulnerable situations	4.5.1 Parity indices (female/male, rural/urban, bottom/top wealth quintile and others such as disability status, indigenous peoples and conflict-affected, as data become available) for all education indicators on this list that can be disaggregated	Data unavailable	
4.6 By 2030, ensure that all youth and a substantial proportion of adults, both men and women, achieve literacy and numeracy	4.6.1 Proportion of population in a given age group achieving at least a fixed level of proficiency in functional (a) literacy and (b) numeracy skills, by sex	Data unavailable	
4.7 By 2030, ensure that all learners acquire the knowledge and skills needed to promote sustainable development, including, among others, through education for sustainable development and sustainable lifestyles, human rights, gender equality, promotion of a culture of peace and non-violence, global citizenship and appreciation of cultural diversity and of culture's contribution to sustainable development	4.7.1 Extent to which (i) global citizenship education and (ii) education for sustainable development are mainstreamed in (a) national education policies; (b) curricula; (c) teacher education; and (d) student assessment	Data unavailable	
4.a Build and upgrade education facilities that are child, disability and gender sensitive and provide safe, non-violent, inclusive and effective learning environments for all	4.a.1 Proportion of schools offering basic services, by type of service	Data unavailable	
4.b By 2020, substantially expand globally the number of scholarships available to developing countries, in particular least developed countries, small island developing States and African countries, for enrolment in higher education, including vocational training and information and communications technology, technical, engineering and scientific programmes, in developed countries and other developing countries	4.b.1 Volume of official development assistance flows for scholarships by sector and type of study	US\$ 3.3 million	2019
4.c By 2030, substantially increase the supply of qualified teachers, including through international cooperation for teacher training in developing countries, especially least developed countries and small island developing States	4.c.1 Proportion of teachers with the minimum required qualifications, by education level	Data unavailable	
Goal 5. Achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls			
5.1 End all forms of discrimination against all women and girls everywhere	5.1.1 Whether or not legal frameworks are in place to promote, enforce and monitor equality and non-discrimination on the basis of sex	Yes (Libyan constitution (Article 5) and Libyan constitutional declaration 2011 (Article 6), Law 10 of 1984, Law 16 of 1985, Law 12 of 2010). However, there are no institution to monitor equality and non-discrimination.	2020
5.2 Eliminate all forms of violence against all women and girls in the public and private spheres, including trafficking and sexual and other types of exploitation	5.2.1 Proportion of ever-partnered women and girls aged 15 years and older subjected to physical, sexual or psychological violence by a current or former intimate partner in the previous 12 months, by form of violence and by age	Ever married women aged 15 and older subjected to physical violence (8.2%), sexual violence (2.6%), verbal violence (79%) by current intimate partner in the previous 12 months, by form and by age.	2014

	5.2.2 Proportion of women and girls aged 15 years and older subjected to sexual violence by persons other than an intimate partner in the previous 12 months, by age and place of occurrence	Average 2.6%. It Varies between 0 (15-19) and 4.5% (20-24)	2014
5.3 Eliminate all harmful practices, such as child, early and forced marriage and female genital mutilation	5.3.1 Proportion of women aged 20-24 years who were married or in a union before age 15 and before age 18	Data unavailable	
	5.3.2 Proportion of girls and women aged 15-49 years who have undergone female genital mutilation/cutting, by age	Not applicable (No FGM in Libya)	
5.4 Recognize and value unpaid care and domestic work through the provision of public services, infrastructure and social protection policies and the promotion of shared responsibility within the household and the family as nationally appropriate	5.4.1 Proportion of time spent on unpaid domestic and care work, by sex, age and location	Data unavailable	
5.5 Ensure women's full and effective participation and equal opportunities for leadership at all levels of decision-making in political, economic and public life	5.5.1 Proportion of seats held by women in (a) national parliaments and (b) local governments	- 16 per cent of parliamentary seats being held by women (30 out of 188 seats); - 15% ministerial positions held by women (5 out of 33)	2021
	5.5.2 Proportion of women in managerial positions	30%	2013
5.6 Ensure universal access to sexual and reproductive health and reproductive rights as agreed in accordance with the Programme of Action of the International Conference on Population and Development and the Beijing Platform for Action and the outcome documents of their review conferences	5.6.1 Proportion of women aged 15-49 years who make their own informed decisions regarding sexual relations, contraceptive use and reproductive health care	Data unavailable	
	5.6.2 Number of countries with laws and regulations that guarantee full and equal access to women and men aged 15 years and older to sexual and reproductive health care, information and education	Yes. Libya has number of laws that ensure equal and full access to women and men to RH services: Law 24 of 1995 (UHC), law 106 of 1973. However, access to public health facilities to diagnostic, treatment and follow-up for large segments of non-documented people, migrants, refugees differ across the country.	2020
5.a Undertake reforms to give women equal rights to economic resources, as well as access to ownership and control over land and other forms of property, financial services, inheritance and natural resources, in accordance with national laws	5.a.1 (a) Proportion of total agricultural population with ownership or secure rights over agricultural land, by sex; and (b) share of women among owners or rights-bearers of agricultural land, by type of tenure	Data unavailable	
	5.a.2 Proportion of countries where the legal framework (including customary law) guarantees women's equal rights to land ownership and/or control	Data unavailable	
5.b Enhance the use of enabling technology, in particular information and communications technology, to promote the empowerment of women	5.b.1 Proportion of individuals who own a mobile telephone, by sex	Data unavailable	
5.c Adopt and strengthen sound policies and enforceable legislation for the promotion of gender equality and the empowerment of all women and girls at all levels	5.c.1 Proportion of countries with systems to track and make public allocations for gender equality and women's empowerment	Data unavailable	
Goal 6. Ensure availability and sustainable management of water and sanitation for all			
6.1 By 2030, achieve universal and equitable access to safe and affordable drinking water for all	6.1.1 Proportion of population using safely managed drinking water services	85%	2020
6.2 By 2030, achieve access to adequate and equitable sanitation and hygiene for all and end open defecation, paying special attention to the needs of women and girls and those in vulnerable situations	6.2.1 Proportion of population using (a) safely managed sanitation services and (b) a hand-washing facility with soap and water	a) 44.7% b) unavailable	2020

6.3 By 2030, improve water quality by reducing pollution, eliminating dumping and minimizing release of hazardous chemicals and materials, halving the proportion of untreated wastewater and substantially increasing recycling and safe reuse globally	6.3.1 Proportion of domestic and industrial wastewater flows safely treated	3%	2020
	6.3.2 Proportion of bodies of water with good ambient water quality	Data unavailable	
6.4 By 2030, substantially increase water-use efficiency across all sectors and ensure sustainable withdrawals and supply of freshwater to address water scarcity and substantially reduce the number of people suffering from water scarcity	6.4.1 Change in water-use efficiency over time	55%	2020
	6.4.2 Level of water stress: freshwater withdrawal as a proportion of available freshwater resources	Annual water withdrawal amounts are 6 times more than the safe withdrawal	
6.5 By 2030, implement integrated water resources management at all levels, including through transboundary cooperation as appropriate	6.5.1 Degree of integrated water resources management	80%	2020
	6.5.2 Proportion of transboundary basin area with an operational arrangement for water cooperation	95%	2020
6.6 By 2020, protect and restore water-related ecosystems, including mountains, forests, wetlands, rivers, aquifers and lakes	6.6.1 Change in the extent of water-related ecosystems over time	Negative 50%	2020
6.a By 2030, expand international cooperation and capacity-building support to developing countries in water- and sanitation-related activities and programmes, including water harvesting, desalination, water efficiency, wastewater treatment, recycling and reuse technologies	6.a.1 Amount of water- and sanitation-related official development assistance that is part of a government-coordinated spending plan	US\$ 5 million	2019-2020
6.b Support and strengthen the participation of local communities in improving water and sanitation management	6.b.1 Proportion of local administrative units with established and operational policies and procedures for participation of local communities in water and sanitation management	Data unavailable	2020
Goal 7. Ensure access to affordable, reliable, sustainable and modern energy for all			
7.1 By 2030, ensure universal access to affordable, reliable and modern energy services	7.1.1 Proportion of population with access to electricity	68.5%	2019
	7.1.2 Proportion of population with primary reliance on clean fuels and technology	Data unavailable	
7.2 By 2030, increase substantially the share of renewable energy in the global energy mix	7.2.1 Renewable energy share in the total final energy consumption	0.03%	2021
7.3 By 2030, double the global rate of improvement in energy efficiency	7.3.1 Energy intensity measured in terms of primary energy and GDP	7.47 megajoules per constant 2011 purchasing power parity GDP	2018
7.a By 2030, enhance international cooperation to facilitate access to clean energy research and technology, including renewable energy, energy efficiency and advanced and cleaner fossil-fuel technology, and promote investment in energy infrastructure and clean energy technology	7.a.1 International financial flows to developing countries in support of clean energy research and development and renewable energy production, including in hybrid systems	Data unavailable	
7.b By 2030, expand infrastructure and upgrade technology for supplying modern and sustainable energy services for all in developing countries, in particular least developed countries, small island developing States and landlocked developing countries, in accordance with their respective programmes of support	7.b.1 Installed renewable energy-generating capacity in developing countries (in watts per capita)	0.754 watts per capita	2019

Goal 8. Promote sustained, inclusive and sustainable economic growth, full and productive employment and decent work for all			
8.1 Sustain per capita economic growth in accordance with national circumstances and, in particular, at least 7 per cent gross domestic product growth per annum in the least developed countries	8.1.1 Annual growth rate of real GDP per capita	-4.60%	2018
8.2 Achieve higher levels of economic productivity through diversification, technological upgrading and innovation, including through a focus on high-value added and labour-intensive sectors	8.2.1 Annual growth rate of real GDP per employed person	-20.7%	2019
8.3 Promote development-oriented policies that support productive activities, decent job creation, entrepreneurship, creativity and innovation, and encourage the formalization and growth of micro-, small- and medium-sized enterprises, including through access to financial services	8.3.1 Proportion of informal employment in total employment, by sector and sex	Total: 17.16% Non-displaced: 17.15% Returnees: 17.49% IDPs: 16.43% Refugees: 54.99%	Aug-21
8.4 Improve progressively, through 2030, global resource efficiency in consumption and production and endeavour to decouple economic growth from environmental degradation, in accordance with the 10-Year Framework of Programmes on Sustainable Consumption and Production, with developed countries taking the lead	8.4.1 Material footprint, material footprint per capita, and material footprint per GDP	See indicator 12.2.1 for information	
	8.4.2 Domestic material consumption, domestic material consumption per capita, and domestic material consumption per GDP	See indicator 12.2.2 for information	
8.5 By 2030, achieve full and productive employment and decent work for all women and men, including for young people and persons with disabilities, and equal pay for work of equal value	8.5.1 Average hourly earnings of employees, by sex, age, occupation and persons with disabilities	Data unavailable	
	8.5.2 Unemployment rate, by sex, age and persons with disabilities	19.39% (2020) - 15.35% male (2019), 24.13% female (2019) From MSNA 2021: Total: 18% (Non-displaced: 18%; Returnees: 22%; IDPs: 17%; Refugees: 12%)	2020
8.6 By 2020, substantially reduce the proportion of youth not in employment, education or training	8.6.1 Proportion of youth (aged 15–24 years) not in education, employment or training	Data unavailable	
8.7 Take immediate and effective measures to eradicate forced labour, end modern slavery and human trafficking and secure the prohibition and elimination of the worst forms of child labour, including recruitment and use of child soldiers, and by 2025 end child labour in all its forms	8.7.1 Proportion and number of children aged 5–17 years engaged in child labour, by sex and age	Total: 10.04% Non-displaced: 9.77% Returnees: 12.74% IDPs: 8.07%	Aug-21
8.8 Protect labour rights and promote safe and secure working environments for all workers, including migrant workers, in particular women migrants, and those in precarious employment	8.8.1 Fatal and non-fatal occupational injuries per 100,000 workers, by sex and migrant status	Data unavailable	
	8.8.2 Level of national compliance with labour rights (freedom of association and collective bargaining) based on International Labour Organization (ILO) textual sources and national legislation, by sex and migrant status	10	2018
8.9 By 2030, devise and implement policies to promote sustainable tourism that creates jobs and promotes local culture and products	8.9.1 Tourism direct GDP as a proportion of total GDP and in growth rate	Data unavailable	

8.10 Strengthen the capacity of domestic financial institutions to encourage and expand access to banking, insurance and financial services for all	8.10.1 (a) Number of commercial bank branches per 100,000 adults and (b) number of automated teller machines (ATMs) per 100,000 adults	(a) Commercial bank branches (per 100,000 adults): 11.36 (b) ATMs per 100,000 adults: 3.593	2018
	8.10.2 Proportion of adults (15 years and older) with an account at a bank or other financial institution or with a mobile-money-service provider	65.67 (both sex) Men: 70.69; Women 59.62	2017
8.a Increase Aid for Trade support for developing countries, in particular least developed countries, including through the Enhanced Integrated Framework for Trade-related Technical Assistance to Least Developed Countries	8.a.1 Aid for Trade commitments and disbursements	US\$ 9.49 million	2019
8.b By 2020, develop and operationalize a global strategy for youth employment and implement the Global Jobs Pact of the International Labour Organization	8.b.1 Existence of a developed and operationalized national strategy for youth employment, as a distinct strategy or as part of a national employment strategy	No national strategy in existence.	2021
Goal 9. Build resilient infrastructure, promote inclusive and sustainable industrialization and foster innovation			
9.1 Develop quality, reliable, sustainable and resilient infrastructure, including regional and transborder infrastructure, to support economic development and human well-being, with a focus on affordable and equitable access for all	9.1.1 Proportion of the rural population who live within 2 km of an all-season road	Data unavailable	
	9.1.2 Passenger and freight volumes, by mode of transport	Freight volumes, by mode of transport (tonne kilometre) (AIR): 758,181	2019
		Freight volumes, by mode of transport (tonne kilometre) (ROA): 17,589,400,000	2019
		Passenger volumes, by mode of transport (tonne kilometre) (passenger-kilometre) (AIR): 1,648,142,373	2019
		Passenger volumes, by mode of transport (tonne kilometre) (passenger-kilometre) (RAI): 3,191,714,286	2019
		Passenger volumes, by mode of transport (tonne kilometre) (passenger-kilometre) (ROA): 53,588,404,761	2019
9.2 Promote inclusive and sustainable industrialization and, by 2030, significantly raise industry's share of employment and gross domestic product, in line with national circumstances, and double its share in least developed countries	9.2.1 Manufacturing value added as a proportion of GDP and per capita	2.40	2020
	9.2.2 Manufacturing employment as a proportion of total employment	9	2018
9.3 Increase the access of small-scale industrial and other enterprises, in particular in developing countries, to financial services, including affordable credit, and their integration into value chains and markets	9.3.1 Proportion of small-scale industries in total industry value added	Data unavailable	
	9.3.2 Proportion of small-scale industries with a loan or line of credit	Data unavailable	
9.4 By 2030, upgrade infrastructure and retrofit industries to make them sustainable, with increased resource-use efficiency and greater adoption of clean and	9.4.1 CO ₂ emission per unit of value added	5.89	2018

environmentally sound technologies and industrial processes, with all countries taking action in accordance with their respective capabilities			
9.5 Enhance scientific research, upgrade the technological capabilities of industrial sectors in all countries, in particular developing countries, including, by 2030, encouraging innovation and substantially increasing the number of research and development workers per 1 million people and public and private research and development spending	9.5.1 Research and development expenditure as a proportion of GDP	Data unavailable	
	9.5.2 Researchers (in full-time equivalent) per million inhabitants	Data unavailable	
9.a Facilitate sustainable and resilient infrastructure development in developing countries through enhanced financial, technological and technical support to African countries, least developed countries, landlocked developing countries and small island developing States	9.a.1 Total official international support (official development assistance plus other official flows) to infrastructure	US\$ 6.23 million	2018
9.b Support domestic technology development, research and innovation in developing countries, including by ensuring a conducive policy environment for, inter alia, industrial diversification and value addition to commodities	9.b.1 Proportion of medium and high-tech industry value added in total value added	Data unavailable	
9.c Significantly increase access to information and communications technology and strive to provide universal and affordable access to the Internet in least developed countries by 2020	9.c.1 Proportion of population covered by a mobile network, by technology	Proportion of population covered by a mobile network, by at least 2G mobile network: 78.08	2017
		Proportion of population covered by a mobile network, by at least 3G mobile network: 78.08	2017
		Proportion of population covered by a mobile network, by at least 4G mobile network: 40.00	2017
Goal 10. Reduce inequality within and among countries			
10.1 By 2030, progressively achieve and sustain income growth of the bottom 40 per cent of the population at a rate higher than the national average	10.1.1 Growth rates of household expenditure or income per capita among the bottom 40 per cent of the population and the total population	Data unavailable	
10.2 By 2030, empower and promote the social, economic and political inclusion of all, irrespective of age, sex, disability, race, ethnicity, origin, religion or economic or other status	10.2.1 Proportion of people living below 50 per cent of median income, by sex, age and persons with disabilities	Data unavailable	
10.3 Ensure equal opportunity and reduce inequalities of outcome, including by eliminating discriminatory laws, policies and practices and promoting appropriate legislation, policies and action in this regard	10.3.1 Proportion of population reporting having personally felt discriminated against or harassed in the previous 12 months on the basis of a ground of discrimination prohibited under international human rights law	Data unavailable	
10.4 Adopt policies, especially fiscal, wage and social protection policies, and progressively achieve greater equality	10.4.1 Labour share of GDP	41.22%	2017
	10.4.2 Redistributive impact of fiscal policy ⁴	Data unavailable	

10.5 Improve the regulation and monitoring of global financial markets and institutions and strengthen the implementation of such regulations	10.5.1 Financial Soundness Indicators	Data unavailable	
10.6 Ensure enhanced representation and voice for developing countries in decision-making in global international economic and financial institutions in order to deliver more effective, credible, accountable and legitimate institutions	10.6.1 Proportion of members and voting rights of developing countries in international organizations	Data unavailable	
10.7 Facilitate orderly, safe, regular and responsible migration and mobility of people, including through the implementation of planned and well-managed migration policies	10.7.1 Recruitment cost borne by employee as a proportion of monthly income earned in country of destination	Data unavailable	
	10.7.2 Number of countries with migration policies that facilitate orderly, safe, regular and responsible migration and mobility of people	Data unavailable	
	10.7.3 Number of people who died or disappeared in the process of migration towards an international destination	793	2020
	10.7.4 Proportion of the population who are refugees, by country of origin		
10.a Implement the principle of special and differential treatment for developing countries, in particular least developed countries, in accordance with World Trade Organization agreements	10.a.1 Proportion of tariff lines applied to imports from least developed countries and developing countries with zero-tariff	52.3%	2018
10.b Encourage official development assistance and financial flows, including foreign direct investment, to States where the need is greatest, in particular least developed countries, African countries, small island developing States and landlocked developing countries, in accordance with their national plans and programmes	10.b.1 Total resource flows for development, by recipient and donor countries and type of flow (e.g. official development assistance, foreign direct investment and other flows)	- Net official development assistance received: US\$ 316 million (2019) - Foreign direct investment: US\$ 0 (2018)	2019 2018
10.c By 2030, reduce to less than 3 per cent the transaction costs of migrant remittances and eliminate remittance corridors with costs higher than 5 per cent	10.c.1 Remittance costs as a proportion of the amount remitted	Data unavailable	
Goal 11. Make cities and human settlements inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable			
11.1 By 2030, ensure access for all to adequate, safe and affordable housing and basic services and upgrade slums	11.1.1 Proportion of urban population living in slums, informal settlements or inadequate housing	Total: 2.47% (<i>Non-displaced: 1.95%; Returnees: 5.02%; IDPs: 7.27%; Refugees: 77.41%</i>)	Aug-21
11.2 By 2030, provide access to safe, affordable, accessible and sustainable transport systems for all, improving road safety, notably by expanding public transport, with special attention to the needs of those in vulnerable situations, women, children, persons with disabilities and older persons	11.2.1 Proportion of population that has convenient access to public transport, by sex, age and persons with disabilities	Data unavailable	
11.3 By 2030, enhance inclusive and sustainable urbanization and capacity for participatory, integrated and sustainable human settlement planning and management in all countries	11.3.1 Ratio of land consumption rate to population growth rate	Data unavailable	
	11.3.2 Proportion of cities with a direct participation structure of civil society in urban planning and management that operate regularly and democratically	Data unavailable	
11.4 Strengthen efforts to protect and safeguard the world's cultural and natural heritage	11.4.1 Total per capita expenditure on the preservation, protection and conservation of all cultural and natural heritage, by source of funding (public, private), type of heritage (cultural, natural) and level of government (national, regional, and local/municipal)	Data unavailable	

11.5 By 2030, significantly reduce the number of deaths and the number of people affected and substantially decrease the direct economic losses relative to global gross domestic product caused by disasters, including water-related disasters, with a focus on protecting the poor and people in vulnerable situations	11.5.1 Number of deaths, missing persons and directly affected persons attributed to disasters per 100,000 population	Data unavailable	
	11.5.2 Direct economic loss in relation to global GDP, damage to critical infrastructure and number of disruptions to basic services, attributed to disasters	32% contraction in the per capita income	2020
11.6 By 2030, reduce the adverse per capita environmental impact of cities, including by paying special attention to air quality and municipal and other waste management	11.6.1 Proportion of municipal solid waste collected and managed in controlled facilities out of total municipal waste generated, by cities	Data unavailable	
	11.6.2 Annual mean levels of fine particulate matter (e.g. PM2.5 and PM10) in cities (population weighted)	Data unavailable	
11.7 By 2030, provide universal access to safe, inclusive and accessible, green and public spaces, in particular for women and children, older persons and persons with disabilities	11.7.1 Average share of the built-up area of cities that is open space for public use for all, by sex, age and persons with disabilities	Data unavailable	
	11.7.2 Proportion of persons victim of physical or sexual harassment, by sex, age, disability status and place of occurrence, in the previous 12 months	Data for Refugees only: Females: 12-17: 2.4% 18-59: 4.9% Males: 12-17: 0.3% 18-59: 0.36%	Aug-21
11.a Support positive economic, social and environmental links between urban, peri-urban and rural areas by strengthening national and regional development planning	11.a.1 Number of countries that have national urban policies or regional development plans that (a) respond to population dynamics; (b) ensure balanced territorial development; and (c) increase local fiscal space	Data unavailable	
11.b By 2020, substantially increase the number of cities and human settlements adopting and implementing integrated policies and plans towards inclusion, resource efficiency, mitigation and adaptation to climate change, resilience to disasters, and develop and implement, in line with the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015–2030, holistic disaster risk management at all levels	11.b.1 Number of countries that adopt and implement national disaster risk reduction strategies in line with the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015–2030	Data unavailable	
	11.b.2 Proportion of local governments that adopt and implement local disaster risk reduction strategies in line with national disaster risk reduction strategies	Data unavailable	
11.c Support least developed countries, including through financial and technical assistance, in building sustainable and resilient buildings utilizing local materials	<i>No suitable replacement indicator was proposed. The global statistical community is encouraged to work to develop an indicator that could be proposed for the 2025 comprehensive review. See E/CN.3/2020/2, paragraph 23.</i>	Data unavailable	
Goal 12. Ensure sustainable consumption and production patterns			
12.1 Implement the 10-Year Framework of Programmes on Sustainable Consumption and Production Patterns, all countries taking action, with developed countries taking the lead, taking into account the development and capabilities of developing countries	12.1.1 Number of countries developing, adopting or implementing policy instruments aimed at supporting the shift to sustainable consumption and production	Data unavailable	
12.2 By 2030, achieve the sustainable management and efficient use of natural resources	12.2.1 Material footprint, material footprint per capita, and material footprint per GDP	24,883,716 metric tons	2017
	12.2.2 Domestic material consumption, domestic material consumption per capita, and domestic material consumption per GDP	- Domestic Material Consumption, All Raw Materials: 70,422,350.36 metric tons.	2017

11.5 By 2030, significantly reduce the number of deaths and the number of people affected and substantially decrease the direct economic losses relative to global gross domestic product caused by disasters, including water-related disasters, with a focus on protecting the poor and people in vulnerable situations	11.5.1 Number of deaths, missing persons and directly affected persons attributed to disasters per 100,000 population	Data unavailable	
	11.5.2 Direct economic loss in relation to global GDP, damage to critical infrastructure and number of disruptions to basic services, attributed to disasters	32% contraction in the per capita income	2020
11.6 By 2030, reduce the adverse per capita environmental impact of cities, including by paying special attention to air quality and municipal and other waste management	11.6.1 Proportion of municipal solid waste collected and managed in controlled facilities out of total municipal waste generated, by cities	Data unavailable	
	11.6.2 Annual mean levels of fine particulate matter (e.g. PM2.5 and PM10) in cities (population weighted)	Data unavailable	
11.7 By 2030, provide universal access to safe, inclusive and accessible, green and public spaces, in particular for women and children, older persons and persons with disabilities	11.7.1 Average share of the built-up area of cities that is open space for public use for all, by sex, age and persons with disabilities	Data unavailable	
	11.7.2 Proportion of persons victim of physical or sexual harassment, by sex, age, disability status and place of occurrence, in the previous 12 months	Data for Refugees only: Females: 12-17: 2.4% 18-59: 4.9% Males: 12-17: 0.3% 18-59: 0.36%	Aug-21
11.a Support positive economic, social and environmental links between urban, peri-urban and rural areas by strengthening national and regional development planning	11.a.1 Number of countries that have national urban policies or regional development plans that (a) respond to population dynamics; (b) ensure balanced territorial development; and (c) increase local fiscal space	Data unavailable	
11.b By 2020, substantially increase the number of cities and human settlements adopting and implementing integrated policies and plans towards inclusion, resource efficiency, mitigation and adaptation to climate change, resilience to disasters, and develop and implement, in line with the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015–2030, holistic disaster risk management at all levels	11.b.1 Number of countries that adopt and implement national disaster risk reduction strategies in line with the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015–2030	Data unavailable	
	11.b.2 Proportion of local governments that adopt and implement local disaster risk reduction strategies in line with national disaster risk reduction strategies	Data unavailable	
11.c Support least developed countries, including through financial and technical assistance, in building sustainable and resilient buildings utilizing local materials	<i>No suitable replacement indicator was proposed. The global statistical community is encouraged to work to develop an indicator that could be proposed for the 2025 comprehensive review. See E/CN.3/2020/2, paragraph 23.</i>	Data unavailable	
Goal 12. Ensure sustainable consumption and production patterns			
12.1 Implement the 10-Year Framework of Programmes on Sustainable Consumption and Production Patterns, all countries taking action, with developed countries taking the lead, taking into account the development and capabilities of developing countries	12.1.1 Number of countries developing, adopting or implementing policy instruments aimed at supporting the shift to sustainable consumption and production	Data unavailable	
12.2 By 2030, achieve the sustainable management and efficient use of natural resources	12.2.1 Material footprint, material footprint per capita, and material footprint per GDP	24,883,716 metric tons	2017
	12.2.2 Domestic material consumption, domestic material consumption per capita, and domestic material consumption per GDP	- Domestic Material Consumption, All Raw Materials: 70,422,350.36 metric tons.	2017

		- Domestic material consumption per capita: 11.04731 metric tons.	
12.3 By 2030, halve per capita global food waste at the retail and consumer levels and reduce food losses along production and supply chains, including post-harvest losses	12.3.1 (a) Food loss index and (b) food waste index	a) No data; b) Household Food Waste per capita (Kg) - 75.71312; Food Service food waste per capita (kg) - 27.64808; Retail food waste per capita (kg) - 15.64023	2019
12.4 By 2020, achieve the environmentally sound management of chemicals and all wastes throughout their life cycle, in accordance with agreed international frameworks, and significantly reduce their release to air, water and soil in order to minimize their adverse impacts on human health and the environment	12.4.1 Number of parties to international multilateral environmental agreements on hazardous waste, and other chemicals that meet their commitments and obligations in transmitting information as required by each relevant agreement	49.88	2020
	12.4.2 (a) Hazardous waste generated per capita; and (b) proportion of hazardous waste treated, by type of treatment	Data unavailable	
12.5 By 2030, substantially reduce waste generation through prevention, reduction, recycling and reuse	12.5.1 National recycling rate, tons of material recycled	<5%	2020
12.6 Encourage companies, especially large and transnational companies, to adopt sustainable practices and to integrate sustainability information into their reporting cycle	12.6.1 Number of companies publishing sustainability reports	0	2020
12.7 Promote public procurement practices that are sustainable, in accordance with national policies and priorities	12.7.1 Degree of sustainable public procurement policies and action plan implementation	Data unavailable	
12.8 By 2030, ensure that people everywhere have the relevant information and awareness for sustainable development and lifestyles in harmony with nature	12.8.1 Extent to which (i) global citizenship education and (ii) education for sustainable development are mainstreamed in (a) national education policies; (b) curricula; (c) teacher education; and (d) student assessment	Data unavailable	
12.a Support developing countries to strengthen their scientific and technological capacity to move towards more sustainable patterns of consumption and production	12.a.1 Installed renewable energy-generating capacity in developing countries (in watts per capita)	0.75	2019
12.b Develop and implement tools to monitor sustainable development impacts for sustainable tourism that creates jobs and promotes local culture and products	12.b.1 Implementation of standard accounting tools to monitor the economic and environmental aspects of tourism sustainability	0	2019
12.c Rationalize inefficient fossil-fuel subsidies that encourage wasteful consumption by removing market distortions, in accordance with national circumstances, including by restructuring taxation and phasing out those harmful subsidies, where they exist, to reflect their environmental impacts, taking fully into account the specific needs and conditions of developing countries and minimizing the possible adverse impacts on their development in a manner that protects the poor and the affected communities	12.c.1 Amount of fossil-fuel subsidies (production and consumption) per unit of GDP	- Fossil-Fuel Subsidies (Consumption and Production) (Constant Price in Millions): US\$ 4,483.48 - Fossil-Fuel Subsidies (Consumption and Production) as a Proportion of Total GDP: 14.24%	2019
Goal 13. Take urgent action to combat climate change and its impacts			
	13.1.1 Number of deaths, missing persons and directly affected persons attributed to disasters per 100,000 population	Data unavailable	

13.1 Strengthen resilience and adaptive capacity to climate-related hazards and natural disasters in all countries	13.1.2 Number of countries that adopt and implement national disaster risk reduction strategies in line with the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015–2030	0	2020
	13.1.3 Proportion of local governments that adopt and implement local disaster risk reduction strategies in line with national disaster risk reduction strategies	Data unavailable	
13.2 Integrate climate change measures into national policies, strategies and planning	13.2.1 Number of countries with nationally determined contributions, long-term strategies, national adaptation plans and adaptation communications, as reported to the secretariat of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change	Libya is the only country of the signatories of the UNFCCC who has not reported back the nationally determined contributions, long-term strategies, national adaptation plans and adaptation communications, as reported to the secretariat of the UNFCCC	2020
	13.2.2 Total greenhouse gas emissions per year	58.9 million metric tonnes of CO ₂	2018
13.3 Improve education, awareness-raising and human and institutional capacity on climate change mitigation, adaptation, impact reduction and early warning	13.3.1 Extent to which (i) global citizenship education and (ii) education for sustainable development are mainstreamed in (a) national education policies; (b) curricula; (c) teacher education; and (d) student assessment	Data unavailable	
13.a Implement the commitment undertaken by developed-country parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change to a goal of mobilizing jointly \$100 billion annually by 2020 from all sources to address the needs of developing countries in the context of meaningful mitigation actions and transparency on implementation and fully operationalize the Green Climate Fund through its capitalization as soon as possible	13.a.1 Amounts provided and mobilized in United States dollars per year in relation to the continued existing collective mobilization goal of the \$100 billion commitment through to 2025	Data unavailable	
13.b Promote mechanisms for raising capacity for effective climate change-related planning and management in least developed countries and small island developing States, including focusing on women, youth and local and marginalized communities	13.b.1 Number of least developed countries and small island developing States with nationally determined contributions, long-term strategies, national adaptation plans and adaptation communications, as reported to the secretariat of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change	<i>N/A. Libya is not a LDC or small island developing state.</i>	
Goal 14. Conserve and sustainably use the oceans, seas and marine resources for sustainable development			
14.1 By 2025, prevent and significantly reduce marine pollution of all kinds, in particular from land-based activities, including marine debris and nutrient pollution	14.1.1 (a) Index of coastal eutrophication; and (b) plastic debris density	Data unavailable	
14.2 By 2020, sustainably manage and protect marine and coastal ecosystems to avoid significant adverse impacts, including by strengthening their resilience, and take action for their restoration in order to achieve healthy and productive oceans	14.2.1 Number of countries using ecosystem-based approaches to managing marine areas	Data unavailable	
14.3 Minimize and address the impacts of ocean acidification, including through enhanced scientific cooperation at all levels	14.3.1 Average marine acidity (pH) measured at agreed suite of representative sampling stations	Data unavailable	
14.4 By 2020, effectively regulate harvesting and end overfishing, illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing	14.4.1 Proportion of fish stocks within biologically sustainable levels	Data unavailable	

and destructive fishing practices and implement science-based management plans, in order to restore fish stocks in the shortest time feasible, at least to levels that can produce maximum sustainable yield as determined by their biological characteristics			
14.5 By 2020, conserve at least 10 per cent of coastal and marine areas, consistent with national and international law and based on the best available scientific information	14.5.1 Coverage of protected areas in relation to marine areas	2,277.75 KM2 (Two marine protected areas exist in Libya, but no management plans are in place)	2021
14.6 By 2020, prohibit certain forms of fisheries subsidies which contribute to overcapacity and overfishing, eliminate subsidies that contribute to illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing and refrain from introducing new such subsidies, recognizing that appropriate and effective special and differential treatment for developing and least developed countries should be an integral part of the World Trade Organization fisheries subsidies negotiation ⁴	14.6.1 Degree of implementation of international instruments aiming to combat illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing	Level 2/ Country accepted the FAO Port State Measures Agreement (state: accession)	2018
14.7 By 2030, increase the economic benefits to small island developing States and least developed countries from the sustainable use of marine resources, including through sustainable management of fisheries, aquaculture and tourism	14.7.1 Sustainable fisheries as a proportion of GDP in small island developing States, least developed countries and all countries	Data unavailable	
14.a Increase scientific knowledge, develop research capacity and transfer marine technology, taking into account the Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission Criteria and Guidelines on the Transfer of Marine Technology, in order to improve ocean health and to enhance the contribution of marine biodiversity to the development of developing countries, in particular small island developing States and least developed countries	14.a.1 Proportion of total research budget allocated to research in the field of marine technology	Data unavailable	
14.b Provide access for small-scale artisanal fishers to marine resources and markets	14.b.1 Degree of application of a legal/regulatory/ policy/institutional framework which recognizes and protects access rights for small-scale fisheries	The country signed the Ministerial Declaration on a Regional Plan of Action for small scale fisheries in the Mediterranean and Black Sea (level 3)	2018
14.c Enhance the conservation and sustainable use of oceans and their resources by implementing international law as reflected in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, which provides the legal framework for the conservation and sustainable use of oceans and their resources, as recalled in paragraph 158 of "The future we want"	14.c.1 Number of countries making progress in ratifying, accepting and implementing through legal, policy and institutional frameworks, ocean-related instruments that implement international law, as reflected in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, for the conservation and sustainable use of the oceans and their resources	Data unavailable	
Goal 15. Protect, restore and promote sustainable use of terrestrial ecosystems, sustainably manage forests, combat desertification, and halt and reverse land degradation and halt biodiversity loss			
15.1 By 2020, ensure the conservation, restoration and sustainable use of terrestrial and inland freshwater ecosystems and their services, in particular forests,	15.1.1 Forest area as a proportion of total land area	0.0012	2020
	15.1.2 Proportion of important sites for terrestrial and freshwater biodiversity that are covered by protected areas, by ecosystem type	0	2020

wetlands, mountains and drylands, in line with obligations under international agreements			
15.2 By 2020, promote the implementation of sustainable management of all types of forests, halt deforestation, restore degraded forests and substantially increase afforestation and reforestation globally	15.2.1 Progress towards sustainable forest management	Data unavailable	
15.3 By 2030, combat desertification, restore degraded land and soil, including land affected by desertification, drought and floods, and strive to achieve a land degradation-neutral world	15.3.1 Proportion of land that is degraded over total land area	Data unavailable	
15.4 By 2030, ensure the conservation of mountain ecosystems, including their biodiversity, in order to enhance their capacity to provide benefits that are essential for sustainable development	15.4.1 Coverage by protected areas of important sites for mountain biodiversity	Data unavailable	
	15.4.2 Mountain Green Cover Index	6.363817097	2018
15.5 Take urgent and significant action to reduce the degradation of natural habitats, halt the loss of biodiversity and, by 2020, protect and prevent the extinction of threatened species	15.5.1 Red List Index	0.96769	2021
15.6 Promote fair and equitable sharing of the benefits arising from the utilization of genetic resources and promote appropriate access to such resources, as internationally agreed	15.6.1 Number of countries that have adopted legislative, administrative and policy frameworks to ensure fair and equitable sharing of benefits	Data unavailable	
15.7 Take urgent action to end poaching and trafficking of protected species of flora and fauna and address both demand and supply of illegal wildlife products	15.7.1 Proportion of traded wildlife that was poached or illicitly trafficked	Data unavailable	
15.8 By 2020, introduce measures to prevent the introduction and significantly reduce the impact of invasive alien species on land and water ecosystems and control or eradicate the priority species	15.8.1 Proportion of countries adopting relevant national legislation and adequately resourcing the prevention or control of invasive alien species	Data unavailable	
15.9 By 2020, integrate ecosystem and biodiversity values into national and local planning, development processes, poverty reduction strategies and accounts	15.9.1 (a) Number of countries that have established national targets in accordance with or similar to Aichi Biodiversity Target 2 of the Strategic Plan for Biodiversity 2011–2020 in their national biodiversity strategy and action plans and the progress reported towards these targets; and (b) integration of biodiversity into national accounting and reporting systems, defined as implementation of the System of Environmental-Economic Accounting	yes (for a). No (for b)	2020
15.a Mobilize and significantly increase financial resources from all sources to conserve and sustainably use biodiversity and ecosystems	15.a.1 (a) Official development assistance on conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity; and (b) revenue generated and finance mobilized from biodiversity-relevant economic instruments	(a) 0.00415 MMUSD	2016
15.b Mobilize significant resources from all sources and at all levels to finance sustainable forest management and provide adequate incentives to developing countries to advance such management, including for conservation and reforestation	15.b.1 (a) Official development assistance on conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity; and (b) revenue generated and finance mobilized from biodiversity-relevant economic instruments	(a) 0.00415 MMUSD	2016
15.c Enhance global support for efforts to combat poaching and trafficking of protected species, including	15.c.1 Proportion of traded wildlife that was poached or illicitly trafficked	Data unavailable	

by increasing the capacity of local communities to pursue sustainable livelihood opportunities			
Goal 16. Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels			
16.1 Significantly reduce all forms of violence and related death rates everywhere	16.1.1 Number of victims of intentional homicide per 100,000 population, by sex and age	Data unavailable	
	16.1.2 Conflict-related deaths per 100,000 population, by sex, age and cause	Number of conflict-related civilian deaths: 170 (149 male, 9 female, 12 unknown).	2020
	16.1.3 Proportion of population subjected to (a) physical violence, (b) psychological violence and (c) sexual violence in the previous 12 months	Data unavailable	
	16.1.4 Proportion of population that feel safe walking alone around the area they live	Total: 83.02% (Non-displaced: 84.05%; Returnees: 74.31%; IDPs: 86.06%; Refugees: 0%)	Aug-21
16.2 End abuse, exploitation, trafficking and all forms of violence against and torture of children	16.2.1 Proportion of children aged 1-17 years who experienced any physical punishment and/or psychological aggression by caregivers in the past month	Data unavailable	
	16.2.2 Number of victims of human trafficking per 100,000 population, by sex, age and form of exploitation	Data unavailable	
	16.2.3 Proportion of young women and men aged 18-29 years who experienced sexual violence by age 18	Data unavailable	
16.3 Promote the rule of law at the national and international levels and ensure equal access to justice for all	16.3.1 Proportion of victims of violence in the previous 12 months who reported their victimization to competent authorities or other officially recognized conflict resolution mechanisms	Data unavailable	
	16.3.2 Unsensitized detainees as a proportion of overall prison population	90%	2018
	16.3.3 Proportion of the population who have experienced a dispute in the past two years and who accessed a formal or informal dispute resolution mechanism, by type of mechanism	Data unavailable	
16.4 By 2030, significantly reduce illicit financial and arms flows, strengthen the recovery and return of stolen assets and combat all forms of organized crime	16.4.1 Total value of inward and outward illicit financial flows (in current United States dollars)	Data unavailable	
	16.4.2 Proportion of seized, found or surrendered arms whose illicit origin or context has been traced or established by a competent authority in line with international instruments	Data unavailable	
16.5 Substantially reduce corruption and bribery in all their forms	16.5.1 Proportion of persons who had at least one contact with a public official and who paid a bribe to a public official, or were asked for a bribe by those public officials, during the previous 12 months	Data unavailable	
	16.5.2 Proportion of businesses that had at least one contact with a public official and that paid a bribe to a public official, or were asked for a bribe by those public officials during the previous 12 months	Data unavailable	
16.6 Develop effective, accountable and transparent institutions at all levels	16.6.1 Primary government expenditures as a proportion of original approved budget, by sector (or by budget codes or similar)	137.5%	2019
	16.6.2 Proportion of population satisfied with their last experience of public services	Data unavailable	
16.7 Ensure responsive, inclusive, participatory and representative decision-making at all levels	16.7.1 Proportions of positions in national and local institutions, including (a) the legislatures; (b) the public service; and (c) the judiciary, compared to	* Proportion of women in Parliament: 15.96% (30/188 seats)* ;	Jan-21

	national distributions, by sex, age, persons with disabilities and population groups	* Women in ministerial positions: 5.6% (1/18 ministers)	
	16.7.2 Proportion of population who believe decision-making is inclusive and responsive, by sex, age, disability and population group	Data unavailable	
16.8 Broaden and strengthen the participation of developing countries in the institutions of global governance	16.8.1 Proportion of members and voting rights of developing countries in international organizations	Data unavailable	
16.9 By 2030, provide legal identity for all, including birth registration	16.9.1 Proportion of children under 5 years of age whose births have been registered with a civil authority, by age	Data unavailable	
16.10 Ensure public access to information and protect fundamental freedoms, in accordance with national legislation and international agreements	16.10.1 Number of verified cases of killing, kidnapping, enforced disappearance, arbitrary detention and torture of journalists, associated media personnel, trade unionists and human rights advocates in the previous 12 months	* Journalists killed: 0 (for 2020 and 2021) * Citizen journalists killed: 0 (for 2020 and 2021) * Media assistants killed: (for 2020 and 2021) * Journalists imprisoned: 0 in 2021 (no data for previous years), 1 journalist still imprisoned since 1973. * Citizens journalists imprisoned: 0 in 2021 (no data for previous years) * Media assistants imprisoned: 0 in 2021 (no data for previous years)	2020 /21
	16.10.2 Number of countries that adopt and implement constitutional, statutory and/or policy guarantees for public access to information	Data unavailable	
16.a Strengthen relevant national institutions, including through international cooperation, for building capacity at all levels, in particular in developing countries, to prevent violence and combat terrorism and crime	16.a.1 Existence of independent national human rights institutions in compliance with the Paris Principles	Libya's National Human Rights Institutions not fully compliant with the Paris Principles	2019
16.b Promote and enforce non-discriminatory laws and policies for sustainable development	16.b.1 Proportion of population reporting having personally felt discriminated against or harassed in the previous 12 months on the basis of a ground of discrimination prohibited under international human rights law	Data unavailable	
Goal 17. Strengthen the means of implementation and revitalize the Global Partnership for Sustainable Development			
Finance			
17.1 Strengthen domestic resource mobilization, including through international support to developing countries, to improve domestic capacity for tax and other revenue collection	17.1.1 Total government revenue as a proportion of GDP, by source	Data unavailable	
	17.1.2 Proportion of domestic budget funded by domestic taxes	Data unavailable	
17.2 Developed countries to implement fully their official development assistance commitments, including the commitment by many developed countries to achieve the target of 0.7 per cent of gross national income for official development assistance (ODA/GNI) to developing countries and 0.15 to 0.20 per cent of ODA/GNI to least developed countries; ODA providers are encouraged to consider setting a target to provide at least 0.20 per cent of ODA/GNI to least developed countries	17.2.1 Net official development assistance, total and to least developed countries, as a proportion of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Development Assistance Committee donors' gross national income (GNI)	316010009.765625 received in ODA	2019

17.3 Mobilize additional financial resources for developing countries from multiple sources	17.3.1 Foreign direct investment, official development assistance and South-South cooperation as a proportion of gross national income	FDI net inflows (USD): 0	2018
	17.3.2 Volume of remittances (in United States dollars) as a proportion of total GDP	0% (personal remittances received as proportion of GDP)	2019
17.4 Assist developing countries in attaining long-term debt sustainability through coordinated policies aimed at fostering debt financing, debt relief and debt restructuring, as appropriate, and address the external debt of highly indebted poor countries to reduce debt distress	17.4.1 Debt service as a proportion of exports of goods and services	Data unavailable	
17.5 Adopt and implement investment promotion regimes for least developed countries	17.5.1 Number of countries that adopt and implement investment promotion regimes for developing countries, including the least developed countries	Data unavailable	
Technology			
17.6 Enhance North-South, South-South and triangular regional and international cooperation on and access to science, technology and innovation and enhance knowledge-sharing on mutually agreed terms, including through improved coordination among existing mechanisms, in particular at the United Nations level, and through a global technology facilitation mechanism	17.6.1 Fixed Internet broadband subscriptions per 100 inhabitants, by speed ⁵	4.832	2017
17.7 Promote the development, transfer, dissemination and diffusion of environmentally sound technologies to developing countries on favourable terms, including on concessional and preferential terms, as mutually agreed	17.7.1 Total amount of funding for developing countries to promote the development, transfer, dissemination and diffusion of environmentally sound technologies	Data unavailable	
17.8 Fully operationalize the technology bank and science, technology and innovation capacity-building mechanism for least developed countries by 2017 and enhance the use of enabling technology, in particular information and communications technology	17.8.1 Proportion of individuals using the Internet	21.759	2017
Capacity-building			
17.9 Enhance international support for implementing effective and targeted capacity-building in developing countries to support national plans to implement all the Sustainable Development Goals, including through North-South, South-South and triangular cooperation	17.9.1 Dollar value of financial and technical assistance (including through North-South, South-South and triangular cooperation) committed to developing countries	USD 34,130,580 (Total official development assistance (gross disbursement) for technical cooperation)	2018
Trade			
17.10 Promote a universal, rules-based, open, non-discriminatory and equitable multilateral trading system under the World Trade Organization, including through the conclusion of negotiations under its Doha Development Agenda	17.10.1 Worldwide weighted tariff-average	0%	2015
17.11 Significantly increase the exports of developing countries, in particular with a view to doubling the least developed countries' share of global exports by 2020	17.11.1 Developing countries' and least developed countries' share of global exports	Data unavailable	
17.12 Realize timely implementation of duty-free and quota-free market access on a lasting basis for all least	17.12.1 Weighted average tariffs faced by developing countries, least developed countries and small island developing States	Agricultural Products - 2.17% Total or no breakdown - 0.6%	2019

developed countries, consistent with World Trade Organization decisions, including by ensuring that preferential rules of origin applicable to imports from least developed countries are transparent and simple, and contribute to facilitating market access		Clothing - 10.16% Industrial Products - 1.35% Oil - 0% Textiles - 4.87%	
Systemic issues			
<i>Policy and institutional coherence</i>			
17.13 Enhance global macroeconomic stability, including through policy coordination and policy coherence	17.13.1 Macroeconomic Dashboard	Data unavailable	
17.14 Enhance policy coherence for sustainable development	17.14.1 Number of countries with mechanisms in place to enhance policy coherence of sustainable development	Data unavailable	
17.15 Respect each country's policy space and leadership to establish and implement policies for poverty eradication and sustainable development	17.15.1 Extent of use of country-owned results frameworks and planning tools by providers of development cooperation	Data unavailable	
<i>Multi-stakeholder partnerships</i>			
17.16 Enhance the Global Partnership for Sustainable Development, complemented by multi-stakeholder partnerships that mobilize and share knowledge, expertise, technology and financial resources, to support the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals in all countries, in particular developing countries	17.16.1 Number of countries reporting progress in multi-stakeholder development effectiveness monitoring frameworks that support the achievement of the sustainable development goals	Data unavailable	
17.17 Encourage and promote effective public, public-private and civil society partnerships, building on the experience and resourcing strategies of partnerships	17.17.1 Amount in United States dollars committed to public-private partnerships for infrastructure	Data unavailable	
<i>Data, monitoring and accountability</i>			
17.18 By 2020, enhance capacity-building support to developing countries, including for least developed countries and small island developing States, to increase significantly the availability of high-quality, timely and reliable data disaggregated by income, gender, age, race, ethnicity, migratory status, disability, geographic location and other characteristics relevant in national contexts	17.18.1 Statistical capacity indicator for Sustainable Development Goal monitoring	Data unavailable	
	17.18.2 Number of countries that have national statistical legislation that complies with the Fundamental Principles of Official Statistics	Yes	2020
	17.18.3 Number of countries with a national statistical plan that is fully funded and under implementation, by source of funding	Libyan National Statistics Development Strategy 2018-2023 endorsed in December 2017. Not fully funded.	2020
17.19 By 2030, build on existing initiatives to develop measurements of progress on sustainable development that complement gross domestic product, and support statistical capacity-building in developing countries	17.19.1 Dollar value of all resources made available to strengthen statistical capacity in developing countries	USD 78,510.5	2018
	17.19.2 Proportion of countries that (a) have conducted at least one population and housing census in the last 10 years; and (b) have achieved 100 per cent birth registration and 80 per cent death registration	Last census undertaken in 2006. National population Survey conducted in 2012 (TBC). No data available on registration of births and deaths.	2021

ANNEX II: SELECT LIST ON THE STATUS OF COMMITMENTS UNDER INTERNATIONAL TREATIES AND AGREEMENTS

International Human Rights Treaties and Procedures

Ratification status

Treaty Description	Signature Date	Ratification/Accession Date
Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance (CED)	-	-
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW)	-	16 May 1989
International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families (CMW)	-	18 Jun 2004
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD)	-	3 Jul 1968
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT)	-	16 May 1989
Optional Protocol of the Convention against Torture (CAT-OP)	-	-
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (CCPR)	-	15 May 1970
Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights aiming at the abolition of the death penalty (CCPR-OP2-DP)	-	-
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR)	-	15 May 1970
Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC)	-	15 Apr 1993
Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of children in armed conflict (CRC-OP-AC)	-	29 Oct 2004
Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the sale of children, child prostitution and child pornography (CRC-OP-SC)	-	18 Jun 2004
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD)	1 May 2008	13 Feb 2018
1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees	-	-
1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees	-	-
Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness	-	16 May 1989
Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons	-	16 May 1989

Acceptance of individual complaints procedures for Libya

Complaints Procedure	Acceptance of Procedure
Individual complaints procedure under the Convention against Torture (CAT, Art. 22)	N/A
Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (CCPR-OP1)	Yes (16 May 1989)
Individual complaints procedure under the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance (CED, Art. 31)	-
Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW-OP)	Yes (18 Jun 2004)
Individual complaints procedure under the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD, Art. 14)	N/A
Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR-OP)	No
Individual complaints procedure under the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families (CMW, Art. 77)	N/A
Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC-OP-IC)	No
Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD-OP)	No

Acceptance of the inquiry procedure for Libya

Inquiry Procedure	Acceptance of Procedure
Inquiry procedure under the Convention against Torture (CAT, Art. 20)	Yes (16 May 1989)

Inquiry procedure under the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance (CED, Art. 33)	-
Inquiry procedure under the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW-OP, Art. 8-9)	Yes (18 Jun 2004)
Inquiry procedure under the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR-OP, Art. 11)	-
Inquiry procedure under the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC-OP-IC, Art. 13)	-
Inquiry procedure under the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD-OP, Art. 6-7)	-

Commitments	1 st Cycle	2 nd Cycle	3 rd Cycle
UN - Universal Periodic Review recommendations/human rights commitments	2010	2015	2020

International Humanitarian Law

Treaty Name	Ratification/Accession Date
1998 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court	-
1949 Four Geneva Conventions	22 May 1956
1977 Two Protocols additional to the four 1949 Geneva Conventions, which strengthen the protection of victims of international (Protocol I) and non-international (Protocol II) armed conflicts	7 Jun 1978
1954 Hague Convention for the protection of cultural property in the event of armed conflict	14 May 1954
1972 Convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of bacteriological (biological) and toxic weapons and on their destruction	19 Jan 1982
1980 Convention on prohibitions or restrictions on the use of certain conventional weapons which may be deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects (CCW)	-
1993 Convention on the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons and on their destruction	6 Jan 2004
1997 Convention on the prohibition of the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of anti-personnel mines and on their destruction	-
1997 Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons	20 Sep 2017 (signature)
2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions	-
1968 Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity	16 May 1989
1951 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide	16 May 1989

Other Relevant UN Conventions

Treaty Description	Signature/Notification/Deposit Date	Ratification/Accession Date
United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC)	23 Dec 2003	7 Jun 2005
United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC)	13 Nov 2001	18 Jun 2004
Convention against Discrimination in Education	09 Jan 1973	09 Apr 1973
1972 World Heritage Convention	-	13 Oct 1978
2003 Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage	-	-

African Union Treaties and Agreements

Treaty Name	Signature Date	Ratification/Accession Date
African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (Banjul Charter)	30 May 1985	19 July 1986
African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child	9 Jun 1998	23 Sep 2000
African Youth Charter	10 Jan 2008	11 Aug 2008
African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance	-	-
African Charter on the Values and Principles of Decentralisation, Local Governance and Local Development	-	-
Protocol to the Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community Relating to the Pan-African Parliament	15 Jun 2001	10 Sep 2002
Charter for African Cultural Renaissance	-	-
African Union Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa (Kampala Convention)	-	-
Protocol to the African Charter on Human and People's Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa (Maputo Protocol)	5 Nov 2003	23 May 2004
Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Rights of Older Persons	-	-
Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities in Africa	-	-
Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights	9 Jun 1998	19 Nov 2003
Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights	-	-
Protocol to the Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community Relating to free movement of Persons, Right of Residence and Right of Establishment	-	-
OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism	14 Jul 1999	16 Jan 2002
Protocol to the OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism	22 Dec 2006	7 Mar 2007
OAU Convention on Mercenaries (1977)	-	25 Jan 2005
OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa	-	25 Apr 1981
Revised African Convention on the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources	19 Feb 2004	4 Jun 2006
Bamako Convention on the Ban of the Import into Africa and the Control of Transboundary Movement and Management of Hazardous Wastes within Africa	30 Jan 1991	2 Nov 1992
Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union	3 Jan 2003	24 Jun 2003
African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption	5 Nov 2003	23 May 2004
African Charter on Maritime Security and Safety and Development in Africa (Lomé Charter)	15 Oct 2016	-
The African Union Non-Aggression and Common Defence Pact	21 Jan 2006	4 Jun 2006

International Environmental Agreements

Agreement	Ratification/ Accession Date
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) (1992)	29 Jun 1992
Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (Kyoto Protocol) (2005)	24 Aug 2006
Paris Climate Accord (2016)	22 Apr 2016 (signature)
Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal (1989)	12 Jul 2001
Convention on Biological Diversity (1993)	12 Jul 2001
Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity (2003)	14 Jun 2005

Rotterdam Convention on the Prior Informed Consent Procedure for Certain Hazardous Chemicals and Pesticides in International Trade (2004)	9 Jul 2002
Minamata Convention on Mercury (2013)	10 Oct 2013 (signature)
Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants (2001)	14 Jun 2005
United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification (1994)	22 Jul 1996
Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer (1987)	11 Jul 1990
Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer (1985)	11 Jul 1990
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES)	28 Jan 2003
Bonn Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals (CMS)	-
Agreement on the Conservation of African-Eurasian Migratory Waterbirds	31 Mar 2005

ILO Conventions (Fundamental)

Convention	Ratification Date	Status
Forced Labour Convention (1930)	13 Jun 1961	In Force
Abolition of Forced Labour Convention (1957)	13 Jun 1961	In Force
Equal Remuneration Convention (1951)	20 Jun 1962	In Force
Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention (1958)	13 Jun 1961	In Force
Minimum Age Convention (1973)	19 Jun 1975	In Force
Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention (1948)	4 Oct 2000	In Force
Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention (1949)	20 Jun 1962	In Force
Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention (1999)	4 Oct 2000	In Force

International and Regional Trade Organizations

Agreement	Signature/Join Date	Status
World Trade Organization (WTO)	-	Non-member ²¹⁴
African Economic Community (AEC)	1998	Member
African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA)	2018	Not Ratified
Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD)	1998	Member
Arab Maghreb Union (AMU)	1989	Member
Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA)	2006	Member
Greater Arab Free Trade Area (GAFTA)	2005	Member

²¹⁴ Working party established on 27 Jul 2004 but has not yet met.

ANNEX III: CATEGORIES OF PEACEBUILDING EXPENDITURES²¹⁵

	Domain	Category Description
Core peacebuilding	Basic safety and security	Security system management and reform
		Reintegration and Small arms and light weapons (SALW) control
		Removal of land mines and explosive remnants of war
		Child soldiers (prevention and demobilization)
		Participation in international peacekeeping operations
Secondary Peacebuilding	Inclusive political processes	Civilian peacebuilding, conflict prevention and resolution
		Legal and judicial development
		Legislatures and political parties
		Anti-corruption organisations and institutions
		Democratic participation and civil society
		Media and free flow of information
		Human rights
		Women's equality organisations and institutions
	Core government functions	Public sector policy and administrative management
		Public finance management
		Decentralisation and support to subnational government

²¹⁵ Adapted from OECD. 2018. States of Fragility 2018. p. 149.

ANNEX IV: SECTORAL BREAKDOWN OF ODA TO LIBYA, 2017-2021

	2017	2018	2019	2020 (est)	2021 (est)
Basic Safety and security	14.53	39.66	10.54	29.82	0.37
Child soldiers (prevention and demobilisation)			0.05		
International peacekeeping operations	0.31	1.46	0.21		
Reintegration and SALW control	0.25	0.61			
Removal of land mines and ERW	11.25	19.04	8.77	3.16	0.22
Security system management and reform	2.72	18.55	1.52	26.66	0.16
Core government functions	38.16	26.38	23.47	50.35	10.25
Local governance	5.83	9.72	4.53	38.42	8.32
Other	0.06	0.07	0.04		
PFM / DRM	2.12	8.01	12.38	9.75	1.05
Public admin / CSR	30.15	8.58	6.52	2.19	0.88
Economic growth	8.58	6.33	9.34	4.84	15.29
Agriculture / Livestock			0.00		0.70
Communications	1.99	0.03	0.00		
Employment creation	0.86	0.11	1.56	4.24	13.89
Energy	0.31	0.08	0.28	0.60	
Financial sector development	4.80	0.04	0.72		
Industry, Mining, construction					
Private sector development	0.62	6.07	6.79		0.70
Transport & Storage					
Emergency Response	117.77	106.30	100.12	207.30	150.50
Administrative costs of donors	2.17	4.76	11.04		
Emergency food assistance	11.35	8.50	14.75	7.20	15.70
Immediate post-emergency reconstruction and rehabilitation	9.31	23.13	7.15		
Material relief assistance and services	75.49	44.40	46.87	191.20	124.30
Multi-hazard response preparedness		2.06	2.27		
Refugees / asylum seekers in donor countries	0.35	0.98	0.61		
Relief co-ordination and support services	19.10	22.47	17.44	8.90	10.50
Inclusive political processes	231.34	75.54	117.97	64.79	53.73
Anti-corruption					
Civilian peacebuilding, conflict prevention and resolution	191.66	47.71	85.10	46.83	29.66
Democratic participation / civil society	11.87	10.72	11.56	9.08	14.50
Elections	7.97	6.87	10.73	6.28	9.30
Governance - other ²¹⁶	1.25	0.04	3.32		
Human rights ²¹⁷	13.07	5.72	2.04	2.23	0.26
Justice / rule of law	2.29	4.43	2.74	0.37	
Media / free press	3.23	0.06	2.48		
Other	4.49	4.32	2.42		
Commodity aid / general programme assistance	0.02	1.16	0.01		
Mult-sector / cross-cutting	4.47	3.16	2.41		
Restoration of Basic Services	23.35	38.31	30.45	77.16	116.39
Education	8.56	10.43	10.19	3.94	
Health	10.66	25.95	8.16	43.27	6.69
Facilitation of orderly, safe, regular and responsible migration and mobility	0.12	0.94	10.30	29.70	109.00
Other	0.22	0.38			
Social protection	1.49	0.32		0.25	
Water & Sanitation	2.29	0.28	1.79		0.70
Sector not specified	5.01	0.32	0.81	0.41	0.41
Sector not specified	5.01	0.32	0.81	0.41	0.41
Total	443.22	297.16	295.12	434.67	346.93

²¹⁶ Includes support for legislatures and political parties and anti-corruption organisations and institutions.

²¹⁷ Support for women's rights, organizations, and movements and the Elimination of Violence Against Women has been merged with human rights.

ANNEX V: CCA METHODOLOGY

The CCA development process was undertaken under the oversight and authority of the Assistant Secretary-General, UN Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator (ASG-RC/HC) and the UN Country Team (UNCT), in close consultations with UNSMIL and the Humanitarian Country Team (HCT). On behalf of the ASG-RC/HC and the UNCT, the RCO facilitated the CCA process on a day-to-day basis, in coordination with the Programme Management Team (PMT).

As per DCO guidance, the analytical component of the CCA was primarily undertaken by the UN system in the country to ensure ownership of the process and the institutionalization of the knowledge and analysis emanating from the exercise. Overall process was coordinated by the RCO and a dedicated consultant, including drafting and editing of the CCA.

Several technical working groups were established drawing on expertise across the UN system in Libya including non-resident entities which were structured around the “five Ps” of sustainable development, namely: 1) People; 2) Prosperity; 3) Planet; 4) Peace; and 5) Partnerships.

The composition of these groups was determined by the respective mandates and scope of work of UN entities. Membership of these working groups were drawn from the different humanitarian-development-peace pillars or mandates of the UN system to ensure that the triple nexus permeated all aspects of the CCA.

Context related sections of the CCA drew from a multitude of internal and published literature and resources including, but not limited to: UNSMIL reports, including the Secretary-General on the situation in Libya, for political, conflict and security analysis in the absence of a dedicated conflict analysis; UNSMIL Human Rights/OHCHR reports and data on human rights; the 2021 Humanitarian Needs Overview/Humanitarian Response Plan and additional humanitarian information such as the ongoing Multi-Sectoral Needs Assessment by OCHA; World Bank’s Libya Economic Monitor and UNSMIL Economic Unit’s analysis on recent macro-economic developments; the 2019 UN-European Union-World Bank Supporting Peace and Stability in Libya; the UN Socio-Economic Framework in the Response to COVID-19 in Libya; and other sectoral analysis produced by the UN agencies and external entities.

As a substantial component of the CCA is the analysis on Libya’s progress against the SDGs and their respective targets, the technical working groups undertook a mapping of SDG specific data against the global SDG indicator framework, noting gaps and identifying proxy data as a necessary. Data was drawn from various sources including the Libya’s 2020 Voluntary National Review and other global platforms such as the UN Stats, the World Bank’s World Development Indicators, and where relevant, UN agency global sectoral leads on specific SDGs. Data was also gathered from the national counterparts as well as from UN agencies in country. On behalf of the UNCT, the PMT provided inputs and feedback on successive drafts/sections of the CCA to ensure timely review in close cooperation with UNSMIL and HCT.

donor community, the World Bank and African Development Bank, various national NGOs and CSOs, government institutions and ministries (including the Office of the Prime Minister), the National Oil Corporation, and General Federation for Chambers of Commerce, amongst others.

The CCA was validated and endorsed by the UNCT and UNSMIL, with representation from the Libyan Government of National Unity, at a workshop held in Tunis, Tunisia from 29 November – 1 December 2021.

Various stakeholders were consulted during the CCA process including the international humanitarian and development

